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INTRODUCTION 
The recent widespread development of interest by 
employers, employees, and the general public in executive 
compensation plans has led to the preparation of this study. 
1. Purpose of The Study 
The purpose of this study is to present in an inte-
grated manner the general problems involved in the compen-
sation of top corporation executives, and, in more detail, to 
present and discuss the pros and cons of various methods which 
have been devised to compensate these top executives in a fair 
and yet most economical manner. It is hoped that the author 
has been successful in presenting here factual material and 
significant ideas which will be helpful to the ·reader in 
planning an executive compensation system or merely in helping 
him to gain a more complete understanding of the problems in-
volved in compensating top executives as well as some of the 
more important presently devised ways of solving these 
problems. It is not the purpose of this study to develop a 
theory or a philosophy about executive compensation. 
10 
2. Scope of The Study 
In the earliest section an attempt has been made to 
give meaning to the term "executive" and to narrow its defi-
nition to a point which will make the term useful and somewhat 
more precise. This has been done in order that there be a 
common understanding between the reader and the author 
throughout the rest of this study as to the meaning of the 
word. This study deals primarily with "top 11 executives and, 
even more precisely, with ntop" executives in large corpo-
rations. 
Analysis shows that companies with 20,000 or more 
employees generally need one policy making executive per 1,000 
employees*. Thus, a company with 25,000 employees will have 
approximately 25 in its top management group, while a company 
with 200,000 employees will have 200. This 0.1 per cent of 
the total employees is the group which shall be referred to 
as top executives for the purposes of this study and will in-
clude upper level executives; i.e., presidents, vice presi-
dents, division managers, etc. 
The scope of this study is fragmentary in the sense 
that the entire field of corporate executive payments by size 
of company and by industry has not been covered. One of the 
early results was a clear indication that the size of the 
~57, p. 106. 
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company, as well as the industry, affected compensation 
practices and policies. In this study, however, only large 
companies are examined; the practices and policies of smaller 
companies remain to be analyzed. In like manner, the execu-
tive compensation policies of only a few industries have been 
touched upon here. 
3. Determining Executive Worth 
The second area with which this study concerns 
itself is the problems involved in top executive compensation 
determination. Several systems are suggested here for 
planning salary levels and determining the worth of various 
top level executives as well as establishing logical relation-
ships in payments to executives within a particular company . 
This has been done in order to serve as a basis for de-
termining fair executive's compensation before proceeding on 
to the various methods of paying this compensation. 
4 . Various Pay Plans 
In the presentation of the different top executive 
pay plans which are discussed here, it has been necessary in 
the interest of brevity to omit historical background which, 
in the case of some plans, such as pension trusts, goes back 
to the nineteenth century. Likewise, some of the steps that 
would have been included in a full and logical development 
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of each phase of the technical requirements of each plan have 
been here omitted. It is hoped, however, that the clarity of 
this summary has not unduly suffered and that it may be of 
practical assistance to those interested in the subject. 
5. Income Tax Considerations 
As will be later explained, income taxes play a 
very significant role in executive compensation plans. Income 
taxes have been a nagging problem for the relatively highly 
paid executive ever since Congress adopted the progressive 
income tax over forty years ago. However, it took the tax 
increases occasioned by World War II and, to a lesser extent, 
by the subsequent Korean War, to fully awaken company direct-
ors and top managements to the importance of the tax factor 
as an element in establishing realistic executive compen-
sation. 
6. Studies Done by Others 
There have been many studies done in the area of 
executive compensation. Some of the best of which are Compen-
sating the Corporate Executive, by George Thomas Washington 
and Henry V. Rothchild; Executive Pay Plans, by William J. 
Casey and J. K. Lasser; and several studies made by the 
National Industrial Conference Board. However, with tax laws 
almost constantly in the process of change and with new types 
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of executive pay plans frequently being devised as well as 
old ones being modified, executive compensation appears to be 
such a dynamic field that continuous study is needed to keep 
abreast of changes and new innovations. 
7 . Significance of the Study 
Federal taxation and inflation in the United States 
during the past seventeen years have drastically cut the 
purchasing power of executive compensation after taxes. Many 
people view the current situation with little concern for 
they feel that financial incentives now offered executives are 
sufficient. It is difficult, however, to attract and hold the 
best executives as the size and nature of an enterprize 
increases. Many capable executives are going in business for 
themselves. Many others are refusing promotions to positions 
of higher responsibility which cannot offer them much ad-
ditional compensation. Others plan to retire early just when 
their combination of business knowledge and experience is at 
a peak. It is important, therefore, that the modern corpo-
ration find ways of compensating its top men adequately and 
yet within the economic limits of the company, for if it 
fails to do this it may soon find that its top management men 
have been lured away by more appealing offers and that it is 
without a source of qualified men from which to draw future 
leaders of the company. 
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I. WHAT IS AN EXECUTIVE? 
Programs for the organized selection,training, and · 
development of executives have been adopted only in the 
recent few years, yet the "executive" has been with us for 
some time. Certainly the building of the Great Pyramid over 
6,000 years ago required not ·only the equivalent of a vice 
president in charge of purchasing, but also a counterpart of 
a vice president in charge of manufacturing, a vice president 
in charge of transportation, and a vice president in charge 
of engineering. Below that line of vice presidents there 
must have been scores of foremen, below that, thousands of 
workers, and at the very top there must have been one able 
chief executive. 
The American executive of today is a familiar 
figure; he is, typically, decisive, somewhat aloof, and 
generally regarded by his employees with a certain awe. 
This, then, might give us a starting point in defining an 
executive. However, United States executives themselves 
have not yet come to agree on exactly what the word 
11 executive" means. Someday a definitive answer may be 
produced, but it will have to come out of a minute study 
of what it is that executives actually do, day by day, and 
hour by hour. So far, there has been little research of this 
kind into American management. 
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Even within the ranks of management the question 
of what is an executive is grotesquely confused. A corpo-
ration may include on the "executive payroll" anyone earning 
a salary as low as $10,000 a year, yet usually only a few 
top ranking personnel are admitted to the "executive dining 
room", and fewer still are invited to the councils of the 
"executive committee". On the other hand, many corporation 
presidents hold that all men in management are executives, 
and by management they mean everybody who supervises the 
work of others, right down to the f oremen in the shop. 
Fortune magazine recently asked a large group of 
top ranking executives to define what they meant by an 
executive*. Out of ninety-nine definitions offered, no two 
were alike; yet, out of the total mixture of executive 
functions ·that were described or implied, there emerged this 
composite self-portrait: 
"An American executive is a person paid for a full 
time job in which he: (1) directly helps to set his 
company's objectives and over-all policies; (2) is 
required to make or approve decisions that signifi-
cantly affect profits and future plans; (3) coordi-
nates several major corporate functions or those of 
a major division or department; (4) maintains and 
*63,,pp. 107-108. 
16 
develops an organization of trained subordinates to 
achieve the company's objectives; and (5) delegates 
responsibility and authority to the organization, 
and controls performance and results through at 
least one level of supervision . " 
As Harry J . . Loynd, president of . Parke, Davis & 
Company, has said, 
"One would not expect to find t he manager of the 
corner store referred to as an "executive" even 
though for that particular small enterprise he 
performs all the executive responsibilities which 
are required. Probably the term executive is most 
applicable and understood for business enterprises 
of medium, say 1,000 employees , : up t o the largest."* 
Probably the most brief definition of an executive 
has been given by Trans World -Airlines' President Ralph 
Dannon, who said that an executive is "a man who can select, 
train, and lead others as a team to a successful objective. 11 ** 
The question of what changes a man into an execu-
tive, and when, can never be fully answered. But there does 
seem to be a fork in the road, a subtle shift in a man's 
attitude toward work and its costs, and it is when this 
* 63, p. 228. 
**63, p. 108. 
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subject change takes place that , it is believed, he really · 
becomes an executive. 
But before proceeding with the question of how 
best to compensate top executives , it seems logical that we 
should first have clear in our own minds exactly what is a 
top executive. How does he live? What work does he do? 
~~ere does he come from? What is his background? What are 
his characteristics? And, ultimately, how much is he worth? 
For if we do not have some understanding of what top execu-
tives are, we can never hope to understand the complex 
problems involved in compensating them fairly. 
A. The Modern Executive 
1. Description of the Modern Executive 
Tne modern executive neither looks nor acts like 
his predecessors of 100 years ago. He is no colorful "robber 
baron" but a quiet, bespectacled, administrator. As Mr. 
Greenewalt, President of Du Pont, has pointed out,* 
"In the stuff of which heroes are fashioned, the 
executive is well down the list. He is less romantic 
than the pirate or the cowboy ...... he is less spect-
acular than the soldier and less portentous than the 
statesman. There is apparently nothing in the 
*15, p.39. 
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double-breasted pin-stripe nearly so inviting to 
the chronicles of history as epaulets or the cutaway. 11 
The modern executive may not even be a capitalist 
in the sense that his personal investments are a major 
source of income. The modern executive, having matured in 
a period of a constant trend toward 11 big government 11 , is 
not even a rugged individualist, as that phrase was used 
a short time ago. The average top executive is an intelli-
gent , firm, frank, serious, conscientious, tranquil, tolerant 
worker who identifies himself so completely with his work 
that he has little time to· pursue the persuasive and literary 
activities which are his major outside interests.* 
2. Life of the Modern Executive 
The successful average American executive gets up 
ea rly - -about 7:00A.M. -- eats a large breakfast, and 
rushes to his office by train or automobile. It is not 
unusual for him, after spending from 9 : 00 A.M. to 6:00 P. M. 
in his office, to hurry home, eat dinner, and crawl into 
bed with a briefcase full of homework. He is constantly 
pressed for time, and a great deal of the time he spends in 
his office is extraneous to his business . He gets himself 
involved in all kinds of community work either because he 
*15, pp. 39-40 . 
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wants to or because he feels he has to for the sake of 
public relations. 
If he is a top executive, he lives on an economic 
scale ·not too different from that of the man on the next 
lower income rung. He surrenders around 40 per cent of his 
salary to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (he may give up as 
much as 75 per cent), but still manages to put a little of 
his income iri stocks, bonds, and life insurance. What time 
he has left from his work -- on weekends and brief vacations -
he spends exercising, preferably outdoors, and usually at 
golf. Next to golf, fishing is the most popular executive 
diversion. 
He spends almost no time on politics. He enter-
tains often because he must (i.e., for business reasons or 
on account of his wife), and under much the same compulsion 
he attends cultured events. He does little reading outside 
of newspapers, newsmagazines, reports, and trade papers. He 
drinks, if he drinks at all, modestly and on a schedule. 
Alcoholism, it is clear, does not go with success.* 
Executives are well aware that the absorption by 
their work means less time with their wives and children. 
Younger executives, in particular, accuse themselves; they 
are not, they say, the fathers they should be, and they often 
*56, p. 78. 
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mention some long-planned project to do something with their 
sons, like building a boat. But they add ruefully, they 
never will. 
Now that "committee management 11 has become so much 
the rule, the average executive spends roughly six of his 
eight office hours talking with other executives in meetings 
and conferences, and he would be considered strange indeed 
if he went out to lunch by himself. The other two hours are 
not spent in solitary contemplation; they are no more than 
the sum of a few minutes here and there between meetings and 
the ringing of the telephone. The executiVe, as one puts it, 
is never alone, never physically , at any rate. In many 
instances the team play has grown so frantic that executives 
look on the office day as something of an interruption in 
their actual work. This not only explains the amount of 
after-hours work, it also explains the tendency of man,y 
executives to get to work in the morning earlier then 
anyone else.* 
In most places the average executive office week 
runs between forty-five and forty-eight hours. Most execu-
tives arrive at the office between 8:00 and 9:00A.M. and 
leave about 5:30 or 6:00P.M. At this point the executive 
is past the half-way mark; the work night has begun. On 
*65, p. 109. 
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the average, he will work four nights out of five. One 
night he will be engaged in business entertaining -- more, 
probably, if he is the president . Another night he will 
probably spend at the office or in a lengthy conference 
somewhere else. On two other nights he goes home, not to a 
sanctuary so much as to a branch office. Only a minority of 
executives have equipped their dens with dictating machines, 
calculators and such, but the majority devote at least i two 
nights a week to business reading.* 
Putting all the commitments together, we ·get a 
work week something like this; forty-five to forty-eight 
hours of daytime work, one night working late at the office, 
two nights working at home, one night entertaining -- all in 
all, some fifty-seven to sixty hours. And this evidently is 
a minimum; come convention time, a trip, a company emergency, 
and the week can easily go to seventy or eighty hours. 
Public pronouncements of many corporations suggest 
that they fear this kind of speed-up will debilitate their 
executives. In practice, ho~ever, the corporation does about 
everything it can to encourage the speed-up. One company, 
for example, nas a pool of dictaphones to loan to its 
executives.* 
*65, p. 109. 
**65, p. 111. 
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a. Executive Hobbies 
When it comes to hobbies, even here the executive 
applies the yardstick of business relevance. While some 
executives are genuinely absorbed in a hobby for the sheer 
creative enjoyment, for a large number the pursuit carries 
strong therapeutic overtones. For them the hobby is not a 
joy in itself but simply a means of restoring themselves 
between rounds. To this end some executives go through an 
almost compulsive ritual -- like watering the flowers at 
a regular weekend time whether or not it has just rained.* 
b. Social Contributions 
Today the spcial implications of executive work 
have so changed that no longer can such men think of busi-
ness chiefly as corporate profits. They must consider their 
decisions in terms of social well-being as well as in terms 
of dividends and personal financial rewards. 
As Sidney Swensrud, President of Gulf Oil, has 
said, "The men who come into management must understand the 
whole sweep of modern economic, political, and social life."** 
But, rightly or wrongly, most executives consider 
civic work a diffusion of their energies, and only when 
*65, p. 150. 
**1, p. 254. 
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they see a clear relation between civic work and their careers 
do they perform it with enthusiasm . Significantly, the 
businessmen who plunge into civic work with great gusto are 
usually the bankers, merchants, and others for whom it is 
virtually part of their jobs. Many high-ranking executives 
in business corporations do realize that extracurricular 
activities, · such as membership on boards of directors and 
service with .business associations and with civic and phil-
anthropic groups, constitute an integral part of their jobs. 
Recognition of these activities emphas i zes the fact that a 
business concern is a social enterprise with far reaching 
ramifications. 
As so aptly put by Charles C. Abbott, dean of the 
new graduate school of business administration at the Univer-
sity of Virginia, 
"(The modern top executive) .... must be able to keep 
his expensive physicists and engineers busy, juggle 
automation and union negotiations, f i nd new plant sites 
and keep production going during the relocation period, 
find new products, be charming to his stockholders and 
government, and put the Community Chest fund over the 
top, all at the same time."* 
*86, p. 34. 
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B. Top Executive Worries 
For the top executive, the balanced life is as 
elusive as ever, possibly even more so. He faces something 
of a dilemma. If there is one thing that characterizes a 
successful executive, it is a keen sense of self -- a 
desire to control one's environment rather than be controlled 
by it . 
A president doesn't usually worry too much about 
the things that most people expect to bother him. For 
example, he seldom lies awake very long thinking about fi-
nances or lawsuits or sales or production or engineering or 
accounting problems. He is pretty well able to take care of 
those during regular business hours. Furthermore, when he 
approaches such problems, the president can bring to bear on 
them all the energy and the trained judgment and past ex-
perience of his whole organization. He has a lot of help 
with problems of that kind. 
There are other problems, however, that he has to 
sweat and struggle with, largely by himself. They are the 
problems he thinks about at night. They all arise out of 
one simple fact which can be summed up in one sentence. 
The biggest trouble with industry is that it is full of 
human beings. 
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· It is no great problem for the president fo find a 
man to run a section or a department where one line of work 
is followed. But to find a man who has wide enough knowledge 
and enough background of the right kind to run a whole group 
of things is a problem which causes many a corporation presi-
dent to toss in his sleep . The effects of the atomizing of 
labor are not limited to production employees alone, as 
management, too, has become extremely specialized. The 
specialization of management at all levels has lagged 
somewhat behind the specialization of equipment and employees, 
but it is following exactly the same course and giving rise 
to the same problems. 
Mr. J. L. Me Caffrey has said: 
11 The president is like a man confronted by an enormous 
tool bench who only hopes that he can pick the right 
screw-driver for a particular special job. There must 
be many (presidents) who sometimes wish for a good 
old-fashioned jackknife with twelve blades and a 
corkscrew that could handle almost any job in 
passable fashion. 11 * 
But to add to the problem still further, the chief 
executive must concern himself with how he can maintain the 
interest of and get full advantage from the specialists who 
are too specialized to promote. On the one hand, the company 
*55, p. 129. 
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absolutely requires the skills of these specialists in order 
to carry on its complicated operations. On the other hand , 
he has to get future management from somewhere and that 
somewhere has to be largely within the existing company, if 
he is to have any management mora l e at all. 
1. Normal Problems 
The burden of the daily drive is intensified for 
the executive because normally only the toughest problems 
com to him -- the ones that are referred to him by the 
board of dil"ectors and the ones which his subordinates do 
not feel authorized or qualified to decide. Many of these 
problems are of the type where there is little or no infor-
mation available to help in solving them. If a decision 
has to be made before adequate information can be gathered, 
it is likely to be the top executive who is asked to take 
the responsibility of making that decision.* 
The top executive operates in an environment 
abounding in uncertainties. He seldom can know for sure in 
advance what will be the reaction of employees, customers, 
investors, creditors, and others to any course of action 
which he has decided to follow. In many industries, techno-
logical changes are continually taking place and new eco-
nomic, political, and social developments arise with 
*5,p. 84. 
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perplexing frequency. Decisions often have to be reached 
before future trends can be fully evaluated. The wheels of 
business can seldom be stopped to await the gathering of 
more facts and the unfolding of new trends . 
If the corporation has a well-chosen board of 
directors, the board determines policies and gives counsel 
and advice to the chief executive. But the burdens of re-
sponsibility for putting the policies into effect and for 
attaining successful results rests heavily on the shoulders 
of the president. Mistakes inevitably occur, but his success 
is not measured by the infrequency with which he makes 
mistakes, but by the degree to which his sound decisions 
outweigh his faulty ones.* 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the task of 
making executive decisions in an environment so full of 
uncertainty and so fraught with actual or potential conflicts 
of interest places a burden on top executives which can only 
be borne successfully by men of good physical stamina and 
morale courage. 
2. Special Problems 
In addition to these normal pressures to which the 
executive is subjected, there are many special stresses 
*5, pp. 17-18. 
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peculiar to individual managements. Imagine, for example, 
the strain of working .for a certai n oil company which makes 
up a dossier for each management decision detailing who 
supported it and who opposed it and then checks back at the 
end of each year, when some of the results of the decision 
are apparent, to see who is going to be promoted or 
banished. Or consider what happens in a company that has 
gone through a complicated series. of mergers in the space of 
fi ve years. With each merger, all of management's 11 lines of 
force" are rearranged, new executives are brought in while 
old ones are displaced, some men are progressively down-
graded in relation to the top. An executive in his mid-
forties who previously had only three men between himself and 
his goal the vice presidency, -- now has more competition, 
and much less certainty of what he i s competing for. He is 
confronted by three alternatives: he can quit, something he 
has never thought of and is unprepared for; he can "play for 
retirement", i.e., give up, but still stay on the job; or he 
can completely overhaul his conception of himself and bid 
for a much bigger spot (for which he may not be equipped) in 
the b i gger company.* 
3. Loneliness of the Top Office 
As the executive climbs the ladder to the top of 
the "pyramid", his home life becomes shorter and in the 
*59, p. 110. 
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midst of the crowd at the office he will become more and 
more isolated -- no longer intimate with those he has passed, 
and not quite accepted by the elders he has joined. 
"The job of being president of a large, modern 
corporation is a lonely one." This is the answer most given 
by the men who hold these jobs , as set forth in a recent 
survey conducted by Business Week .* "You've got nobody to 
turn to to check your own judgment~; > said one president. 
Another explained that about forty per cent of his time was 
spent creating dignity and protecting the dignity of the 
first, second, and third level management team members. 
"You've got to be aggressive without being tyrannical.", 
said another.** 
Most every president, however, seems to accept the 
feeling of loneliness as part of the job. Occasionally one 
may ask himself, is it worth it all? By conceding the 
costs, he has already made the decision. This, he knows 
now, is how it has to be. He is an executive. 
4. Physical Stamina 
Sheer physical survival is a problem with many 
executives staying at the top and not breaking under the 
*49' p. 118. 
**25, p. 122. 
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strain. It is a medical f~ct tha t the life span of the 
average American business executive is at least six years 
shorter than that of his employees.* 
A detailed break-down of 3,000 executive medical 
examinations made by Life Extension Examiners in 1951 
revealed that 1,198 executives -- 39.9 per cent of those 
examined, had something wrong with them. The average age 
of these executives -- whose fields included insurance, 
retail sales, instalment banking, and manufacturing -- w~s 
43.8 years. Of the 1,198 who has some degree of ill health, 
450 had abnormal electrocardiograms, 280 had uncorrected 
poor vision, and 359 were affected by high blood pressure. 
In many instances, an executive had more than one ailment.** 
Doctor Johnson, who is Medical Director of Life 
Extension Examiners, says that most executives especially 
the younger ones who have yet to reach the top are 
"victims of themselves". Suddenly finding themselves shoved 
"upstairs" before they are ready for the responsibility, 
many are unable to stand the pressure but unwilling to "step 
down". As a result, they work harder and longer, orten 
bringing the office home in their briefcases, in order to 
keep up the required pace. 
*88, p. 27. 
** 80 J p. 143. 
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5. Motivation of Top Men 
There have beenmany varied reasons given by 
executives as to why they work so hard. In the end results, 
however, executive motivations are essentially what they 
have always been . The drives most often identified by 
executives, when attempting to justify the amount of work 
they do, are self-expression, a sense of contribution, 
responsibility, prestige, and fear of failure.* Even 
without going into detail on each of these drives, it is 
fairly obvious that they are basic human drives commonly 
felt by people in all types of work, and not particularly 
unique to the business executive. However, the executive, 
it appears, is particularly aware of these motivating 
forces, and is greatly affected by their influence in his 
day-to-day living. 
The material in the preceeding pages emphasizes 
that being a top executive is not an easy task. It requires 
vast amounts of effort, hard work, time, and training. Yet 
millions of Americans diligently aspire to the life of a 
top executive, coveting his opportunities for pleasure 
while, actually, they have only the faintest notion of what 
his life is really like, what he does when he goes home, or 
even the requirements which he must meet in order to hold 
his present position. 
*65, p. 111. 
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C. Top Executive Qualifications 
It may be rated a natural urge to want to be an 
executive. It makes one a boss; it gives him a title and 
some prestige tha~ goes with it; it adds to his income and 
puts money in his pocket. Too often, sadly enough, these 
things are all that stands behind the primary urge. People 
forget that if they want an increasing share in the success 
of a business, they must be prepared to assume an increasing 
part of its responsibilities . Many persons long to become 
top executives. For some reason or other, they all take it 
for granted they qualify for it. On the other hand, few of 
them have taken the trouble to analyze and observe the 
executive's job and provide the necessary qualifications 
fo r filling it properly. They do not give it any attention, 
like something entirely distinct from the business of work-
ing and the daily duties that go with whatever work is 
being done. They do not recognize the essential differences 
between doing and managing . They do not prepare for it 
while they will prepare for any other kind of professional 
or technical work. 
Much still remains to be known about the elusive 
qua li ties of leadership, but four common denominators seem 
to characterize almost every successful leader. These are: 
the ~bility to visualizei to organize, to deputize, and to 
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supervise. The capacity to do these is just rare enough to 
make it a very highly paid accomplishment. In fact, there 
is no label more valuable in business than to be known as a · 
good manager of any part of it. 
But more specifically, the question is, are there 
any dimensions of successful top management that can be 
identified and measured? Or, even more specifically, how 
do successful executives become what they are? Where do 
they come from? What kind of educations do they have? What 
are their particular abilities, interests, and personality 
characteristics? Let us consider each of these questions 
independently in order that we might arrive at some sort of 
composite picture of the successful top executive. 
1. What Makes Executives Successful? 
a. Administrative Ability 
American industry, in these days particularly, 
needs leaders skilled in the arts of administration. The 
social skills are necessary because industry no longer 
consists of only the technical skills of buying, making, and 
selling products. It includes, also, knowing how to live 
with people and convincing them the present economic system 
is best. In answer to the question -- are there specific 
things you have to know to be a top executive, the answers 
of a group of corporation presidents differed widely, but, 
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for the most part, they tended to de-emphasize technical 
knowledge.* They kept reiterati ng the idea that it is the 
organizing and lifting of people beyond themselves that 
counts. The main requirements, said one, "Is the ability 
to get the best of the sub-executives -- push them just a 
little further than they want to be pushed, without their 
knowing it." 
Crawford Greenewalt, President of Du Pont, has 
said that: 
"The basic requirement of executive capacity is the 
ability to create a harmonious whole out of what the 
academic world calls dissimilar disciplines. This is 
a fancy way of saying that an executive is good when 
he can make a smoothly functioning team out of people 
with many different skills required in the operation 
of a .modern business. His most important function is 
to reconcile, to coordinate, to compromise·, and to 
appraise the various viewpoints and talents under his 
direction to the end that each individual contributes 
his full measure to the business at hand. 
"Perhaps t_he best analogy to an executive's job is that 
of the symphony conductor under whose hand one hundred 
or so highly specialized and very different talents 
become a single effort of great effectiveness."** 
*49, p. 124. 
** 16 , p . --1 • 
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b. Sense of Timing 
Keen timing is a characteristic of outstanding 
top executives. In business management, maximun effective-
ness is attained when executive action is keenly timed.* 
The art of timing lies in an executive's ability to read the 
handwriting on the wall or to sense an impending change well 
in advance of the point where it mounts to full force. The 
executive who has such a knack usually enjoys a relatively 
long span within which to prepare for dealing with new 
situations while competitors who awaken belatedly to the 
problems must rush their preparations, often causing mistakes. 
The question of when to build a new plant often is 
a major problem in timing. Consideration must be given to 
potential sales, available labor supply, the raw material 
situation, the managerial crew, financial resources, and 
general business conditions. The latter of these often offers 
a particularly dangerous point to analyze, for if a new plant 
is built at about the peak of a boom period, it is likely to 
become a "white elephant" as business drops off. On the 
other hand, great courage is required to embark on the con-
struction of a new plant when business is slack and the 
outlook bleak, but such a move may be a most timely one. 
*5, p. 143. 
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Another example of timing may be drawn from th~ 
1920's. During this period General Motors was developing 
the Chevrolet car for the low-price field and adding style 
to its appearance. ·Mr. Ford persisted in manufacturing his 
standardized Model T. By making over a million cars a year 
of that one model, Mr. Ford kept his costs and his prices 
low. In 1927, however, Ford's sales dropped about 60 per 
cent and the sales of Chevrolets ran far ahead of those of 
Fords. Belatedly, Mr. Ford scrambled to put out a new model 
of more stylish appearance. His persistence in refusing to 
introduce new models until a drastic drop in sales forced 
such action enabled Chevrolet to become firmly established 
as a large-scale producer of low-priced cars. It also 
facilitated the entrance of other cars, such as Plymouth, 
into the market. Mr. Ford had a great genius for production 
but not for timing market trends.* 
2. Where do Top Men Come From? 
a. Shortage of Top Executives 
A study by McKinsey and Company, a management 
consulting firm, showed that the average company increased 
its payroll over fifty per cent between 1939 and 1950. 
One company lh four doubled the number of people employed 
during this period.** These facts, plus the constantly 
*5, p. 144. 
**22, p. 7. 
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expanding business since 1950, have developed an almost 
insatiable appetite for executive talent. Few needs are 
more acute than the need for executives, men who have' demon-
strated ability to adapt organizations to continued change. 
Many companies are looking f or presidents and are 
offering high opening bids. Several outfits in the $40 -
million to $45 million sales bracke t offered from $60,000 
to $125,000 in total remuneration, including pensions and 
stock options. In companies in the $90 million class, the 
offers went to $160,000 for a top man.* 
b. Where to Find Top Men 
But the big question of where to find top execu-
tives is not entirely without answer. In many cases it is 
found in the very company seeking such talent. A recent 
survey of 159 business leaders disclosed that 36 per cent 
had never worked for any other company and that, during 
their entire business life, 73 per cent had worked for only 
three companies or less.** 
There are essentially three ways in which a man 
can be acquired for a top position. 
*28, p. 114. 
**15, p. 13. 
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The ~irst is the "Horatio Alger" method in which 
a young man starts as office boy and works up. This has 
been so much the most common method in the past that it has 
been said of many organizations that, "when the president 
dies, they hire a new office boy and raise each employee 
one step."* 
The second method is for the company to go out and 
hire a young man for the particular purpose of training him 
to become a potential executive. This i s now being done by 
many progressive managements in many large American corpo-
rations. 
Thirdly, top executives may be brought in from the 
outside to replace retiring or deceased managers. Although 
many companies frown -on this as a bad practice, claiming it 
destroys executive morale, other boards of directors realize 
the value of skilled managers and are dissatisfied with the 
men who have crept along through jobs in the company without 
the necessary vision to prepare themselves for real responsi-
bilities. However, finding competent men in the business 
world who are willing to fill a vacancy in the top management 
of a company is often a most difficult chore. Experienced 
business and financial men say that it is much easier to 
raise a million dollars than it is to find a man, or men, who 
are capable of administrating it satisfactorily while it is 
*15, p. 14'". 
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at work. Business and credit reports show that the average 
life of a business is very short -- ten years or less. .They 
also show the specific reason for 35 per cent of business 
failures as bad management. Others argue that the ·figure is 
really 100 per cent.* 
c. The Long Road Up 
In June, 1956, Business Week completed a survey of 1 
the presidents of the nation~ 500 leading corporations.** 
From this survey the ambitious businessman can get some idea 
of what chance he has of climbing to the top and, roughly, 
how long it will take him to get there. 
About 85 per cent of the presiqents then in office 
were more than fifty years old. Two hundred and eighty of 
the five hundred presidents interviewed had one or more 
college degrees and eighty nine others had spent some time 
in college. 
Although these presidents had reached the top by 
different routes., including marketing, finance, production, 
and general management, the latter seemed to offer a slightly 
better chance, with 31.4 per cent of the presidents taking 
this way as compared to 25.6 per cent for production, 23.6 
per cent for marketing, and 19.4 per cent for finance.*** 
*11, p. 2. 
**25, p. 110. 
***25, p. 111. 
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The last twenty year's figures, however, showed that just 
about the same number came from general management or pro-
duction as from marketing and finance. 
The number of lawyers coming to the top has also 
been decreasing. The old-school enterprisers who started 
many of our major companies kept their affairs so secreted 
that when they died, only their lawyers knew what had been 
going on in the companies. Therefore, many such lawyers 
gravitated into top management • . The greater openness with 
which business is now conducted means that all . competent 
executives have a nearly equal chance at the presidency. 
Presidents are not, contrary to .what many people 
believe, born overnight. Even sensational successes have 
taken many years to arrive at their goals. Harlow Curtice, 
President of General Motors, had a comparatively meteoric 
career in the booming auto industry. He rose from book-
keeper to president of General Motors' A. c. Spark Plug 
Company in fifteen years and was elected president of Buick 
four years later. William Balderson, former president of 
Philco, took eighteen years to work up from a division 
manager.* '·: 
The Business Week survey showed, too, that however 
hard men work to reach the office of president, few are likely 
*53, p. 114. 
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to remain there long. Of the 500 companies surveyed, 458 
changed presidents in the past ten years, more than half of 
these since 1950. Some presidents who have held their jobs 
for an unusually long time -- more than twenty-five years --
have done so more by family or company tradition and stock 
ownership than by ability alone. However, nepotism and 
rights of ownership have been playing constantly smaller 
parts in the selection of presidents. In another survey of 
204 presidents, 196 were ·"professional" managers; only 6 were 
owners, partners, or sons of partners.* 
Only 5 of the 458 presidents were under forty, and 
there were none under thirty-five years of age. Twenty~four 
of the men were in their seventies, and, altogether, there 
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were 78 who were sixty-five OF over. It is believed that this 
latter group would have been larger than the seventeen per cent 
which it represents if it had not been for compulsory retirement 
plans, attractive pension plans, and other company benefits now 
being offered to retiring top executives. 
3. Educational Qualifications 
a. College Degrees 
In a recent study of thirty-three top executives 
conducted by- Doctor Robert M. Wald and Roy A. Doty, it was 
found that twe-thirds of the group were college graduates; 
*66, p. 45. 
"a very high figure, considering that only one - fourth of one 
per cent of the total population of this country was even 
enrolled in college thirty years ago" when these executives 
were of college age.* Of the eleven executives who didn't 
receive college degrees, all but two took business and 
accounting courses in business col l eges, trade schools, 
correspondence schools, or the evening divisions of univer-
sities. Also, age seemed to make no difference; those in 
their late fifties and sixties had enjoyed as good educations 
as those in their forties. 
Sears, Roebuck and Company would bear out these 
facts, for while Sears concluded that college degrees, as 
such, do not necessarily contribute to the rate at which 
people move ahead to the store manager level, there is a 
definite trend in Sears (and probably elsewhere) for college 
men to predominate at the higher executive levels.** The 
extent of this trend is indicated by the Report of the 
Commission of Human Resources and Advanced Training which 
states that in 1953, of 1,372,000 professional level workers 
in business and commerce, 741,000, or 54 per cent, were 
college graduates.*** 
*73, p. 47. 
** 15, p. 13. 
*** 15, p. 13. 
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b. Types of Degrees 
The odds improve somewhat for the top job aspirant 
if he has a technical degree. The largest group of presi-
dents in the previously mentioned Business Week survey had 
Bachelor of Science degrees -- almost 22.3 per cent.* , This 
is probably true because many manufacturing concerns feel, 
when they hire young college graduates, that the specialist 
is immediately more useful to them than the general man and, 
at the same time, has equal ability to advance rapidly 
through the beginner's jobs to management levels. 
This preference for specialists over the more 
generally educated "liberal arts 11 man is very pronounced, if 
the experience at Yale Univer,si ty is typical. In 1950, only 
18 out of 66 corporation job interviewers who visited Yale 
were even interested in talking to liberal arts graduates; 
in 1951, only 15 out of 91; and in 1952, only 16 out of 117. 
At John Hopkins University, in 1953, only 16 out of 200 
scouts had any interest in the liberal arts man, as compared 
to the engineer, the chemist, and other specialists.** 
Many manufacturing and merchandising companies 
have been advocating employing the more generally educated 
graduate, but there are many more advocates than actual 
*25' p. 111. 
** 58, p. 113. 
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employment. Although many board chairmen and company presi-
dents are making an increasing number of convocation speeches 
about the need for broadly educated men and their feelings 
about the narrow specialization of many middle management 
executives; yet, the talent scouts of many of these same 
corporations come to the campus each spring to recruit 
management trainees who are specifically grounded in the 
methods and techniques of accounting, engineering, market 
research, and the like; they .are not in the market for 
broadly educated college graduates. Apparently they are 
under orders to hire graduates who can immediately sit down 
at a desk and start producing.* 
c. Industry by Industry 
Industry by industry, it would appear that the 
machinery companies have the best educated leaders, with 83 
per cent of their presidents having college degrees. The 
petroleum industry is next with 87 per cent; pharmaceuticals 
follow with' 67 per cent; and then chemicals and food with 66 
per cent. At the ·bottom of the list is the printing and 
publishing industry with 33 per cent.** 
*15' p' 14. 
**25, p_. 116. 
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d. Choosing Potential Executives 
If you are choosing a young man with the poten-
tialities to develop into a future top executive, there may 
be certain characteristics which are measurable even at the 
college age; Doctor Wald 's executive analysis previously 
mentioned indicated that, in the group studied, the subsequent 
characteristics of intellectual ability and skill -inhuman 
relations had, at the college age, been evidenced by:# 
(1) a scholastic average of "B", or better, 
(2) a background of a happy, upper middle-class 
home in a city, 
(3) participation in at least one arid, in most 
instances, several extracurricular 
activities. 
Several findings also stbod out as noteworthy among 
the academic experiences -of the group members in high school { 
The subjects in which most of the group performed best and 
which they liked best were mathematics and history, followed 
by english and science. Mathematics was mentioned as the 
most helpful subject in rising to and succeeding in an 
executive position; english followed close behind * 
# For an insight into the difficulties of measuring such 
criteria, see "Conference on Non-Intellective Determinants 
of Achievement", Items, June, 1953, Social Science Research 
Council, page 13, F.F. 
*73, p. 47. 
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4. Abilities, Interests and Personalities 
Undoubtedly the single, most important qualifica-
tion for a chief executive is knowledge of the business, 
but, as we are more concerned with the characteristics that 
enable a man to achieve such a position, let us consider 
the several recent studies ·Of this subject. 
Perhaps the best evidence of what we - want is to be 
found by analyzing the characteristics of those men who have 
already become successful executives. Such a study has 
recently been made and published in the Harvard Business 
Review . * The composite description of some 33 top executives 
who were analyzed in terms of intell i gence, interests, and 
personality characteristics (measured in percentiles of 
average men and compared to similar studies of some 380 
foremen) showed that the outstanding characteristics of the 
successful executives are intellectual ability, tranquility,# 
firmness, frankness, seriousness, and tolerance• ·. (See chart 
on page 48.) 
*73, p. 47. 
· #While 11 tranquil" in the sense of being less irritable than 
most employees, they were not markedly more stable or con-
fidentj .indeed, this study developed what others had guessed 
at, that there is some evidence that executives were more 
motivated to success by a need for achievement and a fear 
of failure. 
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Chart I. 
INTELLECTUAL ABILITY, 
PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS, AND INTERESTS 
OF 33 TOP - LEVEL EXECUTIVES 
(mean percentile scores) 
measure 
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Source: Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1954, p. 47. 
In another study of some 204 company presidents 
recently reported in the Harvard Business Review, much the 
same qualities were noted, but with slightly different termi-
nology; thus, _ firmness was designated "moral courage"; 
frankness was referred to as "motives which were trusted"; 
tranquility was described as "rational optimism", and toler-
ance as "an affirmative attitude toward people".* 
In the study of 33 top executives mentioned above, 
it was found that the entire group possessed high moral and 
religious standards. Every one of them was brought up with 
church training; over two-thirds were continuing as active 
church members of established churches; and over nine-tenths 
expressed belief in a supreme being and in the concept of 
religion as a positive force essential to properly conducted 
business and world affairs. 
The group members, without exception, expressed 
that their homes and families constituted a great source of 
satisfaction to them, and many . looked forward to retirement 
so that they could enter into more family activities. Less 
than fifteen per cent had ever been separated from their 
wives or divorced.** 
*66, p. 45. 
**73, p. 51. 
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D. Evaluating Top Executives 
1. Ratio of Accomplishment Method 
An appropriate definition of an excellent manage-
ment team is one whose ratio of accomplishment ranks high in 
relation to its ratio of opportunity. There are many who 
·would say that net earnings on sales and capital employed is 
a sufficient index of management ability. This is not neces-
sarily so. For there are other equally significant factors 
which must be given consideration.* · 
In the past decade, Standard Oil Company of Cali-
fornia has increased its net earnings per share of commqn 
stock five-fold, while American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany has shown no such increase whatsoever. Both companies, 
however, have excellent managements . In fact, judging by 
management rating m~thods employed by the American Institute 
of Management, the difference in quality is comparatively 
negligible.** 
It follows, therefore, that accomplishment must be 
studied in the cold, grey light of opportunity. We can best 
appraise this interrelationship by studying the industry. 
concerned, both past and present, and by making allowances 
for other factors that are at least partially outside of 
*19, p. 2. 
**19, p. 3: 
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management's control. State and federal regulation of A. T. 
& T. operations, and those of its subsidi~ries, preclude 
earnings increases, even in periods of rising costs, such as 
we are currently experiencing. Public utilities can in-
crease earnings (dollar-wise) only when their requests for 
higher rates are granted by legally constituted commissions 
and administrative tribunals. 
2. "Piggy-Back Executives" 
There is, in management, a group of executives 
" known as "piggy-back executives". This group has neither 
the ability nor the qualifications to hold top level jobs, 
but they are, nevertheless, in such positions. 
An excellent example of this reached a climax 
during the Great Depression of the thirties, when a recently 
prosperous vice president of a bank turned up at a Long 
Island seashore, digging clams -- and for a living. After 
fifteen years, this individual had run into trouble. Unable 
to make the correct decisions, he had been turned out to 
shift for himself. The amazing thing about this story is 
that the man was actually a clam-digger -- he had merely 
reverted to type. 
A similar thing could happen today if we were to 
be suddenly hit by · a depression. Many executives now riding 
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"piggy-back 11 on their working associates have raised admin-
istrative costs to a high level. This is no doubt one of the 
reasons why governmental cost-plus-contracts allow but five 
per cent for administrative purposes. 
At a recent meeting of a group of middle manage-
ment executives whose salaries ranged from $12,000 to $18,000, 
less than ten per cent were either wil ling to accept, or 
willing to be trained to accept, the presidency of their 
respective companies. 'fhese men represented 125 companies in 
nearly 100 different industries.* The reasons given by the 
90 per cent of the group who declined the offer included; 
(1) 11 the company is too big and the president has to travel 
most of the time; (2) it would mean moving and having to 
separate the children from their schools and friends; (3) the 
additional income that would accrue to a president would be 
taxed away, anyhow." 
3. The Acid Test of Executive Competence 
The constant dilemma of the top executive· is how 
to make decisions which reflect wisdom and still make them 
promptly. 
Some very capable executives never become success-
ful simply because they adopt a judicial approach to difficult 
*19, p, 4. 
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problems, rather than a dynamic one. They concentrate so much 
on the one best way of doing a thing that they do nothing. 
Then there are some executives who fail because 
making up their minds is torture to them. They have a deep-
rooted fear which seems to enlarge as the time for making a 
tough decision approaches. When they finally are forced into 
making the decision, they seek instinctively to hedge the 
risk of failure by communicating their decision to their sub-
ordinates in such an equivocal manner that they can later 
claim they were correct, no matter what the outcome. 
The direct opposite of this group are the men who 
decide too quickly and taoeasily without having sufficient 
information on which to base their decisions. There is no 
self-satisfaction in the world like that of little men when 
they make breath-taking decisions with the utmost calm. All 
their associates can do is shudder and go quietly back to 
their desks, shaking their heads. 
In order to make a decision wisely, each phase of 
the problem must be explored so far as time permits. Each 
person with knowledge bearing on the problem should be heard, 
and all points, in so far as is possible, should be brought 
out and e~aluated. It is impossible to weigh the pro and con 
without finding out what they are. Then the time for reflec-
tion must be allowed. This is often quite difficult in our 
busy world of today.* 
*83, p. 569. 
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Reflection must not degenerate into weakness or 
cowardice. When the time is right, there is no way to decide 
but to decide. And, once decided, the question should stay 
that way, unless it may be shown that circumstances have 
changed or that new evidence has been discovered which was 
not previously taken into account. 
The executive who makes decisions in this manner 
is well on his way to becoming successful, because, after all, 
it is wise decision-making which distinguishes the able 
executive from the mediocre one. And it is wise decision-
making which projects the capable middle management man into 
the top position in his firm. Decision making is, then, truly 
the acid test of management. 
E. Summary 
Many people think that managing is a knack, that 
you are born with . it, that it is an accident of birth, like 
race or religion, that you have it or you do not. However, 
when we study those who succeed, we find that they have 
common qualities. These are attainable qualities, directly 
contributing to the necessary proficiency which they have 
acquired. Why, then, are some men successful top executives 
while their seeming counterparts never reach such heights? 
The answer is that the successful executive must be a builder 
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as well as doer. He must constantly think in terms of 
building; building morale, building a successful manage-
ment team, building sales and profits, building the company, 
and building himself. Merely doing his routine work is not 
enough. If he takes the responsibility, the issue is clear-
cut. He must add something to the situation that does not 
exist without him. If he . can do this, the company has the 
responsibility of rewarding him adequately. The amount and 
manner of the reward shall be discussed in the remainder of 
this report. 
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II. TOP EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION 
A. Executive Compensation in Gener al 
The size of the executive's salary has become a 
topic for widespread public discussion within the past fifty 
years. Back when most of America's businesses were operated 
by executives who were also the owners or dominant stock-
holders, there was little public concern over executive sal~ 
aries. Now, however, when most of our large corporations are 
widely owned and reinvestment of earnings does not provide 
an effective substitute for salary payments to executives, 
stockholders and the general public alike have joined in 
rather general condemnation of high executive salaries. 
Justification of these large amounts paid annually 
as executive salaries has b.een a constantly recurring problem. 
However, justification may simply be, paying the market rate 
for the required man. Since men with the necessary talents 
are scarce, the rate is high and the spread in such payments 
is wide. wny such men are so scarce has been previously 
considered. 
Fixing the market rate for executives , however, 
is most difficult. That some executives are paid too much 
is certarnly truej just as clearly, though, others are paid 
too little. No one should attempt to answer the question 
of how much an executive is worth or to try to justify execu-
tive salary payments without knowing the contributions made 
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by the individual executive. The inexperienced is liable to 
believe that any executive receiving a large salary is being 
overpaid. He may be. But how much would it be necessary to 
pay his successor? And who could forecast the possible sue-
cess of such a man? 
The question of the fair amount which executives 
should receive as salaries also leads to an examination of 
the duties and responsibilities of executives. These are 
extensive, and even a casual examination of management prob-
lems suggests that overpaying successful executives may be 
difficult. The qualities which they must posses, such as 
foresight, imagination, courage, decisiveness~ leadership, 
and other kindred virtues, are rare and command substantial 
reward.* 
A glance at aggregate compensation figures, unless 
they are related to the contributions which efficient manage-
ment makes in terms of increased sales, wages, profits, and 
dividends, may prove misleading. Actually, if all the sala-
ries paid to top executives were turned back, the amount each 
wage earner or stockholder would receive on the average would 
be equal to the price of a pack of cigarettes a week.** 
Within the range of their experience, most persons 
are satisified to regard income di fferentials as reasonable. 
*1, pp. 253-254. 
**8, p . 386. 
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It seems equitable that a foreman should get an appreciably 
higher wage than a machine operator, and a supervisor more 
than a foreman, but the same sense of equity does not extend 
to ranges of income far beyond their own. This is usually 
true because the going rates at higher levels are less defi-
nite, and the equivalence of service and compensation unfa-
miliar. A salary of, say, $300,000 is so remote from the 
average person that an effort is required to reason about it 
in the same terms as would apply to a salary of $5,000. 
The principles which should govern equitable pay-
ment f or services, however, are essentially the same at all 
levels. There should exist an equivalence of exchange between 
compensation and all the services, broadly described, that the 
recipient gives. 
On the plane of routine work, competition produces 
a highly typical going market rate for services. In such 
employments the statistical problem of assessment is the 
rather simple one of describing the average rate of pay. 
Any dispersion about the average may be presumed to register 
the difference between beginning rates and rates for experi-
enced workers, together with such variations, often geo-
graphical, as must always exist in an imperfect market. A 
particular executive's compensation that is above or below 
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the average for routine work may be readily tested against 
that for a similar job, since the work itself is measurable.* 
1. Importance of Fair Salaries 
One of the most critical problems in executive 
compensation is ensuring that adequate financial motivation 
is provided the executive group. A survey recently made by 
Me Kinsey and Company, a management consulting firm, indicated 
that policy-level executives of sixty-one large representative 
companies received barely one per cent of the total wage and 
salary outlay, and the entire executive group received only 
four per cent of the total payroll.** With success or failure 
in most companies dependent on this small group, it hardly 
seems prudent to underpay their efforts. 
Of importance, of course, is the fact that although 
the executive payroll is distributed to a relatively small 
group, it nevertheless affects many more employees. All 
employees are interested in how much the "boss" gets, and, if 
they feel this figure is too high, industrial unrest may 
result. 
Executive compensation is also, of course, of 
interest to the executives themselves, who, like the employees, 
are desirous of receiving as much reward as possible for their 
*3, p. 9. 
** 68, p. 87 ~ 
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services. But how much should an executive be paid for his 
services? It is easy to say that he should be paid what he 
is worth, but some violent arguments have raged as to whether 
or not an executive is worth a half- million dollars a year. 
One side argues that had it not been for the outstanding 
leadership of .the executive, that the company would not have 
been so successful; while the other side retorts that the 
same results could have been obtained with much less compen-
sation, and that executive talents are not so scarce that a 
few isolated individuals possess a monopoly. All this leads 
to the conclusion that great care must be used to set compen-
sation for top executives, since such decisions affect the 
attitudes of many others, in addition to the efficiency of 
the executives. Corporations cannot safely ignore the fact 
that the great majority of citizens in our democracy do not 
understand what executives do, and, as voters, are likely to 
echo the sentiment that "no man is worth $25,000 a year". 
It is interesting, although perhaps not enlighten-
ing, to note the contrast in public attitudes towards the 
salaries of highly paid moving-picture actors or radio enter-
tainers, and those of corporation executives, not that any 
valid comparison can be made between these two noncompeting 
groups, but it is interesting to note that the popularity 
of a moving-pictures star or a radio entertainer seems to 
be enhanced by publication of his almost fabulous income, 
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whereas news of the payment of a similar amount to a corpo-
ration executive would be likely to engender criticism. 
2. The Going Market Rate 
The traditional approach to attracting a scarce 
element in our economy is the offer of a higher price. 
Corporations must, of course, consider the "going market 
rate" when attempting to attract or hold top executive 
personnel.* What similar executives get in other . companies 
is often a key factor in determining how much an executive 
shall be paid. 
While it is usually true that a good manager can 
set his own price so far as salary is concerned, if he has 
I proven ability that he can earn it, . it is also true that 
there is a going price for the services of top men; that 
price is very largely -- far more than is generally be-
lieved -- dependent upon what others pay.** 
If executive morale is to be maintained at the 
highest level, salaries and earnings must be set with care-
ful consideration to the man himself, his capacity for future 
development, and the -relation of his and other executives 1 
contribution to the profits of the business, as well as to 
going market rates. This point, however, shall be discussed 
more fully at a later time. 
*72, p. 25. 
** 13, p. 4. 
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3. Evaluating Executives' Worth 
a. Need for a Formal Evaluation Plan 
Management has instituted series of intelligen~ 
controls over virtually every important operating phase of 
business except executive salaries. Budgets are prepared 
·for all sorts of expenditures, tieing their figures to sales 
forecasts and profits, yet motivation for executives is 
often overlooked and no such relationship to profits is made. 
Historical patterns often determine individual 
executive salaries rather than relating over-all executive 
compensation to the total company picture. Surveys have 
shown that executive salaries are related to the company's 
profit position only in that they are unlikely to be increased 
if profits are declining.* 
For example, during 1949 and 1950, net profits in-
creased thirty per cent, while corporate officers salaries 
increased only six per cent.** Primarily, this condition 
results from the fact that the average corporation does not 
have an organized salary program for its management. 
Without adequate controls, executive salaries tend 
to drift into a mire of inequities , both in terms of internal 
as well as external salary comparisons. 
*57, p. 106. 
**76, p. 622. 
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The widespread variation in degrees of authority 
and responsibility accounts for the lack of standardization 
in seemingly equal jobs in different companies. In one com-
pany an executive position may be merely clerical and detail 
in nature, while in another company the same titled position 
could be a highly responsible one. The degree of emphas i s 
given a particular function may vary greatly from company to 
company. Public relations, for example, may be a fulltime 
responsibility of a vice president in one company and merel~ 
a part-time publicity function adjunct to advertising in 
another.* 
The success of a business is obviously related to 
the quality of its management team; yet, no simple formula 
for determining the worth of top management has ever been 
developed. Proper compensation is significant to the con-
tinued growth of efficient business operations; still, no 
easy way is available to determine precisely how much a top 
executive is worth. 
The objectives of executive compensation· are actu-
ally no different from the objectives determining pay of 
other employees. These goals are, in general: to secure and 
keep an adeqva te supply of capable people, to reward them in 
* 12, p. 5. 
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accordance with the level of their job in the job structure, 
and to provide an incentive to produce in accordance with 
capabilities.* 
b. Job Evaluation Systems 
That "the man makes the job" has not been denied 
by those who advocate salary schedules, but they profess that 
it is still possible to establish pay ranges that will sharp-
en top management's judgment of executive rankings. 
There are at least five different job evaluation 
methods in which positions are graded primarily according to 
status on the company's organization chart; the classifica-
tion method in which the grading is done according to duties, 
working conditions, responsibilities, and authorities as set 
forth by job description and procedure manuals; the factor 
comparison and the point systems which measure jobs in terms 
of such requirements as experience, education, persuasive-
ness, ability, judgment, etc. (each factor may be rated 
superior, good, fair, etc., or each may be given point values); 
and finally, and most simple, the Basic Abilities System under 
''~hich each position is graded according to "semi~skills u 
(abilities and knowledge acquirable in less than six months) 
and "skills" (abilities and knowledge taking a year or more 
to acquire.) 
*2, p. 403. 
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Job evaluation for executive jobs has been employed 
in a growing number of organizations. Mr. Andrew R. Towl, an 
authority in the field, states that: 
"It is desirable to pay individuals on the basis of 
performance, but this does not remove the necessity 
of paying the job in line with its position in the 
structure. Only the development of job structures 
(through at least informal job evaluation) and 
pricing in accordance with these structures will 
maintain proper relationships between the pay for 
jobs."* 
Studies such as Towl's point to the necessity of 
maintaining such relationships if satisfaction and produc-
tivity of all employees are to be maintained. 
c . "Proportion-Management" Concept 
I 
An intriguing device for determining adequacy of 
executive salary levels is suggested by Patton in the Janu-
ary _, 1953 issue of Fortune magazine . ** Called the "pro-
portion-management" concept, it is based on his finding that 
in large companies top management comprises 0.1 per cent of 
the total employees and middle management, 0.9 per cent of 
the total. By comparing the proportion of total payroll -
*2, p. 391. 
**57, pp.~06-107. 
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paid _ to these groups in a given company to industry figures , 
it would be possible to determine adequacy of executive 
salary levels. Patton's test of the concept was worked out 
on data from thirty-seven companies employing 20,000 or more, 
and he found top management received 1.2_ per cent of payroll 
in 1950, as against 2.0 per cent in 1939. Although this 
study has not been extended to smaller organizations, it 
might be possible to collect industry data by company size 
to use as yardsticks. 
d. "Consistent-Percentage " Relationship 
Another useful tool in es t ablishing ~roper executive 
compensation levels is the consistent-percentage relationship 
existing between the compensation of the corporation's presi-
dent and some of its other major executives. A recent s tudy 
made by the American Management Association regarded the 
president's salary as 100 per cent and found that top finan-
cial offices consistently equaled 43 per cent of that figure, 
the treasurer's salary · 25 per cent of it, and the top adver-
tising executive 21 -per cent.* Using these relationships, 
after determining the level of the major executives' salary, 
a company can establish appropriate salary relationships for 
some of the other major executive positions. 
*76, pp. 622-624. 
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e. Incentive Compensation 
Companies with well-designed incentive compensation 
plans have found that they have less trouble attracting and 
holding top quality executives than is usually the case.* 
Many companies hold the opinion that the full measure of 
executive effort can never be obtained without some stimu-
lant . 
One company pays its top executives a percentage 
of profits, another establishes a quota of profits which 
must be earned before executives share, and a third estab-
lishes a sliding scale of percentages related to sales.** 
The theory in these cases is that profits are 
correlated to executive contributions. This is not always 
true, for in many cases, during periods of prosperity and 
depressions, company profits fluctuate regardless of execu-
tives' efforts. Nevertheless, a well designed incentive 
system does provide stimulation of executives in areas where 
effort might otherwise tend to be lacking. 
4. The Danger of Surveys 
Surveys of executive compensation can only, of course, 
provide a frame of reference -- a starting point for applying 
judgment to the value of the leadership, planning, and deci-
sion responsibilities on each executive's shoulders. 
*22,p. 9. 
**8, p. 387. 
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Compensation is the only executive motivation which 
· can be measured with any accuracy and, hence, provides a 
useful tool in studying executive compensation, but it is 
important that management realize the shortcomings of surveys, 
not the least of which is a general hUman weakness to place 
trust in figures presented in an organized form. In such a 
situation, it may easily be forgotten that averages may miss 
the .objectives of a particular company. What is needed is a 
thoughtful appraisal of all the elements, i~cluding_ surveys, 
which are part of the compensation picture. There is no 
"one" yardstick on which management can rely.* 
Every company is somewhat different because of what . 
individual executives bring to it. To a very important degree, 
every executive makes his own job. The unquestioning accept-
ance of survey-based compensation figures overlooks this fact 
and frequently results in salary increases that bolster over-
head instead of incentive. 
a. Paying the Man 
If we think of the top executive as a replaceable 
part in a large machine, it is foolish to pay him more than 
the rate at which a replacement for him may be secured. If, 
however, we think of him as contributing to the business in 
*68, p. 90. 
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a comparable manner to the stockholder, then there is no 
more reason to impose a limitation on compensation paid to 
executives than .there is in the case of dividends. 
A former railroad president once said: 
"For thirty years, I was paid according to myjob. 
I think that for twenty years I was ready for an 
executive position, but the way I went up was the 
railroad way -- seniority. If I had one word of 
advice to give businessmen, it would be to start 
rating men and paying them on the basis of what 
they are worth, not what the job is supposed to be 
worth, ac~ording to some arbitrary scale ..•• "* 
5. The Tax Problem 
While pot the subject of this study, the impact of 
high income tax rates on incentives must be given some con-
sideration. Executives have refused promotions because the 
actual "net after taxes" did not compensate them adequately 
for the obligations and efforts entailed in a new position.** 
Taxes have such an important effect on different types of 
executive compensation pl.ans that they will be taken up 
separately as they apply to each plan in the later chapters 
of this report. 
*24, p. 10. 
**12, p. 4. 
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6. General Problems Involved 
The data in the preceeding pages i .llustrates two 
obvious conclusions. The first being that compensation data 
based on titles alone are of little value, and the second 
that comparability of duties, responsibilities, and authority 
must be weighed in determining the worth of individual execu-
tive positions. 
A major influence in executive compensation in 
every company is the heritage of ideas, including "proper" 
relationship among executive salaries, which have been handed 
down in that organization. These ideas take form in the 
executive structure which in turn perpetuates the ideas. 
From the instances cited, it is argued neither for 
higher nor lower executive salaries. Evidence has merely 
been examined here which attests to the fact that there is 
great diversity in executive functions and executive compen-
sation, as well as in the methods used to arrive at the amount 
of such compensation. Executive compensation must allow for 
the unique relationship within each company. Merely paying 
men executive salaries does not make them effective execu-
tives. Economy, however, comes from continuous attention to 
executive developments and the creation of a pattern of 
executive compensation which reflects and strengthens the 
actual pattern of active executive teamwork. 
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B. Company and Industry Variations 
1. General Variability 
To the outsider, executive compensation offers a 
baffling picture indeed. From company to company and from 
industry to industry there appears to be no pattern whatso-
ever in the amount corporate officials receive as salaries, 
bonuses, and other remuneration. Two companies of approxi-
mately the same size and in the same industry may pay their 
top executives widely disparate salaries and bonuses. 
The total remuneration of all officers of a com-
pany has an inferred common base,# but the compensation of 
individual executives depends heavily on the duties handled 
by such men as compared to similar positions in similar 
companies in the same industry. A company seeking to arrive 
at a fair figure for compensating its senior executives 
could examine the average total compensation paid to senior 
executives in companies of similar size in the same industry. 
It could then apportion on a qualitative basis the total com-
pensation to be paid to this group among the senior executives 
required to manage the business.* 
2. Company Variations 
In general, the larger the corporation, the more 
important do minor differences become between individual 
# See page 68. 
*12, p. 5. 
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executive salaries because there is a more narrow range within 
which to provide differences. Organizational structure i .s 
also very important in determining the worth of certain key 
executive jobs. The combining of several separate depart-
ments under one executive may be possible in small companies, 
while in large ones specialization is necessary because of the 
volume of work involved. Thus, the size of a company is an 
important factor in affecting the compensation of its officers.* 
In recent years, many small companies have come to. 
realize that they must raise their executives' compensation 
sharply if they are to attract and hold good men, in compe-
tition with giant corporations. Examples of this are standing 
offers of $60,000 for a president of a corporation with only 
$12 -million sales and it will throw in a stock bonus plan, and 
another corporation with only $11 -million sales will pay 
$30 , 000 for a sales vice-president; this is the same salary 
being paid by a coinpeti tor with ·; twice as much business.** 
It may be interesting to note in passing, the wide 
variations of payment differentials between companies. For 
illustration, an analysis of a sample of one hundred companies 
taken at random from the New York Stock Exchange list shows 
that in 1947 twenty-six of these companies paid the chief 
executive the same as, or less than ten per cept more, than 
*12, p. 5. 
**28, p. 114 
72 
• 
they paid the number two execut i ve . At the other extreme, 
twenty companies paid the chief executive at least twice as 
much as the next man. (General reference to comparable data 
for 1948 and 1949 confirm the major point of the 1947 data.)* 
More specific examples might i nclude Fruehauf 
Trailer Company, whose sales totaled over $184 million in 
1953, who paid its president $225,000 in salary and bonus, 
while Mack Trucks Incorporated, with very nearly the same 
sal·es volume, awarded its president total compensation of 
onl y $104,700. Similarly, United States Steel, with sales of 
over $3.8 billion in 1953, paid Presi dent Benjamin Fairless a 
t o tal of $258,400, while Bethlehem Steel, whose sales were 
only a little more than one-half of United States Steel's 
that year, rewarded Chairman Grace with $456,654.** 
There has been some discussion as to whether compa-
nie s with the highest. paid managements do the best profit-
wise . A study mentioned earlier proved this to be the case.*** 
In a government regulated industry, one company's top manage-
men t got only 0.6 per cent of the payroll, while another's got 
1.1 per cent . The latter company had a profit gain of 45 per 
cent in the past decade; the former gained only 2 per cent. 
Of course, like the chicken and the egg, it is very difficult 
to prove which came first. 
*72, p . 28. 
**61, p. 111. 
***57, p. 122. 
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3. Industry Variations 
When we come to the differences between industries, 
we find the most significant relationships. As might be ex-
pected, the top managements of such regulated industries as 
public utilities and railroads are among the lowest paid, 
averaging 0.9 per cent and 0.6 per cent of total payroll 
respectively. At the top, in compensation by industries, 
are automobiles, chemicals, and steel companies -- averaging 
between 1~5 per cent and 2.4 per cent of the total payroll.* 
In any comparison of executive compensation, con-
sideration must be given to the nature of the industry and 
the character of the product, as well as to the size and 
standing of the individual company. Obviously, competition 
for business and for specially qualified executives -- is 
much more rigorous in some industries than in others, and the 
marketing of certain products presents more problems than 
others. These and other reasons peculiar to a particular 
industry or company, in part explain substantial variations 
in the compensation of top managements. 
C. Company Payment Practices 
1. Executive Compensation in 1955 
Since the figures are not yet complete for 1956, 
a look at the 1955 figures may give us an indication of the 
amounts which the larger companies in the United States pay 
their top men. 
*57, p. 107. 
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The highest paid executives in 1955 received over 
$700,000. This is the first time since 1950 that this mark 
had been reached. Three men -- Harlow H. Curtice, Albert 
Bradley of General Motors, and Eugene G. Grace of Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation all exceeded the $700,000 mark in 
compensation.* 
It appeared that in 1955 other executive salaries 
in general had also risen substantially. Proctor and Gamble 
Company, for the first time, paid its president $300,000, 
bringing the total to twelve companies having executives 
receiving $300,000 or more. The Ford Company paid its ·board 
chairman, Ernest R. Breech, and its president, Henry Ford II, 
each $565,000 (although part of it is deferred through 1958 
under contingent pay plans.) 
Companies paying above the $200,000 mark to their 
top men included International Harvester, Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia, F. W. Woolworth, Monsanto Chemical, General Foods, 
Jones and Laughlin, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube. 
L. L. Colbert, president of Chrysler Corporati~n, 
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got the largest percentage pay increase in 1955 -- 100 per cent. 
He received in total $500,700 -- $250,900 salary and $249,800 
under a deferred bonus system, as compared to 1954 when he 
received straight salary only, of $250,900. This large 
*36, P~ 103. 
increase, of course, was due to Chrysler's 1955 comeback, 
when sales of $3.4 billion were at an all time high and net 
income was up from $18 million in 1954 to $100 million. 
Of course, the figures quoted here are all gross 
figures and bear little resemblance to take-home pay after 
taxe·s, which is a small percentage of the total. Harlow 
Curtice, for example, is e~pected to be able to keep approxi-
mately $121,328 out of his total compensation of $776,400.* 
2. Normal Payment Relationships 
The highest paid executive in most companies is the 
president or the chairman of the board. Some exceptions, how-
ever, have been where a bonus or profit-sharing plan, in which 
the president and board chairman do not participate, raised 
subordinate executives' compensation above that of their 
superiors.** 
Although it is generally believed that corporation 
presidents all receive fabulous salaries, in reality, many 
are not astronomical. Many presidents are forced to carry 
heavy responsibilities for nominal compensation. 
The second highest paid man in a corporation may be 
the first vice-president, the vice-president in charge of 
*36, p. 103. 
**12, p. 89.. 
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sales, the general manager, the secretary, or the treasurer. 
There seems to be no general rule. * For all industries, 
the average compensation of the second highest paid, ranged 
between 40 per cent and 84 per cent of the average highest 
paid executive.** This indicates the wide variation between 
different companies and industries. 
The third highest paid executive received an 
average of 54 per cent of the highest paid executive. 
Other relationships between executives• salaries 
were brought out in a survey made by the American Management 
Association, which showed that, on the average, those execu-
tives receiving more than 50 per cent of the presidential 
salary were the board chairman, the executive vice-president, 
and the top marketing executive; those receiving 36 per cent 
to 45 per cent were the top production executive, the general 
sales manager, and the treasurer; and those receiving 25 per 
cent to 35 per cent were the top engineering executive, the 
controller, the top advertising executive, the top purchasing 
executive, and the top industrial relations executive. 
Whether the president received $50,000 or $200,000 annually, 
these relationships were fairly constant.*** 
Another study done by the A. M. A. in 1951 . showed 
that, with few exceptions, only the three top officers received 
*23' p. 2. 
**12, p. 10. 
***69,· pp. 60-61. 
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more than $100,000; that other officer-directors averaged 
from $12,800 to $54,000; and top officers other than di-
rectors averaged from $11,800 to $38,000, depending on the 
size of the company.* . There is little evidence in these 
figures that an extreme burden is, on the average, being 
borne by the consumer's dollar. 
Low salaries at high levels, of course, tend to 
depress other levels unduly. An example of this was when 
the head of a large division in an important company was 
paid $18,500, a very low salary for an executive with his 
responsibilities. The two group head who reported to him 
were paid $17,500 and $17,000. And three of the four men 
reporting to the $17,000 executive were paid between $15,500 
and $16,250.** The real problem in this situation was that 
the comparatively narrow spread between the highest and 
lowest salaries, as compared to the spread between responsi-
bilities of the different levels, caused a lack of motivation 
in the lower echelon executives, since added effort on their 
part could only result in much more responsibility with little 
increase in pay. 
Before stockholders criticize the high level of 
executive compensation in their company, it might be well for 
them to remember that they are getting no bargain if they fill 
*53, p. 113. 
**57, pp . 122-124. 
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a $125,000 president's job with a $60,000-a-year man and then 
fail to secure four or five strong subordinate executives 
because they could geta salary equal to the president's, 
elsewhere.* 
3. Executive Salaries and Company Profits 
The relative stability of executive salaries when 
profits remain unchanged, as was pointed out earlier,# is 
another indication that "you get what you pay for". Appar-
ently, higher salaries are paid from higher earnings; good 
executives increase earnings and then receive higher salaries. 
Although business prosperity in certain periods is definately 
a factor, it hardly seems an adequate explanation of the 
relatively better showing of some companies than other com-
panies in identical industries. 
For example, in a consumer goods industry the t wo 
lowest paying companies both showed profit gains in the past 
eleven years of less than 85 per cent, while the company 
paying the highest percentage -- 50 per cent above the other 
two -- reported a gain of nearly 200 per cent during the 
same period.** 
*72, p. 31. 
# See pages 64-65. 
**57, p. 122. 
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In a comparison of profit figures and top manage-
ment compensation for 41 companies from 1939 to 1950, the 
following resulted:* 
Table I. 
MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION AND PROFIT FIGURES 
FOR 41 COMPANIES -- 1939 to 1950 
Increases in Compensation 
(averaged) 
over 80% 
50 - 79 
20 - 49 
0 - 19 
decrease 
Increases in Net Profits 
(averaged) 
360% 
230 
170 
118 
60 
Source: Fortune, March, 1952, . p. 85. 
A number of · top managements have been convinced 
that above-average salaries attract above-average men. Some 
even a ttempt to maintain their salary levels at 10 per cent 
or 15 per cent above the going rate. The fact that they are 
among the most successful companies points to a certain 
measur e of wisdom in their policies.** 
A number of observations may be worth summarizing 
at this point. 
First, executive compensation seems to bear a direct 
relationship to company profits; the higher the profits, the 
*54, p. 85. 
**69, p_. 64. 
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higher the salaries. Likewise, executives must increase their 
company's profits if they in turn expect increased salaries. 
Secondly, there is evidence that the fastest growing 
companies pay relatively higher executive salaries than their 
slower moving competitors. This appears to be true, regard-
less of the industry considered. 
Finally, the highest salaried industries g~nerally 
require a high degree of creative-skill-management. The lower 
salaried industries apparently require less creative manage-
ment. 
D. Executive Compensation -- 1939 to 1956 
Peter Druker, the economist, makes the poi~t that 
if you explain the effect of taxes on executive salaries to 
the average wage earner, "he will not understand, he will not 
believe you, and he will say, 'So what?'."* 
This, unfortunately, seems to be true of many boards 
of directors as well as wage earners, for, on the whole, the 
executive is earning less today than he was in 1939. An 
executive who, before the war, was earning $50,000, would now 
need at least $300,000 to maintain his prewar standard of 
living. A company could hardly afford the publicity, even if 
*88, p. 26. 
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it could afford the money, and so, little has been done to 
correct this destruction of executive pay standards.* Below 
is a table showing the amount that a married executive must 
earn in 1956 to equal his earnings in 1939. 
Table II. 
EXECUTIVE INCOME OF 1939 AND ITS 1956 EQUIVALENT 
(these figures assume a married executive and ignore 
outside income, tax deductions, credits, and exemptions) 
Actual Income 
1939 
$ 10,000 
15,000 
25,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Equivalent Income 
1956 
$ 25,000 
42,000 
88,000 
300,000 
880,000 
Source: Blacket, Olin Wintrop: Management Compensation, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan, 1953 . 
1. From 1939 to 1950 
During the period from 1939 to 1950, a great 
change took place between executive salaries and those of wage 
earners. A study made in 1955 showed that pay increases, on 
the average, were 106 per cent for rank-and-file employees 
during the period 1939 to 1950. Supervisors received increases 
of 83 per cent, middle management 45 per cent, and top 
*53, p. 114. 
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management only 35 per cent in the same period. (See chart 
below.) In real dollars, however, wage earners increased 
their pay 3 per cent, while top managemeht's compensation 
was reduced by 59 per cent.* 
Chart II. 
1950 SALARIES COMPARED WITH 1939 SALARIES 
Gross Dollars Paid 
top 
management 
middle 
management 
supervisory 
employees 
employees under 
wage-hour law 
+ I 0 ~:,- · 
Real Dollars ~Paid (after adjustment for taxes and increased 
cost of living). 
Source: Business Week, March 1, 1952, p. 102. 
Throughout the decade of the forties, high and 
increasing taxes constantly reduced the incomes of executives. 
By the close of the decade, the tax rate on a $60,000 salary 
was the same as that on a salary of $120,000 ten years 
earlier. ~orne executive salary increases were made, but with 
increasing taxes and higher living costs, the salary increases 
were more than offset in most cases. 
*37, p. 102 .. 
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Simple tax computations indicate the take-home pay resulting 
from a $10,000 increase at various salary levels in 1939 and 
1949. (These disregard all other sources of income.) (See 
table below.)* 
Table III. 
TAKE-HOME PORTION OF $10,000 SALARY INCREASE 
Salary Level 
$ 60,000 
80,000 
100,000 
120,000 
140,000 
160,000 
180,000 
Take-Home Portion of $10,000 Salary Increase 
Prewar (1939) 
$6,124 
4,844 
4,049 
3,800 
3,800 
3,626 
3,600 
Postwar (1949) 
$4,528 
4,013 
3,596 
3,358 
3,120 
2,872 
2,608 
Source: Blackett, Olin Wintrop, Management Compensation, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan, 
1953, page 44. 
2. From 1950 to 1956 
As was true in the 1939 to 1950 era, executives 
pay after taxes did not fare as well as wage earners' during 
the period from 1949 to 1956. Although executive compen-
sation rose an average of 5 per cent a year after the 1949 
1950 plateau, taxes still took the largest share of these 
increases-·.** 
*3, p. 44. 
**24, p. 10. 
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In 1950, the A. M. A. found, the average top execu-
tive got 10.3 per cent more than in 1949; in 1951, 5.4 per cent 
more than in 1950 . . In 1952 the increase was less than 1 per 
cent.* That year, a study of 52 corporation presidents' 
salaries showed that 30 got pay increases, 20 got pay cuts, and 
7 stayed the same.** 
Again on the down side, a man making $100,000, with 
a wife and one child and taking standard deductions, had a 
"take-home" of $53,000 in 1950, but only $48,000 in 1954.*** 
3. Trends in Salary Levels 
It appears that the tendency to recognize the import-
· ance of larger salaries to executives is being found more 
predominately in the smaller companies. Companies that before 
the war were paying less than $50,000 are now paying around 
$75, 000; and companies that were paying from $50,000 to 
$100,000 are now paying about $62,000 to $125,000; those which 
paid from $100,000 to $200,000 are now paying about the same or 
a little less; and those which paid over $200,000 are now 
paying much less than before.**** 
*35, p. 66. 
**43, p. 110. 
***48, p~ 188. 
****3, p. 33. 
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While there are still many large corporations which 
pay upwards of $100,000 a year to their chief executives, the 
number is smaller than it was in 1929.* 
The net effect of the pressure on corporations to 
hold down executive salaries while allowing wage rates to rise, 
has been to readjust corporation policies, not only as to the 
amount of salary paid and reported, but the method of payment. 
The explanation for less increase in the higher 
salary ranges is due primarily to stockholders' and labor's 
objections. Salaries are no longer secret but are disclosed 
in proxy statements and reported to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Regardless of the fact that a $50,000 salary may 
be a less equitable compensation for one position than $300,000 
for another, it is only the higher salaries that have proved 
unpopular. 
E. Summary 
We have now .taken a look at the problems involved 
in determining how much to pay a top executive and the need 
for a formal evaluation plan in determining his worth. Be-
cause there are great variations between industries and com-
panies in the amounts they pay their top men, it is wise for 
*13, pp. 3-4. 
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each individual company to evaluate its own top executives 
under a sound evaluation plan, rather than to rely too 
heavily on surveys or the amounts other companies are paying 
men with the same titles. 
The combination of unpopularity at the higher salary 
ranges and not unfavorable cost considerations in the lower 
ranges seems adequate to account for the structual changes 
which have taken place in the pattern of executive compen-
sation during the 1939 to 1956 period. Alternative forms of 
executive compensation have been devised as substitutes for 
straight increases in salaries or bonuses, and it is no acci-
dent that these alternative forms had their chief acceptance 
and growth in the larger companies where the problem was the 
most pressing. These forms of compensation will be the sub-
ject of the remainder of this study. 
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III. COMPENSATION PLANS -- CURRENT BENEFITS 
A. Need for Alternative Compensation Plans 
The great need for qualified executives which has 
developed in recent years, as well as the urge of the execu-
tives themselves for better jobs, more money, and more secu-
rity, has caused a high turnover rate at the higher levels of 
business. Booz, Allen and Hamilton, management consultants, 
report that in one recent month, 26 presidents of companies --
many with sales up to $100 million -- indicated a willingness 
to move to another position.* 
Likewise, many small companies with considerably 
smaller recruiting budgets than their giant competitors, are 
having trouble in acquiring the services of skilled execu-
tives.** Most officers concede that working for these smaller 
companies is chancier than working for a larger well-estab-
lished corporation. 
Again, the successful executive may decide to go in 
business for himself in hopes that he may realize more income 
after taxes by converting his gain into a capital gain which 
is taxable at the maximum rate of 26 per cent. This he does 
by reinvesting his corporation's earnings each year back into 
*28, p. 114. 
**29, p. 99. 
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the business. He often draws only a minimum salary and when 
he needs cash or wishes to retire, he sells part or all of 
his equity and pays the capital gains tax.* 
Recently, a highly paid film executive in Hollywood 
gave up a salary which exceeded $500,000 a year in order to 
start producing pictures himself and realizing the benefits 
of the capital gains tax.** 
The major reason . for the previously mentioned shift-
ing by executives ls the high income tax rates which range up 
to 91 per cent in the top pay brackets. At such rates, an 
ordinary increase is turning out to be of little value to an 
executive who is already highly paid. Corporations, as a 
result, are finding it harder to keep top executive talent. 
The small cash differentials between higher and 
lower paid jobs today also adds ~o the problem, for often the 
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amounts provide insufficient incentive for lower paid executives 
to aspire to the positions of their superiors. If such in-
centives are not to disappear entirely, they must be strength-
ened by means of alternative compensation plans.*** Many 
types of executive pay plans are now in use. They have 
different purposes, values, and risks. 
*53, p. 234 ~ . 
**95, p. 53. 
***67, p. 95. 
1. The Tax Problem 
In adopting such plans, companies are exercising 
the right recognized by law -- of a business or an indi -
vidual to keep his taxes as low as possible within the limits 
provided by law. 
A comparison of the net after taxes for the $25,000, 
$50~000, $75,000, and $100,000 salaried man for the years 
1929, 1932, 1940, and 1951 show why executives and key men in 
these salary brackets are so interested in alternative compen-
sation plans.* 
Table IV. 
THE EFFECT OF INCOME TAXES ON TAKE HOME PAY 
Gross Income $25,000 $50 , 000 $75,000 $100,000 
Income After Taxes 
1929 $24,000 $45,000 $65,000 $ 85,000 
1932 23,000 40,000 60,000 70,000 
1940 22,000 35,000 50,000 60,000 
1951 18,700 31,100 40,500 48,100 
1951 income in $10,135 $16,856 $21,951 $ 26,070 
1939 dollars 
Source: Casey, William J., and Lasser, J.K.: Executive Pay 
Plans, New York, Business Reports Inc., 1951. 
Translating these figures into work days gives a 
startling result -- the $25,000 man works one day in four for 
the United States government -- the top $100,000 man works 
part of every day and full time every other day for the 
government. 
*4_, p. 2. 
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A dramatic example of this is given in an adver~ 
tisement by Doremus and Company for a client who has a job 
to fill: 
"The job: Plantation manager of properties owned by a 
United States company and located in a small Central 
American country. 
The offer: A residence plus $25,000 a year, tax-free." 
Over 2,200 written applications were received, the switchboard 
was flooded with more than 100 long-distance calls, and one 
applicant flew from the midwest to New Yor~ for a personal 
interview. Several corporate executives in the $50,000 salary· 
bracket were among the applicants.* 
Thus, for the highly paid man, the various . tax 
deferral plans are not only tempting but may well be desirable 
as a motivational device. 
Also, alternative executive compensation plans have 
proven to be a method of holding top talent as well as attract-
ing it~ Most experienced executives will be reluctant to 
leave a corporation for which they have worked for several 
years if it involves giving up vested interests in company 
pension plans or loss of future income under deferred pay 
arrangements. 
*51, p. 278. 
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2. Effect of Taxes on Mo tivation 
Many executives f ind it a struggle to simply main-
tain .take-home pay without attempting to secure additional 
income for the years of experience and for added responsi-
bilities. 
Executives in general, however, seem to feel that 
the influence of high taxes is most important on younger 
executives.* The answers given by the top executives of 50 
large United States corporations in reply to the question 
"Are present income tax rates affecting executive incentive?", 
were rather varied.** Only 25 per cent saw no curtailment in 
executive incentives in the foreseeable future because of high 
tax rates. Fifty-five per cent, however, agreed that the 
caliber of top management men may decline along with the dif-
ference in take-home pay between higher and lower echelon 
jobs. They generally believed that top executives already in 
office are not affected as much by today's high tax rates as 
are lower level, younger executives who look toward the top 
position as the "financial payoff". If this "payoff", they 
explain, shrinks because of taxes, younger men may well feel 
that the net after taxes is not worth the additional effort 
and that the risk of failure far outweighs the additional 
income which such a promotion offers. The remaining 20 per 
cent of top executives surveyed believed they saw a definite 
letdown in executive efforts resulting from the high tax rates 
of today. 
*79,p. 529. 
**47, p. 112. 
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B. Trends in Various Plans 
A Dartnell survey made in 1955 indicated that there 
had been, in the previous years, a great swing to executive 
pay plans which provided:* 
• Capital gains subject to the lesser capital gains tax 
rather than the taxes imposed upon "unearned" income, 
• Deferred compensation plans and stock options, 
· Plans protecting executives and dependents, as well 
a s providing high retirement benefits. 
Even before that time, however , in 1952 Booz, Allen 
and Hamilton had completed a study of 164 companies listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange, covering 27 industries. The s e 
companies were examined for changes in methods of compen-
sati ng top executives during the previous two years. (See 
char t below. ) ** 
The largest number of pay plans used by any one 
company to compensate its president was four. Of the 164 
companies studied, only 6 per cent used four methods in 1949 
but by 1951, this was up to 15 per cent.*** 
*24, p. 10. 
** 40, p. 113. 
*** 40, p. 114. 
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Table V. 
CHANGING WAYS TO PAY TOP EXECUTIVES 
( What happened in 2 years at 164 companies in 27 industries) 
Companies Paying 
Salary 
(1) Cash Bonus 
Stock Bonus 
Pension 
Deferred Payment 
Stock Option 
(2) Stock Purchase 
1949 
(number) 
163 
71 
5 
130 
6 
6 
8 
( 1) 
(2) 
Includes profit~sharing 
Includes stock warrants 
1951 
(number) 
162 
81 
7 
141 
10 
17 
11 
Changes from 
1949 (number 
of companies) 
- ]_ 
tlO 
+ 2 
+11 
+ 4 
tll 
+ 3 
Source: Business Week, October 4, 1952, p. 114. 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this survey 
is that there is a definite trend towards alternative plans 
of compensating top executives, either directly or indirectly, 
and that straight salaries alone are becoming unsatisfactory 
as a means of compensation. If taxes and prices continue to 
rise, it may well be that in the future the executive will be 
looking not at the salary level of a job but at what the 
company is offering in the way of a complete pay package. 
No one pay plan is best. · In almost every con-
ceivable method, there are drawbacks if it is used alone. 
Also, a particular plan must be carefully determined if it is 
to best fit a particular company. The tax and business 
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services and books an the subject should not be relied upon 
exclusively when a plan is to be adopted. Services and 
books are useful in suggesting ideas, methods, and alterna-
tives, but it is of the greatest importance that expert 
advice be obtained before a specific plan is adopted. There 
is no such thing as a standard pian; each one must be 
. tailor-made to suit the needs of the particular company.* 
1. Importance of Reasonableness 
Since the first federal income tax law in 1918, 
taxpaying corporations have been allowed to deduct, when 
computing taxes, "a reasonable allowance for salaries or 
other compensation for personal services."** 
Much litigation on "what is reasonable?" has been 
initiated by stockholders of such large companies as 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the American Tobacco Company, 
the National City Bank, Warner Brothers, the National Cash 
Register Company, Loew's Incorporated, and General Motors 
Corporation.*** 
Ordinarily, such actions by stockholders have 
proven to be fruitless so long as the directors of the 
corporation ~ad acted fairly and honestly and observed 
*88, p. 31. 
**10, p. 283. 
***9, p. 19. 
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legal requirements.* It has, however, become evident that 
the courts are inclined to attach importance to managements 
securing approval by the stockholders of all executive com-
pensation arrangements. In this day of the "little" stock-
holder and the employee stockholder, officers' salaries 
must be justified. 
C. Salaries 
During the nineteen t hirties, compensation for top 
executives consisted chiefly of salaries and some form of 
bonus. The more complicated stock option and deferred 
compensation plans, though not unknown, were uncommon. 
The base salary method is still the primary means 
of compensating executives. It should place a monetary value 
on each position in order to establish a salary scale, set up 
an appropriate salary range for each position, and provide 
for a periodic review of individual performance.** Before 
alternative pay plans are considered for compensating execu-
tives, salary levels must be adequate and salary relationships 
must be balanced in terms of functions and responsibilities.*** 
However, if high income tax rates are to continue, 
and it appears that they are, ~alary increases are going to 
*24, p. 11. 
**81, p. 688. 
***2, p. 404. 
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mean less to top executives than was once the case. Little 
enthusiasm will be aroused by the prospect of earning a few 
more tax -free dollars. More and more executives are going 
to demand compensation plaps ·from which "real 11 benefits can 
be derived. Salary increases, which often come close to 
being little more than a show of confidence, will become 
less desirable to t~p executives. 
The competition for executive talent is making it 
increasingly more i mportant to de velop executive pay plans 
which will pr~vide future income for the executive and his 
family, and also assure that a key man's growing knowledge 
and experience will continue to be available to the company. 
1. Tax Reimbursement Plans 
The only way an executive can avoid income taxes 
entirely is to convince his company to adopt a "tax-free 
income" plan. Under such a plan, the company agrees to pay 
him, say, $50,000 after taxes, which today might mean a 
salary of $104,000. Under the "tax reimbursement" plan, the 
company would promise to reimburse the . executive for the 
amount of his taxes on a .stated salary. Both plans, of course, 
place the company at considerable risk, for it will be required 
to pay larger and larger amounts if tax rates increase.*· 
*64, p. 138. 
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11 Tax reimbursement" contracts require the utmost 
care in defining the intention of the parties and in P?O-
viding for possible complications, such as changes in marital 
status, deductions, and the existence of other income.* 
There are at least two other pitfalls associated 
with such plans. The first is that the Internal Revenue 
department is very fussy about this practice and has ruled 
that the employee's pay, for tax purposes, includes the tax 
paid by his employer. Hence, the company is charged addi-
tional tax which is again considered income to the employee 
and, in an endless succession, the cost to the company 
pyramids.** The second problem involved in "tax reim-
bursement" plans is that they are difficult to justify to 
stockholders and could result in troublesome stockholder 
lawsuits against the company.*** 
D. Bonus Plans 
1. Bonuses in General 
More and more companies, in an attempt to place 
the emphasis on "incentive" rather than "compensation", are 
switching to bonus plans for their executive groups. Today, 
over half the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
*10, p. ±86. 
**97, p. 81. 
***2, p. 408. 
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have bonus plans of one type or another.* There has been a 
/ _ 
100 per cent increase in their use during the past decade ~ 
Until recently, the more general type of profit-
sharing was the most popular type of plan, but now with 
increased decentralization as well as better accounting and 
budgetary controls, big companies are pinpointing profit 
responsibilities and bonuses to individual officers down 
through the divisional executive level and, in some cases, 
even further. 
Among the leading companies in the executive bonus 
field are General Electric Company ; General Motors Corpo-
ration; E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company; and Sears, 
Roebuck and Company. Their executive bonus plans have been 
well proven over the years. 
Not all companies can use an incentive bonus plan. 
Much depends on the personality of the chief executive, the 
staff setup, the nature of the industry, and the company's 
willingness to make administration of the plan a full-time 
job. 
This last point is a particularly important one. 
Far too many a management has installed a bonus plan for its 
executive group and then just sat back "to see how it works". 
*27, p. 112. 
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It did not -- not under those circumstances. Percentagewise, 
so few incentive plans have received the skillful adminis-
tration they required to be really productive that most 
companies have never realized the· full value of them.* 
One example of this occurred in a consumer goods 
industry where a company installed an executive bonus plan 
in operation 60 days after a large competitor had done so. 
Four years later the plan -was quietly dropped, unmourned, 
for it had never been productive. It had been put together 
too hastily and then left to administer itself. The final 
decision to discontinue the plan followed the similar deci-
sion by the competitor who had started the whole thing.** 
The point is that there are bonus plans and bonus 
plans. Some provide incentive; others do not. The distinc- . 
tion may not be readily apparent, but it can be very real. 
It is important, therefore, that the chief execu-
tive who decides to adopt an incentive bonus plan for his 
executive group, be fully aware that if this powerful manage-
ment tool which he has chosen to use is to render, to the 
fullest~ the ability to displace individual ownership as the 
key incentive in the future growth of his company, that he 
must stand ready to see that the proper time and effort is 
spent in its skillful administration. 
*70, p. 37. 
**70, p. 37. 
100 
a. Designing a Bonus Plan 
In designing its bonus plan, a company may use a 
profit-sharing fund in which two or more executives wi ll 
share, or it may enter into separate contracts with each 
executive who is to receive a percentage of earnings . 
The method used in computing the bonuses is the 
hea rt of any plan. There are numerous varieties of ways in 
whi ch bonus payments may be computed; almost all plans, 
however, are based on total annual corporate earnings or, 
in some cases, on net sales. One exception to this is the 
du Pont Company, where individuals are rewarded for excep-
tional achievements over a period of years by specific 
grants.* 
To be successful, an executive bonus plan should 
have certain definite characteristi cs; ** 
· Bonus payments should be somehow related to company 
profit s. 
• Executives should know how they are judged. 
· Bonus payments should be based upon individual 
contributions. 
· Top management should "police 11 the plan to insure 
that bonuses are given only on the basis of prof it 
contributions. 
*l~ p. 209-210. 
**2~ p. 406. 
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Bonuses may be paid in cash or in company stock . 
Patton found that companies paying bonuses to executives 
showed greater progress over the years than those who did 
not, and that companie s paying s tock bonuses were among the 
fastest growing, most progressive companies . in the country.* 
Incentive bonuses may be paid in the year earned 
or in a series of ins talments. General Motors Corporation 
pays bonuses in from one to five instal ments to encourage 
executivesto stay with the organization. 
The Kroeger Company scales bonuses to represent 15 
per cent of total compensation at the lower level of execu-
tives, and 30 per cent at the top.** Patton's studies lead 
him to conclude that a successful bonus plan probably 
requires payment, in a good year, of 30 per cent of salary 
or more.*** 
One very successful executive incentive plan allo-
cates bonuses on the basis of three considerations.**** 
First, the individual status is considered, since it is only 
logical that top level executives should have a higher bonus 
priority than the newest eligible man. Second, and most 
important, the profit contribution of the individual execu-
tive is considered in the size of the bonus. Finally, the 
*69, p. 63. 
**18 , p. 6. 
***69, p. 6 4 . 
****82, p ~ 259. 
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difficulty of the job is examined, since in one division, 
meeting stiff competition may call for hard work and yet 
result in relatively low profits, while in another division, 
simply inertia on the part of competitors may account for 
substantial profits, even though the individual executives in 
that division put forth little effort. 
For the company setting up a new bonus plan, most 
consultants suggest that i~ keep the plan confined .to a 
small, top-level group until it has been tested out; that it 
keep it as simple as possible, since complicated formulas 
are not flexible enough to meet changing conditions and, 
also, because most people resent a plan which they do not 
understand; and that it not make incentives too high. If a 
bonus is too large, a man is likely to begin to consider it 
as a part of salary. Generally, it should not be over 40 to 
50 per cent of base pay. Bonuses should not be taken for 
granted, since failure to pay a bonus in one year may prove 
to be as much of an incentive as giving one.* 
b. Advantages of Bonus Plans 
When General Motors Corporation announces that all 
employees earning over $6,000 annually will share in a bonus 
fund of 12 per cent of net profits after setting aside 5 per 
*27, p. 116. 
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cent for invested capital~ several desirable motivations are 
provided.* Employees, in general, wi ll work harder in order 
to become eligible in such a plan; those already eligible 
will work harder to increase the company's net profits and, 
hence, their shares; and, since individual executives share 
on the basis of individual contributions to profits, they 
will be strongly motivated to make the greatest possible 
contributions. 
Nor is this extra compensation costing stockholders 
anything. If the total $7,200,000 in salaries and bonuses 
awarded to General Motors' top sixty executives in 1954 had 
been distributed to shareholders after corporate taxes, each 
dividend would have been increased only about four cents. 
Likewise, without such an excellent incentive bonus plan as 
General Motors now has, it is doubtful that the company's 
earnings would have been as large as they have and that 
stockholders would have received dividends in 1954 totaling 
$5 a share.** 
While discussing the General Motors plan, it might 
be interesting to:··point out that other features of the plan 
give th.e company certain advantages. The payment of bonuses 
larger than $5,000 on ~n instalment basis, for instance, 
helps the company" to hold its executive group, since 
*22, p. 8. 
**61, p. 110 
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instalment payments are forfeited if an executive is dis-
missed or voluntarily leaves the company. Also, the pay-
ment of bonuses over a period of years tends to make 
executives' income less fluctuating and keeps their income 
taxes at a minimum. This satisfaction on their part with 
the plan, results in happier and more cooperative company 
executives. 
Broadly speaking, there is one basic advantage 
which bonuses have, which is often overlooked; this is that 
compensation increases can only come from profit increases. 
Only after executives have increased the profits of their 
companies can they anticipate higher personal incomes. 
This is one of the strongest arguments in favor of incentive 
bonus methods of compensation for executives. 
c. Disadvantages of Bonus Plans 
One large corporation in this country, who is 
regarded as a leader in its field, has a bonus program which 
has been copied by many smaller concerns. It privately 
admi t s that its bonus plan has contributed little to the 
company and that, were it not afraid of the effec.t on morale, 
it would_drop its plan in short order.* This rather vividly 
points out the long known fact that there is no "ideal" form 
* 7 0 ,_ p • 4-6 • 
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of incentive plan. The needs of each individual company must 
control the form of the final plan. A plan which has worked 
well in one company may be completely unsatisfactory in 
another. 
Another important point is that a bonus plan must 
be designed with a particular industry in mind. A plan that 
is well suit'ed to a highly competitive industry is likely to 
be useless in a less competitive one. In fact, surveys have 
shown the bonus plans seem to work best only in highly com-
petitive industries such as retail trade, textiles, and 
automobile manufacturing. These are fast moving businesses 
where executive mistakes are costly and quickly recognizable. 
However, in industries where most decisions are made by 
committees and where the results are years in the making, 
such as in utilities and the oil industry, incentive bonus 
plans do not seem to work as well.* The point is, however, 
that regardless of the company in which an incentive system 
is to be installed, no "model" form can be relied upon 
completely if the plan is to work well. 
Open condemnation of large bonus payments in the 
past has resulted in a general suspicion of executive bonus 
plans by the general public and shareholders alike. Much 
litigation on the question of 11 reasonableness 11 of executive 
*70, p. 39. 
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compensation has arisen because of the payment of fantas-
tically large bonuses resulting from unforeseen increases 
in corporate earnings. As a result, many corporations now 
place limits on the amounts of bonuses which can be paid.* 
The se l i mitations might simply be 100 per cent of base 
salary, or they may be somewhat more complicated, such as 
the Borg-Warner Plan which limi.ts t he bonus to 100 per cent 
of the first $15,000 of salary; 75 per cent of the next 
$20,000; and 50 per cent of any amount in excess of 
$35,000.** 
One of the main disadvantages of a bonus plan is 
that the executive team often QOmes to consider the bonus as 
part of regular salary. This has caused many a bonus plan 
to lose its incentive value. Officers receiving bonuses 
should be kept constantly aware of the fact that their 
bonuses will suffer a severe decline if company profits 
should drop off and that the bonus is extra compensation for 
extra profits and not to be considered as salary. 
Another risk involved in bonus plans for execu-
tives, is that because such plans are based on net income or 
net sales over a one year period, executives may strive to 
increase th~ short-run income of t he company to the detriment 
of its long run success.*** 
*10, p. 45. 
**10, p. 46. 
***13, p. 9~ 
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Not to be overlooked in our problems involved in 
bonus plans for executives is the problem of computation. 
If individual bonus contracts are used, it must be estab-
lished whether or not the basis of such computations are to 
be net income after salaries, net income after bonuses 
(which offers a perplexing situation), how federal income 
taxes of the corporation are to be treated, whether the 
compensation of any one executive should be treated as an 
expense before other executives' bonuses are to be computed, 
and so on. Although these computations may be easily 
handled by the company's accountant, they still represent a 
problem both in poli~y determination as well as in trying 
to explain the logic of such plans to the executives involved 
and the stockholders from whom approval must be granted. 
2. Cash Bonuses 
All that has been said in the previous section 
regarding bonus plans in general applies equally here to cash 
bonuses, since cash bonuses are by far the most popular type 
of bonus payment. It is not necessary, therefore, to go 
further into the area of cash bonuses except to say that 
profit-sharing for executives in the form of annual cash 
distribution~ is no longer as popular as it once was . It 
is less attractive to th~ executive than stock options and 
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stock purchase plans; offering opportunities for capital 
gain; and deferred compensation, annuities, and pensions, 
offering security for later periods .* 
3. Stock Bonuses 
Many companies feel that the payment of company 
stock as bonuses rather than cash, has a distinct advantage. 
They argue that the executive whose stock ownership is 
steadily increasing as a result of bonus payments has double 
incentive to maintain andincrease company profits, for that 
way he protects his . "investment" and, at the same time_, 
receives a "bonus'' in the _form of a capi tal gain when 
increased earnings boost the value of his stock.** 
There are offsetting reasons_, however; why stock 
bonus plans have become less common. When an executive 
receives a bonus in the form of stock, he has received tax-
able income to the extent of the fair market value of the 
stock when received.*** The tax on the bonus is now so great 
that most executives cannot meet it out of their personal 
resources. For example, General Motors found that its execu-
tives were selling their bonus stock to pay the tax. The 
selling not only avoided the objectives of ·the stock bonus 
plan, but also depressed the market price of the stoak for 
*10, p. 96. 
**70, p. 43. 
***10, p. 108. 
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other stockholders. The company had to switch to a part cash, 
part stock bonus arrangement.* Likewise, many companies, 
finding themselves in similar situations,# have established 
20 per cent stock -- 80 per cent cash, or 50 per cent stock -
50 per cent cash bonuses. Others have set up a sliding scale 
or permitted some choice as to the proportion of stock 
included in the bonus payment.** 
A big advantage of the stock bonus is that the 
corporation's cash reserves are not depleted. Shareholders, 
on the other hand, are not too happy with the fact that con-
tinued issuance of bonus stock tends to dilute their invest-
ments as well · as to give .the company's executives a stronger 
voice in stockholder meetings. 
E. Insurance Plans 
Insurance is rapidly becoming a non£alary way of 
holding onto executives and attracting new ones, and more 
companies are extending their group insurance programs in 
order to better supplement executives' pay. The programs 
vary considerably but generally include life insurance and 
health and disability plans. 
* : 4, p. 29. 
# E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, in their annual report 
of 1949, -stated that, "Unfortunately, tax rates have become 
so high that it is now possible only to a limited extent to 
attain the ownership objectives of the Stock Bonus Plan". 
**70, p. 43. 
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There are several reasons for thi~ ~wing to insur-
ance plans.* The first big attraction is that the preaent 
tax laws give tax advantage~ to both the company and the 
executive. Secondly, the various states are liberalizing 
the maximum coverage for individuals in group insurance 
plans. Finally, insurance companies themselves are now more 
willing to extend top limits on coverage and, also, have 
made available a number of new types of insurance protection. 
Together, these result in important and relatively cheap 
ways of raising the after-tax compensation of higher paid 
executives. 
It is generally believed, by authorities in the 
field, that group insurance coverages and other fringe 
benefits for executives should come before any deferred pay 
plans.** They fill an unavoidable business need, and one 
which the executive would otherwise need to buy out of his 
net pay after taxes. 
1. Group Life Insurance 
It would seem that the ultimate in deferring 
compensation for the executive would be to defer it until 
after his death. Thus it would delay payments to the 
executive which, if received by him at present, would be 
*42, p. 120. 
**52; p. 98. 
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more beneficial to the tax collector than to himself and, at 
the same time, would provide security for his family in case 
he dies, at which time the income would be free of income 
tax to the recipients. 
There are two types of such arrangements which the 
law allows. One of these is group life insurance carried on 
the employee's life where the beneficiary is designated by 
the employee. In such a case, the premiums paid by the com-
pany are not considered income to the employee but are con-
sidered a business expense for the purposes of tax deduction 
by the company. The second method is the payment of death 
benefits to the employee's estate or beneficiaries, which 
are exempt up to $5,000 per employee. If such death benefits 
are paid under a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan, 
they are also exempt from estate taxes under a new provision 
in the 1954 tax code.* 
To the top executive in the 50 per cent tax 
bracket, the payment of group insurance premiums by the 
company is worth twice as much as an additional salary 
increase equivalent to the cost of the premium.** Also, the 
insurance may be cheaper under the group plan than the 
executive could buy for himself. 
*74, p. 44. 
**51, p. 300 . 
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The amounts of coverage can be scaled with pay 
levels, for example, giving each employee coverage in the 
amount of a year's pay.* Some state laws limit the maximum 
amount to $20,000 per employee, although recent changes in 
state laws have increased the amount of coverage which may 
be allowed. For example, New York, in 1952, removed its 
$20,000 limit and now has no ceiling on the amount of 
coverage allowed, and Pennsylvania and Connec.ticut have 
recently raised their limits from $20,000 to $40,000.** 
Under the group life plan, every $1,000 worth of 
insurance costs the company about $18; that is $1,800 a year 
for coverage of $100,000 on each t op executive.*** 
Because of the favorable tax treatment, group life 
insurance helps the top executive build up a sizable estate 
which he could not do otherwise. Another advantage is, 
since most top executives are past middle age, that such 
policies can be written without medical examinations if the 
group is large enough. 
A recent study of 38 companies, conducted by the 
American Management Association, showed that although all the 
companies had some sort of group life policies, many of them 
had limits far below state-imposed ceilings. This would 
*51, p. 300. 
**42, p. 122. 
***42, Q. 122. 
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indicate that there is still cons iderable room for improve-
ment i n this area of compensating executives.* 
a. Split-Dollar Insurance 
A recently announced special rule on the treatment 
of split-dollar insurance is making this an increasingly 
popular way to get around the tax disadvantage of the indi-
vidual policy# where the employer pays the premiums.** 
Split-dollar insurance was devised several years 
ago by Prentice-Hall, Incorporated as a means for aiding its 
own executives! , : Under this plan, the executive and his 
company share in the dollar cost of the policy. This means 
decreasing premium payments for the executive 'through the . 
years as well as a tax savings on all that the company pays 
for him. 
Under a split-dollar plan, the company takes out a 
policy for the executive -- usually ordinary life -- and the 
company pays the part of the premium that _corresponds to the 
increase in the cash . su.rrender value of the policy; the execu-
tive pa~s the balance. As the cash value increases, the 
executive's share of the premium decreases so rapidly that 
within ten years his payments cease. I f . the insured dies, 
*42, p. -120 . 
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# In such a case where the company pays the premium on an indi-
vidual insurance policy, the amount of the premium is con-
sidered income and is fully taxabl e to the employee. 
**85, p. 35. 
the company is ·entitled to the cash value and the executive's 
beneficiary gets the difference between the face and the cash 
value. 
In spite of the obvious advantages of split-dollar 
insurance, some insurance companies, such as Equitable Life 
Assurance Society and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 
have been hesitant about issuing these policies.* 
2. Accident and Health Insurance 
Companies are no longer limited to group policies 
or contracts under accident and health insurance. Today, a 
company can provide an individual policy tailored to fit an 
executive's particular needs. Besides policies providing 
regular hospitalization, medical, and surgical care, a com-
pany can also use so-called major medical expense contracts 
and other special policies which protect the executive 
against disastrous medical costs. Under the new rules, the 
costs are tax-free ~o the executive so long as they are paid 
under a health or accident plan.** 
In the previously mentioned survey conducted by the 
A. M. A.#, it was found that more than half of the companies 
carried accident and loss of limbs policies for its management 
*45, p. 65. 
**85, p. 35. 
# See page 116. 
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people. These would cover such hazards as travel accidents 
either on common carriers or any other type of travel -- up to 
$25,000, or sometimes more.* 
3. Medical Catastrophe Insurance 
Another type of insurance which is gaining in popu-
larity as a means of compensating executives is what is known 
as major medical insurance or medical catastrophe insurance. 
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It operates similarly to deductible collision insurance for 
automobiles in that after a certain amount (or percentage of 
gross pay), say $300 of medical expense, the policy becomes 
operative and pays 75 per cent or 80 per cent of the additional 
medical expenses up to a maximum of perhaps $10,000.** 
The cost of such insurance to the company varies, 
depending on who is covered, salary level, and average age of 
the applicants. It is between $1.50 and $8.00 per month per 
covered applicant. 
This expense is, of course, always deductible by 
the company as a business expense, and the benefits are tax-
free to the employees. Ostheimer and Company, Philadelphia 
consultants, says that this type of coverage is growing 
rapidly and, although at present is largely confined to 
executives, there is a trend to cover all employees. 
*42, p. 122. 
**42, p. 122. 
4. Salary Continuance Insurance 
Although most companies have some form of salary 
continuance plan for temporary disability of executives, few 
are designed to provide for an executive for more than a year 
in case of disability. 
-There are now at least two insurance plans in effect 
that cover such a contingency. One has been written by the 
Ford Motor Company, the other by Ostheimer and Company for 
their executives. 
The plans provide yearly payments up to $10,000 for 
a 10 year period for executives too sick to work. Payments 
begin where ordinary salary continuance plans leave off --
usually at the end of six months of sickness. 
Like group life and medical insurance, the costs of 
salary continuance insurance is deductible by the company and 
not taxable to the employee. 
F. Fringe Benefits 
Because of the dual effect of high taxes and 
increased costs of living on top executive salaries, many 
companies have been providing so-called fringe benefits for 
their executive groups. This results in the company 
absorbing normal budgetary costs of the executives, thereby 
increasing their ultimate take-home pay. 
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Although insurance is, of course, one of the more 
important fringe benefits often provided top executives, it 
has been covered in a separate section previously and so, will 
not be taken, up again here. Other fringe benefits besides 
insurance might include: free medical examinations and care, 
counsel and accountants services in assisting in legal, tax, 
and financial problems; payment of business expenses, in-
cluding travel expenses, costs of entertaining, membership 
fees in clubs and business associations, and the costs of 
business magazines and books; payment of personal expenses, 
such. as dining facilities, company recreational costs, costs 
of education and development, scholarships for executives' 
children (on a competitive basis), interest-free loans, and 
. 
the use of company automobiles for personal use if it is 
under 10 per cent of the total car use.* 
Since such benefits are tax-free to the executive, 
in order to pay for them himself his income would have to be 
increased a minimum of 30 per cent for the lower income execu-
tive, and much higher for executives in the upper tax 
brackets.** Obviously then, fringe benefits offer a form of 
executive compensation that merits considerable attention. 
*2, pp. 413-414. 
**8, p. 388. 
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Fringe benefits can benefit both the executive and 
the corporation. For example,* the ABC Tool Company pays 
its vice-president a straight salary of $25,000 a year. The 
company also provides: 
Combination health and accident policy $300 
Free meals in the company 1 s executive dining room 250 
Free country club membership 400 
Annual medical check-up 50 
Group life iqsurance- - term $25,000 200 
Total $1,200 
The ABC Tool Company is in the 52 per cent corporate tax 
bracket; therefore, its after-tax cost of providing these 
benefits is $576 ($1,200 less 52 per cent) . . But suppose, 
that instead of these benefits, ABC gives i:ts vice president 
a straight salary boost which would enable him to buy these 
benefits directly at the same cost. Since the vice presi-
dent is in a 43 per cent tax bracket, he must get $2,100 to 
meet the cost of $1,200. Thus, the raise would cost the 
company more than $1,000 after taxes. The amount which the 
company would save would increase as the executive 1 s salary 
level rose. (See table on page 120.) 
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Fringe benefits are, in effect, then,forms of indirect 
pay which are more valuable to the top executive than direct 
pay of the same amount. They also bui-ld goodwill for the 
company without throwing the budget out of balance. O· 
"* ... 8 5 ~ pp • . 3 2-33 . 
A. 
executive 
income 
level 
$10,000 
15,000 
25,000 
50,000 
75,000 
100,000 
Table VI. 
SAVINGS BY CORPORATIONS 
IN PROVIDING FRINGE BENEFITS FOR EXECUTIVES 
B. 
amount to 
be spent 
on fringe 
benefits 
$ 500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
c. 
added salary 
needed to 
provide sum 
in col.B (1) 
$ 676 
1,351 
2,027 
2,702 
714 
1,428 
2,186 
2,944 
877 
1,754 
2,631 
3,508 
980 
1,960 
2,940 
3,920 
1,429 
2,858 
4,471 
6,084 
2,000 
4,000 
6,000 
8,000 
D. 
after-tax 
cost of sal-
ary increase 
method 
$ 324 
648 
973 
1,297 
343 
685 
1,049 
1,413 
421 
842 
1,263 
1,684 
470 
941 
1,411 
1,882 
686 
1,372 
2,146 
2,920 
960 
1,920 
2,880 
3,840 
E. 
after-tax 
cost of 
fringe 
benefit 
method 
$ 240 
480 
720 
960 
240 
480 
720 
960 
240 
480 
720 
960 
240 
480 
720 
960 
240 
480 
720 
960 
240 
480 
720 
960 
120 
F. 
company 
saves via 
benefits 
(col.D 
less col.E} 
$ 84 
164 
253 
337 
103 
205 
329 
453 
181 
362 
543 
724 
230 
461 
691 
922 
446 
892 
1,426 
1,960 
720 
1,540 
2,160 
2,880 
(1) Does not include tax deductions by executive for benefits 
cost to him. 
Source: Research Institute of America, Incorporated. 
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1. Free Medical Examinations 
The providing of free medical examinations by a 
corporation to its executives is a rather inexpensive fringe 
benefit. · Yet this service can be beneficial both to the 
company an~ to the executive, since trouble discovered soon 
enough can often be remedied. 
Periodic medical check-ups absolutely dispel 
imagi nary ills which cause just as much ·worry to executives 
as do real ones. Thus, a tremendous lift in morale is given 
to the heal thy executive. In addition to the: large. loss a 
company suffers when one of its top men suddenly dies or is 
forced to retire, unknown amounts of money and morale are 
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lost each year by executives who are ill and, therefore, unable 
to operate at top efficiency. Many times their poor morale is 
passed all the way dowri the line and the company profits suffer.* 
· To be really effective, any health program -- whether 
under the company's medical department or conducted by an 
outside organization -- must be strictly confidential. For 
then, and only then, will executives talk openly about them-
selves. Hardly any man will say he is sick if he thinks it 
might cost him his job. 
Free medical examinations do not need to be the end 
of a company 1 s medical program for its executives. A company 
*80, p. 1'43. 
can also furnish medical treatment, such as dental care, eye 
care, x-ray and laboratory services, · the cost of which is all 
deductible by the corporation as a· business expense and is 
not taxable to the executive as income.* 
2. Business and Personal Expenses 
Each dollar of business expense for which an execu-
tive is not reimbursed will take two dollars out of salary for 
the $50,000 married executive, and almost four dollars of 
salary for the $100,000 executive. Many executives' personal 
budgets are overextended each year because of meeting certain 
business expenses and maintaining a scale of living required 
by the job. It appears that this area of executive compen-
sation has been given much serious thought. Several sugges-
tions have been brought forth in which solutions may be found. 
One solution is to have the company assume financial 
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responsibility or extend benefits which will relieve the execu-
tive of some of the pressure of maintaining living standards 
required by his joq. This would include entertainment expenses 
both at his own home and away~ travel expenses, hotel bills, 
club membership dues, company dining room costs, and many other 
such expenses. One company rents homes to its executives, 
heat and repairs, and keeps up the grounds.** 
*90, p . 140. 
**4, p. 65. 
Another method is to have the employment contract 
require the company to pay a definite expense allowance over 
and above salary. This gives the executive a double advan-
tage since he can make use of the optional standard tax 
deduction and still get a deduction of his actual costs. He 
is able to do this as long as it is clearly understood that 
his compensation arrangement reimburses him for his expenses.* 
Some companies explicitly define the expenses which 
the executive is expected to carry as part of his job so that 
he personally can get tax credit for such expenditures.** A 
recent example of this was when a salesman for Time, Incorpo-
rated was denied the right to deduct expenses incurred by him 
personally.*** The tax court upset the government's finding, 
because a memo from Time stated that its salesmen were paid 
high enough salaries so that the company did not expect "an . 
expense account for every phone call, every taxi ride, every 
luncheon, and every drink bought by a salesman in the course 
of his business and social existence" . A policy statement 
like this or a firm contract ordering the cost as a duty 
sustains the right to deduct what might otherwise be costly 
personal expenses. 
Another good system used is to have the company 
make payment on expenses incurred by the executive on behalf 
*51, p. 303. 
**4, p. 64. 
***51, p. 303-. 
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of the company. This will relieve the executive of as . much of 
the record keeping job as possible. This can often be arranged 
in the case of entertainment expenses and travel expenses by 
the use of credit cards, with the bill and supporting chits 
going directly to the company. Of course, this does not mean 
issuing company che-cks for purely personal expenses .(the tax 
court disallowed company payments for the wedding party of the 
treasurer's daughter*). 
On expenses which the company cannot pay directly, 
it is extremely important that the executive keep adequate 
records. Even where the right to an expense deduction is 
established, the tax examiners and the courts naturally pro-
perly disallow because there is no proof of amounts or business 
purpose. One executive whose expense records consisted chiefly 
of checks made out to cash and "self11 had his tax deductions 
reduced from $10,300 to $444.** On business entertaining at 
home, the executive should request current reimbursement, 
identifying in detail the transaction and the expenses. vlhen 
using his own car for both .business and personal purposes, the 
executive should allocate depreciation and operating expenses 
on a mileage basis and "charge" the company for business 
costs.*** Personal use of a company car by an executive is 
*90, p. 138. 
**75, p. 470. 
***90, p. ' l38. 
not taxable as income to him if such is under 10 per cent of 
the total use made of the car by the company.* 
3. Other Fringe Benefits 
The general fringe benefits which might be included 
in an over-all executive compensation arrangement have been 
previously listed. However, several which are possibly not 
self-explanatory will now be considered. 
a. Rest and Recreation 
The general practice is to send the executive on a 
business trip during which he also has the chance to enjoy 
himself. Annual conventions and company meetings are held in 
summer or winter resort areas with facilities for rest and 
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recreation. The company pays the cost of travel, hotel, meals, 
and business expenses. As long as there are valid# reasons for 
the meetings, say the tax experts, there should be no tax 
problem.** 
Many companies give their top men special privileges 
which amount to extra compensation. An aluminum company keeps 
a lodge in Tennessee with a nine hole golf course for enter-
taining customers; steel executives sometimes cruise the Great 
*30, p. 148. 
# The Bureau of Internal Revenue has recently been giving 
this matter of validity serious scrutiny. 
**85, p. &3. 
Lakes on ore boats which have specially fitted-out guest 
chambers almost as luxurious as anything on the Queen Mary.* 
Many companies maintain yachts, private planes, resort homes, 
and even a dude ranch which can be charged off to company 
expenses because they are frequently used by business 
associates.** 
b. Interest-Free Loans 
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The Treasury Department recently announced -- in the 
case of split-dollar insurance -- that an employee does not 
realize taxable income merely because the company makes its 
f unds available to him interest-free.*** This decision 
tended to clarify much discussion which has arisen over the 
point of company loans to employees on an interest-free basis. 
c. Training and Education 
One rapidly growing fringe benefit which companies 
are providing for their executives is educational and traini ng 
benefits for company employees and their children. 
Many companies have utilized special courses, often 
costing as much as $2,000, at such universities as Harvard, 
*91, p. 74. 
**95, p. 55. 
***85, p. 63. 
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Cornell~ Pennsylvania, and -Stanford for the benefit of their 
executive groups.* The tax picture is not yet entirely clear 
on this kind of executive training. 
Scholarships for employees' children have been ruled 
to -be a business expense for a corporation and entirely tax 
deductible, so long as such scholarships are granted on a 
competitive basis.** 
G. Summary 
Bonuses are said, by their proponents, to offer a 
power ful inducement to management to increase company earnings. 
It is argued that the corporation can cut its fixed expenses by 
offering to . the executives, salaries of only moderate size, 
holding out the prospect of substantia l bonuses dependent on 
the future success of t he business. These statements are not 
denied. 
But for the executive in the high salary bracket, the 
progressive income tax is a major factor in determining his 
preferences in payment methods. Regular salary and bonuses are 
taxed at high rates; stock bonuses are taxed at market value 
in the year of receipt. This, by itself, offers a serious dis-
advantage to bonuses and salaries as a method of compensating 
*85, p. 63. 
**30, p. 1~8. 
executives, since much more favorable ways are now available. 
Today's approach, therefore, is not to try for the 
paper gains of a direct salary or bonus increase, but to con-
centrate on laying up income for the future and to increase 
present take-home pay by cutting income taxes as much as 
possible. 
Although many fringe benefits for executives have 
been devised which are entirely tax-free to the recipients 
and tax deductible by the corporation, others present a 
different problem since the tax picture is not entirely cl·ear. 
It is hoped, however, that even though some tax trouble may be 
encountered, the over-all result will be an increase in take-
home pay for top executives. It appears, at present, that 
fringe benefits offer one of the most satisfactory ways of 
compensating the top executive and, no doubt, new fringes will 
be found to a,dd to the list now available. 
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IV. COMPENSATION PLANS -- DEFERRED BENEFITS 
A. Pensions and Profit-Sharing 
Since many companies combine profit-sharing and pen-
sions, and since the tax aspects of pensions are so similar to 
those of profit-sharing, the two are here treated together. 
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In a profit-sharing plan, the company se~aside a 
certain proportion of the year's profits. In the pension plan, 
it allocates payments sufficient to produce the benefits to be 
paid under the plan. In both cases, the corporation makes pay-
ments to a trust for the benefit of its employees. The money 
is held in trust until retirement of the employees, or until 
some other specified time when payment is to be made.* 
Of course, profit-sharing may take any one of several 
forms: a cash bonus, a stock bonus, an interest in ari invest-
ment fund, pension payments, or a combination of any of these. 
For our purposes here, however, profit-sharing will only be 
discussed as it applies to pension plans. 
Apart from special situations, profit-sharing trusts 
are generally more suitable for compensating executives than 
straight pension plans. Although straight pension plans do 
have definite tax possibilities, the fixed costs involved in 
carrying such plans are often too burdensome for small and 
*85, p. 72. 
medium sized companies, particularly in poorer years. The 
profit-sharing plans carry no fixed costs and yet permit 
generous contributions in good years which provide substan-
tial benefits for the executives. 
Profit-sharing may use as its basis corporate 
profits, sales of the company or division, or some other 
suitable base. It may be a fixed percentage on a long-range 
basis, or it may be set from year to year by the board of 
directors.* If the company suffers a loss in one year and 
is unable to pay dividends, they may or may not be made up 
in subsequent years before management again shares in the 
profits.** Each particular company plan has its own rules.# 
Many companies now have limits on their profit-
sharing plans which may be a specific dollar figure, a per-
centage of earned or paid dividends, or both. Other companies 
feel that they want to give their executives the full benefit 
of rapid accumulation of retirement income offered by their 
pension plans and so have removed all restrictions. Robert 
Gair Company, for example, in 1949 and 1950 paid its presi-
dent salary and bonus amounting to over $100,000. However, 
because of a restriction in the pension plan which allowed 
*10, p. 40. 
**21, p. 13. 
# For examples of specific computational and other problems 
which may be encountered in executive profit-sharing 
plans, see 10, pages 38 through 68. 
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only earnings under $8,000 to be used in determining retire-
ment income, the president was entitled to only $1,000 a year 
pension benefits. In 1950, the plan was revised and the 
restriction lifted, thereby allowing the president's retire-
ment benefits to rise to $12,000 a year.* 
Profit-sharing plans are fairly widespread. In 
general, executive profit-sharing plans have had a better 
acceptance record than those for rank-and-file employees, 
since wage earners are usually more interested in an assured 
steady income. The industries having the largest number of 
managerial profit-sharing plans are food, beverages, machin-
ery, metal products, paper, and textiles.** 
Strict tax rules apply and must be closely observed 
in regard to pension and profit-sharing plans. If handled 
correctly, the employee is not taxed until he receives the 
money. Under profit-sharing, the employee, upon leaving the 
company, may draw his profit-sharing fund in a lump sum and 
pay only capital gains tax rates,*** or he may sell his 
profit-sharing contract back to the company when he leaves 
and pay only capital gains taxes on the proceeds.**** More 
will be said about the tax aspects of pensions and profit-
sharing plans later on in this chapter. 
*4, pp. 56,57. 
**21, p. 6. 
***97, p. 80. 
****91, p. 74. 
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1. The Need for Retirement Plans 
It appears that there are several. justifications 
for executive retirement plans for, in spite of stock options, 
bonuses, and other rewards currently being paid to executives, 
an executive's earning power is at its peak during a relative-
ly small number of years, and during this period is gre~tly 
reduced by income taxes and large expenditures necessa~y to 
maintain his position. For these and other reasons, capital 
accumulation by men in the upper management class is probably 
much less than many persons believe it to be, and pensions 
become necessities rather than gratuities to wealthy men. 
A properly designed pension plan benefits the corpo-
ration and its stockholders as well as the executives in that 
it encourages the executive who has passed his period of 
maximum effectiveness, to retire, thereby making room for 
younger and more efficient leaders to run the company. 
Another reason why it is wise for a corporation to 
establish an executive pension plan .is that the company can 
provide necessary retirement benefits for the executive much 
more cheaply than trying to compensate the executive at a 
rate high enough to enable him to provide his own benefits. 
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2. Installing a Pension Plan 
Like any type of executive compensation plan, a 
pension plan should be created to fit the particular com-
pany's needs and obJectives. Much help in designing such a 
plan can often be obtained from the company's attorney, 
accountant, insurance broker, management, and industrial 
relations counsellor, as well as an independent actuary, and 
representatives of a corporate trustee.* 
It has been said that two main principles should 
be followed in the setting up of any executive pension plan. 
First, the amount of benefit should be adequate for the 
retirement of the executive (35 to 40 per cent is typical of 
I 
most "good" plans in this country), and secondly, few excep-
tions, if any, should be allowed to the rule prohibiting the 
deferment of executive pensions beyond the norma~ retirement 
date.** With these two points in mind, the further design-
ing of the plan may be carried out. 
Probably the most important single decision to be 
made in designing a profit-sharing plan is the amount of 
profits to be allocated to the managerial fund. It is 
generally believed that such share should be large enough 
to provide adequate motivation of executives during normal 
*6, p. 17. 
**84-, p. 536. 
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periods but not large enough to draw criticism from stock-
holders, the public, employees, or the labor unions. This is 
often a very difficult decision to make since "normal" may 
have many definitions and what is "reasonable" will depend, to 
a large degree, on the motives of the person doing the defining. 
Another important decision to be made is whether or 
not the plan should be a "qualified" one coming under section 
165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Such a plan would have 
certain advantages to the company but also certain disadvan-
tages,# not the least of which is that the company cannot 
exercise any discretion over the distribution of profits to 
the employees on the basis of outstanding performance but 
must compute each participant's share according to a pre-
determined formula.* 
The tax law encourages pension 9r profit-sharing 
trusts to invest in the granting company 1 s own stock. Under 
such an arrangement, the employee receiving such stock upon 
retirement pays no tax on any increase in its value ' since 
the date of purchase. If he holds onto the stock until his 
death, all his estate pays is a capital gains tax on the 
value of the stock when it was purchased. If he should sell 
it before he dies, he pays the capital gains rate on the 
increase as well as the purchase price.** 
# See pages 138 through 139. 
*21, p. 7. 
**41, p. 25. 
In its final form, whatever it may be, the pension 
plan is presented to the board of directors for approval and, 
in most cases, to the stockholders who are asked to ratify in-
stallation of it, even though such procedure may not be 
legally necessary.* 
3. Types of Executive Pension Plans 
Basically, there are two types of pension plans;** 
the qualified plan which is eligible under section 165 (a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, and the nonqualified plan. The 
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latter, as we shall see, fills a need in executive compensation, 
although it lacks the tax advantages of the qualified plan. 
a. Qualified Plans 
The qualified plan, by complying with the conditions 
set forth in the tax law, gains certain benefits which make it 
highly desirable. First, the company gets an immediate tax de-
duction for any amount paid into such a plan. Secondly, the 
income on the funds invested in the plan is entirely tax free. 
And finally, the employee is not taxed on any benefits until he 
actually receives them and then possibly only at the capital 
gains rate.*** Obviously then, it would seem that a plan which 
is approved by the tax authorities as being qualified is the 
*6, p. 18. 
**7, p. 19. 
***74, p. 40. 
most effective way of compensating top executives. However, 
there is one big drawback to such plans -- they must not 
discriminate in favor of highly paid employees. According to 
the regulations, the pension funds must be allotted to the 
individual largely in the ratio to his basic salary and must 
cover 70 per cent or more of all employees not specifically 
excluded by law.* It is possible to weigh the individual's 
share by his years of service, but here again, the highly 
paid executive must not be favored.** 
b. Nonqualified Plans 
Because of the sever nondiscrimination rules under 
qualified plans, there has recently been great interest shown 
in nonqualified plans . These p1ans offer less striking tax 
advantages, but do give a company much more freedom in choos-
ing who shall receive pension benefits and in ma~ing individ-
ual contracts with executives. A typical executive contract 
might provide for a $40,000 a year current salary and $15,000 
a year for ten years after retirement. 
Some companies use these deferred pay arrangements 
in conjunction with a qualified pension plan. For example, 
the president of Abraham and Strauss will draw, when he 
retires, about $12,000 a year under the company's qualified 
*20, p . 5. 
**21, p. 7. 
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pension plan, and $35,000 a year under a deferred pay agree-
ment.* This subject of deferred compensation is taken up 
more fully in a later section of this stu~y.# 
The disadvantages inherent in the nonqualified plan 
are that the revenue code will not allow the company a deduc-
tion until the benefits are actually paid,** and·, secondly, 
unless the deferred contracts are very carefully worded,## 
the executive may be judged by the tax officials to, have 
received the income in earlier years than when he actually 
receives it, thus neglec~ing any good effects of the plan. 
4. Joint-Capital Trusts 
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Many companies have made an effort to provide greater 
retirement benefits for their executives while, at the same 
time, attempting to keep their costs within reasonable limits. 
The result, in many cases, has been the joint-capital trust. 
Under such a plan, the company contributes an amount 
annually to a trust fund. This may be either a fixed amount, 
a percentage of profits, or a combination of the two~ Like-
wise, the participating executives also contribute to the fund 
a portion of their salaries according to a prearranged formula.*** 
*4, p. 59. 
# See page 148 through 161. 
**74, p. 41~ 
## See . pages 151 through 152. 
***7l,p. 57. ' 
The qualifying conditions of this type of plan are 
more lenient than those of the regular qualified pension plan. 
The Treasury Department has approved a joint trust that· limits 
pa~ticipation to salaried personnel, age 30 and over, with at 
least five years service, and earning over $3,600 per year; 
and the courts recently approved a trust covering 11 partic-
ipants, 8 of whom were principals in a partnership associa-
tion .* : Under a joint-capital tr.ust, the income on invested 
funds is entirely tax free and so, adds greatly to the 
building up of the fund. The contributions by the company 
are allowed as immediate tax deductions and are not consid-
ered to be current income to the trust participants. 
The funds contributed to the trust are ordinarily 
used to purchase capital stock of the corporation. These 
funds provide ~1 excellent source of capital for the corpora-
tion as well as a dynamic demand for its capital stock. Also, 
the tangible stake in the company and its profitability over 
the long-term means an identification of the executive's 
interest with the company's interest. This can act as a 
powerful incentive. 
5. Advantages of Pensions and Profit-Sharing 
In general, companies with profit-sharing plans 
believe that they have received better managerial performance 
*71, p. 59. 
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because of the stimulation provided by such plans. Such 
companies state that their executives pay closer attention to 
costs, to the elimination of waste, and to better utilization 
of labor and equipment.* It is claimed that stockholders, in 
the long run, receive greater profits than if the plans had 
never existed. 
Qualified pension plans, of course, offer definite 
tax advantages as a means of compensating executives, but 
nonqualified plans often more readily suit particular situa-
tions. Both are effective management tools if used correctly. 
Under the qualified pension plan, the average execu-
tive can accumulate more than twice as much as through his 
own interests; first, because the money , paid in by the com-
pany is tax free, and secondly, because the money earned by 
the plan is tax exempt. For instance, if .a company paid a 
forty year old executive an additional $3,000 a year on top 
of a salary already in the 50 per cent bracket, the increase 
would yield only about $1,500 after taxes. Invested at . 4 
per cent until he reaches 65, this increase would build up 
to about $45,000 after annual taxes. On the other hand, if 
the company were to· put $3,000 a year into a pension trust, 
at age 65 the executive's fund would be about $125,000 less 
capital gains taxes of $31,250, leaving him a net of $93,750, 
and the company's cost ·would have remained the same.** 
*21, p. 18. 
**85, p. 7~. 
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An advantage of profit-sharing plans is that they 
offer a degree of flexibility to comp~ny costs which increased 
salary payments do not. Thus, the company is not saddled with 
heavy fixed costs in years of slack business. 
6. Disadvantages of Pensions and Profit-Sharing 
There are varying opinions as to the merits of 
profi t -sharing and pension plans. Some arguments against . 
profit-sharing are: that the profits rightly belong to the 
stockholders, who have risked their money in the company; that 
executives should not require such incentives to give their 
best eff orts to their jobs; that executives may concentrate 
on short-term gains at the expense of the company's long-
term development; that executives of the company are in 
posi tions to set up systems of accounting whi ch will permit 
them to profit at the expense of the stockholder s; and ~- that., 
finally., if executives receive disproport ionate amounts of 
compensation because of greatly expanded business, the l arge 
payments will adversely influence relations with labor and 
the general public as well as with the stockholders them-
selves. 
But the biggest danger with the typical profit-
sharing pension plan, whether it be qualified or not, is this, 
that once it ia. introduced and is in operation, it is liable 
t o be taken for granted as just another "fringe benefit"; 
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such a plan will then fail to provide the incentive which it 
was devised to do and will merely become an added cost to the 
company . 
. .... 
7. Progressive Retirement 
While the subject covered in this section may at 
first seem to be unrelated to the study of executive compen-
sation plans, in reality it is an integral part of any good 
executive retirement plan to have a definite time schedule 
established for the retirement of older executives who are 
no longer able to effectively promote the best welfare of 
the company. 
It is true, of course, that a board of directors 
has the authority to retire an executive whenever it sees 
fit. However, most directors do not like to tell an execu-
tive with whom they have had long and pleasant associations 
that his effectiveness is beginning to wane and that he 
should retire. With a definite retirement timetable estab-
lished, such unpleasantries are avoided. 
Several companies have been experimenting with a 
system known as progressive retirement. Under such a system, 
when an executive reaches a certain age he is given a month 
off, and each year thereafter an added month or two of 
11 vacation time" is granted until full retirement is 
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reached.* With this plan in operation, the executive avoids 
the shock of suddenly reaching retirement age and finding 
himself with nothing to do, as he has gradually become 
accustomed to being away from the company and has begun to 
develop other interests. Also, the company is better off, 
since i t has painlessly retired its older exe~utives while, 
at the same_ time, gradually training its younger men to take 
over the more responsible jobs. 
The William Wrigley, Jr., Company has a modified 
progressive retirement system which operates as follows.** 
(See chart below.) 
Chart III . 
PROGRESSIVE RETIREMENT PLAN OF THE WILLIAM WRIGLEY,JR.,COMPANY 
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If an executive has, for instance, earned $24,000 for each 
of the past three years, and he will have thirty years 
service at age 65, he must decide before reaching 65, how 
much longer he wishes to work. He can (1) retire at 65 
with an $8,700 annual pension; or ( 2) if the retil"ement 
committee approves, stay on and take an extra month's leave 
without pay for each extra year, (i.e., one month the first 
year, two months the second, etc.) . . If he does decide to 
stay on, his pension credit will increase. By the age 69, 
his annual pension credit will be $11,919, and social 
security payments could assure a total income of over 
$13,500 -- close to the $14,000 then earned for seven 
month's work. No executive has yet chosen to work longer 
than the four extra years. 
B. Annuities 
Another way for a company to reward its top execu-
tives at relatively low cost is by the use of annuity insur-
ance policies. There are basically two ways in which this 
can be done. 
One way is for the company to take out the policy 
in the name of the executive but making the executive's 
rights to the annuity forfeitable. The tax considerations 
are then similar to a funded pension plan -- the executive 
is not subject to tax until he actually begins to receive 
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benefit payments, at which time his total income will probably 
be less and lower taxes will result.* From the company's 
viewpoint, the premium payments are considered to be addi-
tional compensation to the executive and are fully deducti-
ble as business expenses. 
Standard Oil of New Jersey puts an amount equal to 
1 to 3 per cent of an executive's annual pay toward annuity 
purchases. One top executive received credits of $18,225 
from the company in 1954, i n addi tion to his salary of 
$195,000. , The company expressly stated in its agreement 
tha t the premiums paid were not to be considered as current 
compensation and, hence, were not subject to present income 
t axes because the employee, "receives no benefits unless and 
until his annuity payments commence".** 
The · other way in which annuity policies can be 
drawn up i s for the company to be the beneficiary. The tax 
laws, in this case, do not allow the , company a business 
deduction for its premium payments but only deduction of the 
proceeds of the policy when actually paid to the executive 
in the form of retirement payments. This method does, 
however, provide probably the safest method of assuring that 
the executive wiJ,l be taxed only when and as the pension 
*10 ' p. 222. 
**95, pp. 54-55. 
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payments are made.* Also, if the executive should die 
before receiving a stipulatedJ,number of payments, there 
would be no tax on the first $5,000 of remaining payments 
paid to his family.** 
C. Deferred Compensation Plans 
Deferred compensation is involved in every form 
of executive compensation arrangement except straight salary, 
current cash bonus payments, and some of the executive fringe 
benefits, Stock bonuses, pension plans, annuities, and the 
various stock plans#, all rest on the idea of deferring 
compensation, the same as does an employment agreement pro -
viding directly for the postponement of benefits for current 
services. Many persons who condemn deferred compensation 
plans often do not realize tha t they are also condemning all 
other important executive pay plans except current salary 
and current bonuses. 
Some people confuse deferred pay arrangements with 
pension plans. The difference may not always be clear. In 
general, deferred pay is salar y that is postponed, while a 
pension is something added to a salary. The latter is 
accepted as soc~_ally desirable as security for old age; the 
*10, p. 212. 
**30' p. 141. 
# See Chapter V for explanations of the various stock plans 
of executive compensation. 
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former may have to be justified purely as a business neces-
sity. Let us look, then, at the reasons for having deferred 
compensation plans. 
The average 50 year old executive earning over 
$20,000 a year is today in at least a 38 per cent tax 
bracket. If he is ·making over $32,000, he is in at least a 
50 per cent tax bracket. In order for him to save enough 
money to provide retirement income equal to half of his 
annual salary, he would have to put away over 46 per cent of 
his take-home pay.* (See chart below.) 
Table VII. 
EXAMPLES SHOWING DIFFICULTIES OF EXECUTIVES 
CREATING AN ESTATE OUT OF INCOME. 
(To have income at age 65 equal to half his take-home 
pay, a 50 year old executive would have to be able to 
save the following amounts from annual take-home pay) 
Gross Income 
$ 25,000 
50,000 
75,000 
100,000 
Necessary Amount 
Of Savings 
$ 8,700 
14,500 
18,850 
22,300 
Necessary percentage 
Of Savings From 
Take-Home Pay 
46.4 % 
46.6 
46.5 
46.3 
Source: Harvard Business Review, January, 1955, Page 96. 
*67, p. 96. 
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It appears that the most effective relief for this 
situation is some sort of deferred pay arrangement. A degree 
of relief can be obtained in some cases by the use of non-
taxable fringe benefits;# however, the only way the problem 
can be attacked on a broad scale is through some sort of 
deferment of compensation. In a study made in 1955' it was 
found that of the i,087 companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, over 900 (approximately 90 per cent) had some 
sort of deferred pay arrangements in effect for their top 
executives . 
Many lower echelon executives, as well as certain 
highly paid business specialists, also have an interest in 
deferred compensation plans, since the income tax rates may 
reach as high as 30 per cent on taxable income of $6,000 and 
50 per cent at the $16,000 level, if the recipient is un-
married.** 
It seems fair to point out that the executive's 
income, like that of the professional man, represents, in 
large part, a return of capital; for one who earns his 
living by selling his services reaches a peak during the 
span of a limited number of years. The traditional ideas of 
thrift stress that th~ earnings of those peak years should 
largely be put aside to provide a fund for later years when 
# See pages 113 through 130. 
*67, p. 89. 
*"*74, p. 39. 
147 
income will decline. However, under today's tax laws, the 
high earnings are largely turned over to the government, . and 
the executive is unable to build substantial resources out 
of his current compensation. 
Although many authorities in the field, and the 
general public as well, may deplore the use of deferred 
compensation plans and consider such company benefits as 
being paternalistic, nevertheless, a well conceived and pro-
perly formulated deferred pay plan may furnish the required 
incentive which is no longer present in current compensation 
alone. 
1. Designing Deferred Compensation Agreements 
Deferred compensation agreements are a relatively 
new device and, since they are so varied in design, it is 
not possible to comment too generally about them. 
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Under such contracts, part of the executive!s income 
may be spread over five or more years or, as is more usually 
the case, over a period of years after the executive retires 
from the company. Such an agreement may call for a specified 
income during the period when the executive is actively 
employed and a reduced income for a period of years thereafter. 
Although the tax laws are still not entirely clear 
as to the treatment of such deferred agreements, it is the 
opinion of tax qounsel that if such agreements are developed 
upon ' the needs of the particular business in order to hold 
key executives, that the courts will sustain such agreements 
as having a "business purpose" and, therefore, will allow 
them for tax purposes.* As to the taxability of such pay-
ments to recipients, tax experts warn that the agreements 
must contain elements of uncertainty about collection of 
deferred pay in order that forfeitability exist and execu-
tives can be sure of avoiding payment of present taxes .. 
For example, it is desirable for the individual 
executive to agree: to give up the deferred pay if he quits 
or is fired before the deferred pay is due; not to compete 
or to work for a competitor during the retirement period; to 
remain available for consulting or advisory services; or to 
waive deferred pay if the company's earnings or sales, or 
some other index of well being falls below stipulated levels 
during the payout period.** Of these arrangements, only the 
first appears to be foolproof. Obviously, any formal 
arrangement by the company to ensure that funds are available 
to pay the exec~tive in later years, removes an element of 
uncertainty and should be avoided. 
In all probability, if the employee's rights are 
not found to b~. forfeitable, he will be taxed in the year 
*78, p. 351. 
**2, p. 411. 
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of severance for the entire amount due him.* This will, of 
course, defeat the purpose of the plan entirely. 
It should be pointed out that deferred compensation 
arrangements should only be adopted after careful consider-
ation has been given to all factors involved in the indi-
vidual case and only after a competent tax specialist and 
attorney have been consulted. 
A deferred benefit plan, of course, should be 
prepared with due thought so as not to force executives for 
whom it holds no interest, into the plan. But there is no 
valid reason for not having such a plan merely because the 
group which wants and needs it is relatively small. 
2. Examples of Deferred Compensation 
As distinguished from deferred profit-sharing, 
deferred compensation plans are usually granted on the basis 
of individual contracts or arrangements. 
For example, Federated Department Stores has a 
contract with one of its executives which allows $55,000 a 
year for life upon termination of active employment. If the 
executive should die before receiving ten annual installments, 
his family will receive payments until the ten installments 
have been paid.** 
*78, p. 352. 
**95, p. 54. 
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Charles F . Johnson, Jr. has a contract wi t h 
Endicott-Johnson Corporation calling for full time employment 
for a three year period at $85,000 a year and then $30,000 a 
year over the next t en years for advisory services.* 
Continental Oil Company has an agreement with its 
pre sident to pay him $35,000 a year after retirement, for 
advisory services. This amount, however, is to be suspended 
during any period in which he engages in a competitive busi-
ness.** 
An interesting variation of deferred compensation 
is the General Electric Plan which has changed its bonus 
incentive plan method of payment in the case of top execu-
tives. One-half of the annual bonus is now paid immediatel;y 
and one-half is to be distributed in company stock, in from 
ten t o fifteen annual installments, commencing with the year 
of the executive's retirement.*** 
Many flexible deferred pay contracts are drawn up 
to protect executives from economic changes, such as infla-
tion. Retired executives of Foote Brothers Gear and Machine 
Corporation get an increase in their deferred pay when the 
operating officers have had their salaries raised.**** 
*67, p. 93. 
**4, p. 40. 
***10, p. 169. 
** "**32, p. 104. 
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Likewise, the Continental Oil Company contract mentioned 
above has an "esculator clause'' that provides for an infla-
tion adjustment.* 
Deferred pay agreements may work to the advantage 
of the company as well as the executive, since many such 
agreements stop benefit payments if company profits fall off. 
American Ship Building Company has agreed to pay its presi-
dent, W. R. Gerhauser, 30 per cent of his average pay in the 
three years preceding retirement, for each of ten years after 
retirement. The contract also states, however, that the com-
pany need not make any such annual payment if in its pre-
ceding two years it has failed to show an operating profit.** 
Probably the most famous de t erred pay contract 
which has ever been drawn up was not for a business executive 
at all, but for a television per f ormer. It was between the 
National Broadcasting Company and Milton Berle, in which it 
was agreed that Berle was to receive $50,000 a year for 30 
years. He was to work 39 weeks a year for the first five 
years, 25 weeks a year for the next five years, to be engaged 
as a producer, writer, director, and consultant for the next 
ten years, and he was under no obligation for the last ten 
years. 
*32 , p. 104. 
**32 , p. 104 . 
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Such a contract, of course, meant a drastic reduc-
tion in Berle's current . income, since before the contract he 
received $13,500 per performance and could, therefore, have 
earned the $1,500,000 in less than three years. At that 
rate, taxes would have taken $1,170,000, leaving him about 
$330 ,000. Under his deferred pay agreement, Berle would keep 
about $936,000 and the government would get only $564,000.* 
The Berle-type contract is not limited to per-
formers; in fact, it is quit~ adaptable to corporate execu-
tives. The president of Universal Pictures has a ·similar 
agreement under which he gets $1,500 a week for five years on 
a full-time basis, and $1,000 a week as a consultant for the 
next five years on a part-time basis .** 
3. Deferred Stock Plans 
Future distributions of·stock may also be provided 
for through an individual deferred contract or agreement. 
The Texas Company has a so-called ~~_incentive compen-
sation account plan" under which a given number of "units" are 
credited to each participating executive's account. Each unit 
represents one share of the company's stock on which dividends 
a re subsequently accumulated . The executive becomes entitled 
*4, pp. 35, 36. 
**4, pp. 35, 36. 
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to receive this stock only if he remains in the company's 
employ until death, disability, or retirement at age 65. If 
he draws the stock after retirement .(ten annual installments) 
he must continue to render consultive services to the com-
pany and, also, agree not to compete with it.* 
'I'he Koppers Company has a deferred stock plan very 
similar to that of the Texas Company, except that benefits 
are paid out not in stock but in the form of cash equal to 
the value of the individual executive's account on the date 
of his retirement or, at his discretion, within three years 
after termination.** 
4 . Advantages of Deferred Compensation 
Several of the advantages of deferred compensation 
arrangements have already been mentioned. There are others, 
however, which are equally important and need to be brought 
forth. 
Since deferred benefits are usually contingent upon 
the executive's continuing in the employ of the firm until 
the deferred benefits become payable, the "holding power" of 
such plans is indeed strong and helps to keep the top manage-
ment team of a company intact. The larger the company's 
*67, p. 100. 
**85, pp. 68,70. 
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investment in training, education, and experience of its top 
executives, the more important such holding power becomes . * 
To the extent that deferred compensation payments 
are made in cash, the company will have the use of su0h . cash 
during t he period of deferment . This may be an important 
factor to a small growth company which has a dire need for 
·cash. Even if the benefits are . paid in stock, the company 
wi ll have the use of the cash which would have been paid as 
dividends on the stock had it been delivered as current com-
pens a tion. -Ja 
Koster points out that deferred pay plans easily 
have the advantage over qualified pension plans, since the 
number of employees who have to be covered is not a problem 
and, hence, it does not become staggeringly expensive for 
the company to maintain such plans.*** 
Deferred pay agreements have often been used to 
lure top executives away from firms not offering such forms 
of compensation.**** 
Of course, deferred pay agreements may also provide 
a company \tli th a much less expensive way of compensating 1 ts 
top men than by using current salaries. In one case where a 
*67, p. 98. 
**67' p. 90. 
***32, p. 104 . 
****4, p. 36. 
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company was seeking an executive vice-president, it offered 
$40,000 a year. The proposed executive, however, asked 
instead for $30,000 a year and $5,000 a year after retire-
ment for a period of as long as he had been employed by the 
company. This was agreed, and it resulted in saving the 
company $5,000 a year, providing it with the use of a good 
deal more cash, and also, reducing substantially the taxes 
of the executive.* 
To illustrate the point more clearly, if an execu-
tive is receiving $25,000 a. year in salary and it turns out 
that the company is willing to give him a $10,000 a year 
increase, over the next five years the executive will net 
only $5,330 a year, or $26,650 if the increase is taken in 
the form of salary. If, instead, the increase is deferred 
and paid over the first five years of retirement, he will 
net $37,990 --a saving to· him of $11,250 .** Below is a 
table showing the comparison of an executive!s after-tax 
income when he takes an annual increase of the stated amount 
during a ten year period, with the amount he keeps if the 
increase is deferred and paid over a ten year period after 
retirement.*** 
*67, p. 100. 
**85, pp. 68, 70. 
***85, p. 35. 
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Table VIII. 
DEFERRED RAISES SAVE ON TAX 
(The table assumes continuation of current tax rates, and 
that other income equals deductions and exemptions in the 
years before and after retirement.) 
Totals Over 10 Year Period 
Income Annual Raise Govern- Married Executive Keeps 
Level Raise Total ment After Taxes 
Takes if paid if raise saves 
currently deferred by 
defer-
ment 
10,000 $ 1,000 $ 10,000 $ 2,600 $ 7,400 $ 8,000 $ 600 
15,000 2,000 20,000 6,400 13,600 16,000 2,400 
20,000 3,000 30,000 11,400 18,600 24,000 5,400 
25,000 5,000 50,000 22,300 27 ,)00 39,800 12,100 
50,000 10,000 100,000 61,400 38,600 78,000 39,400 
100,000 15,000 150,000 112,500 37,500 113,800 76,300 
Source: Nation's Business, September . , 1956, Page 35. 
5. Disadvantages of Deferred Compensation 
Probably the biggest single disadvantage to individ-
ual deferred pay agreements is , the uncertainty of tax laws. 
There is no law which either outlaws or permits them. Many 
large companies, including General Electric, Kroeger, Chrysler, 
General Foods, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Monsanto, Radio 
Corporation of America, Phil co, and othe-rs, have added such 
plans to their executive compensation methods, but Congress 
has still failed to come forth with a definite set of rules 
on the subject of deferred pay.* 
· From the executive's point of view, the deferred 
compensation contract is not so desirable to., him as the 
restricted stock option plan; first, because his premature 
death may preclude the receipt of future benefits to his 
family for any extended period of time; and, secondly, 
because his rights to receive future compensation cannot 
become immediately vested without incurring the risk of 
immediate taxability of such rights. His ultimate receipt 
of future compensation, therefore, may depend on whether or 
not his future services are deemed to be satisfactory by his 
employer.** 
Finally, it should be remembered that the relative 
advantage of deferred pay plans is based on a continuation 
of present tax rates. If they should go up during the de-
ferred period, the tax advantages of deferred pay plans 
might be reduced or even eliminated entirely.*** 
D. Summary 
Pensions and profit-sharing plans which qualify for 
favorable te.x treatment are by far the most economical way of 
acc~rnulating retirement funds for executives. The corporation 
*33, pp. 41,44. 
**77, p. 586. 
***97, p. 80. 
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gets an immediate tax deduction; the earnings on the funds 
are tax freej and there is no taxability to the executive 
until he actually receives the benefits. However, plans 
vihich d1scriminate in favor of highly paid employees cannot 
get such favorable tax treatment, and so, it becomes neces-
sary for the company- .to include rank-and-file employees in 
such a plan if top executives are to be covered. At this 
point, the plan often becomes too costly for the company. 
Recent developments, however, may make qualified 
pension plans more feasible as an executive compensat ion 
method. Union pressures are buildingpensions more firmly 
into the basic pay structure. If this trend continues, and 
it appears likely that it will, companies may be forced to 
ac cept pensions for rank-and-file employees, at which point 
a pension plan for executives geared to rank-and-file plans 
may show very favorable results. 
A salient function of deferred pa y arrangements is 
to spread the compensation of top executives more even1y over 
future years, to reduce fluctuations in their earnings, and 
to assure a minimum flow of income. This function certainly 
seems to be legitimate and has been so recognized by the 
court.* 
*67, p. 97. 
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Flexibility is necessary in any deferred pay plan 
so that particular executives for whom the plan has no imme-
diate appeal, may be excluded, and, at the same time, execu-
tives who do need such a plan may be offered the opportunity 
to take advantage of this way to lower their present tax bills. 
Table IX. 
COMPARISON OF THREE METHODS 
OF ACCUMULATING RETIREMENT INCOME 
Cash Salary Company Qualified 
Invested in Deferred Retirement 
Annuity Pay Plan Plan 
Current value of net 
cost to corporation $108,258 $108,258 $108,258 
Yearly life annuity 
payable to executive 
at the age of 65. 23,146 36,600 51,118 
Yearly life annuity 
remaining after 
income tax: 
first five years 23,146 27,325 35,287 
sixth year 22,261 27,325 35,287 
seventh and 
subsequent years 18,662 27,325 35,287 
Present value to 
employee of life 
annuity remaining 
after federal income 
taxes 60,864 80,273 103,663 
Source: Casey, William J., and Lasser, J. K. : Executive 
Pay Plans, New York Business Reports, Incorporated, 
1951, Page 4. 
The most efficient way of accumulating retirement 
income is through a qualified pension trust; the least 
efficient way is by personal savings. A deferred pay plan 
fa l ls in between these two. Although tax rates will no 
doubt change in the future, above is a table which 
demonstrates the relative efficiency of these three methods 
of accumulating retirement income.* 
*4, p. 4. 
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v. COMPENSATION PLANS -- STOCK BENEFITS 
Protection of the corporation and its stockholders 
results, to a large degree, from the top executive's own 
self-interest. Today, top executives, of at least our larger 
corporations, generally identify their future with that of 
their respective companies. These executives may be the 
beneficiaries of plans conferring large benefits on them; 
they may also own stock interests in their respective firms 
acquired either under a stock option, a stock warrant, or a 
stock purchase plan. There are important advantages to such 
plans. They provide a direct interest in the company and its 
operations, and, undoubtedly, a form of incentive for which 
there is no adequate substitute. Such plans also offer 
substantial tax advantages. 
The stock bonus used to be a popular method of 
giving executives a pay increase as well as a greater stock 
interest in the employing corporation. However, high tax 
rates now discourage this practice and make stock option and 
stock purchase plans much more satisfactory as a form of top 
executive compensation.# 
A. Stpck Options 
Typically, a stock option plan provides executives 
with the privilege of purchasing shares of the company's stock 
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# See pages 111 through 113 for a discussion on stock bonus plans. 
at some future date at a specified price.* Thus, if the 
executive's good work increases the company's profits, he 
will find it profitable to exercise the options and, hence, 
realize greater personal income. Stock option plans offer 
the advantage of_not requiring the expenditure of corporate 
funds to increase executive compensation and, in fact, actu-
ally bring new funds into the business when the options are 
exercised. 
The main advantage of stock options from the execu-
tive's point of view is that they provide him with a chance 
to increase his income substantially and yet pay a relatively 
sma ll tax. However, certain conditions must exist in order 
to make stock options practicable both from the company's as 
well as the executive's viewpoint.** 
First, unless an executive is in a position to con-
tribute to the company's profits, a stock option, in effect, 
represents little more than something for nothing. In order 
to really contribute, an executive must hold a key position. 
Secondly, in order for the stock option plan to be 
truly beneficial to an executive, he must already be in a 
very high tax bracket. He must, also, be in a financially 
*lO, p. 121. 
**89, pp. 148,419. 
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strong enough position to take the risk of possible severe 
declines in the value of his stock interest should the stock 
marke t take a sudden dip. 
Finally, the stock option plan, to be of real bene-
fit as an incentive, must provide for the retention of the 
stock purchased under the plan by the executives; for if this 
is not done, the interests of the executives and the stock-
holders will fail to become identical -- namely, to increase 
company profits over the long run. 
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The decision of whether or not to use stock options 
should depend upon the conditions in each individual company. 
In many cases, probably. the soundest decision would be not to 
issue options. Basic factors which are considered to be of 
utmost importance in the installation of any stock option 
plan are:* that the stock of the company be listed and 
actively traded, that the company has been reasonably success-
ful in the recent past, and that the top executive group be 
fairly young, averaging close to age 55 or less (this makes it 
possible for executives to contribute to company growth over 
a long enough period to warrant an adequate stock option plan). 
Also of great importance is that the company be of a nature in 
which executive decisions play a greater role in share prices 
than random economic fluctuations. 
*89, p. 418. 
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No one denies that stock option plans can be attract-
ive even though governed by various federal restrictions (from 
which they get the name 11 restricted stock options"). It was 
reported in 1954 that nearly 400 companies li·sted on the New 
York Stock Exchange have adopted such plans.* This means that 
about one-third of the companies listed on the exchange used 
stock options as a part of their executive compensation pro-
grams. 
It is felt by many authorities in the field that 
unless companies can reward their executives by such means 
as stock options, executives will leave in increasing numbers 
to enter businesses for themselves.** In many United States 
communities, for example, dealers are realizing more real 
income than the heads of the companies whose products they 
sell. 
1. Types of Stock Options 
There are two types of stock options which companies 
may issue. One is the restricted stock option which, by 
meeting the restrictions set forth in the federal income tax 
laws, gains certain tax advantages. This type of option is 
the most beneficial taxwise and, because of this, is by far 
the most widely used plan. 
*60, p. 118. 
**92, p. 80. 
The other type of option is referred to as the unre-
stricted stock option. It suffers no federal tax restrictions 
but also enjoys no favorable tax treatment. It is a useful 
device in certain cases, but is very limited in popularity. 
a. Restricted Stock Options 
To get the benefits of tax laws on its option plan, 
a company must be sure that its plan qualifies as a restricted 
stock option. The principal rules are:* that the option 
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price be no less than 85 per cent of the market price of the 
stock at the time the option is granted, that an option granted 
after June 22, 1954 must not run for more than ten years, that 
any exercise of the option must be made while the optionee is 
an employee of the company or within three months thereafter, 
and that the stock acquired under the option ,must not be dis-
posed of for at least two years after the granting of the 0 
option and at least six months after the purchase of the stock. 
The employee need pay no tax when he exercises his option but 
only when he sells the stock, and then only at capital gain 
rates (maximum, 26 per cent).**# Quick sale of the stock, of 
course, will rule out any tax advantage. The employee is 
further restricted from selling his option, but he may leave 
it to. his heirs by will.*** 
*67; p. 94. 
**26, p. 69. 
# There are certain minor exceptions to this statement in 
particular cases. See 20, pp. 6,7 for a complete explanation. 
***93, pp. 55, 56. 
b. Unrestricted Stock Options 
A United States Supreme Court decision in May, 1956, 
removed any possibility of obtaining favorable capital gains 
treatment for options fa~ling . to qualify as restricted stock 
options.* With unrestricted stock options, the executive must 
report as compensation the difference between his option price 
and the fair market value of the stock at the time the option 
is exercised. Ultimately, on the sale of the stock, the 
employee will realize capital gain, but only to the extent of 
the appreciation in value after the option is exercised.** 
However, the executive still retains the advantage 
of being able to defer income to a time when his tax bracket 
will be lower. He has considerable discretion in selecting 
the appropriate year, since he alone can determine the parti-
cular years in which the option is exercised and the stock is 
later sold. Another advantage is that the company can deduct 
as an expense the amount taxed to the executive at the time 
he executes the option.*** 
2. Designing a Stock Option Plan 
In designing a particular stock option plan, there 
are certain problems to be faced for which decisions must be 
*85, p. 72. 
**20, p. 7. 
***20, p. 7. 
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.made. Some of the most important would include: how much 
stock should be provided for, how far down the executive 
chain-of-command should options be granted, and how should 
the terms of payment for the stock be arranged. Each of 
these problems will now be briefly examined. 
a. .Amount of Stock Required. 
In making the decision on how much stock should be 
set aside for the option plan, it should be noted that there 
are two important forces working against one another.* The 
option must be large enough to provide incentive, but at the 
same time, it must not be so large that the executive cannot 
pay for the stock. 
A study of incentive compensation made by Patton 
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a few years ago showed that to be successful, a stock option 
should be worth at least two years salary of its participants. 
If the option is worth less than this, its incentive is not 
strong enough to result in an important capital gain for the 
top executives. On the other hand, when the option is worth 
more than four years salary, the executives will usually find 
it difficult to finance the purchase of the stock without 
selling a sizable por~ion of it.** 
*89, p. 420. 
**89, p. 420. 
The amount of stock to be optioned is, of course, 
subject to practical limitations, for stockholders must 
authorize and free from pre-emptive rights sufficient stock 
to fulfill the plan. While most companies limit their stock 
options to unissued stock, the percentage of option shares to 
prior outstanding. stock may range from one to ten per cent or 
even more. Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, for example, 
offered over eleven per cent.*. 
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There will usually be less resistance by stockholders 
to stock option plans if the options are at 95 per cent or even 
100 per cent of market value rather than when the option price 
is set at 85 per cent of market value.~* In a survey of 83 
option plans established by listed companies, the following 
were the results:*** 18 companies set the option price at 85 
per cent, 1 at 90 per cent, 32 at 95 per cent, 25 at 100 per 
cent, 2 at 101 per cent, and 5 at various percentages between 
85 and 100 per cent. Below is a table showing the number of 
shares for eligible employees and the option price as a per-
centage of market price of 16 of the cor porations in this 
survey which optioned 250,000 or more shares of comm~~ stock.**** 
*60, p. 144. 
**4, p. 16. 
***87, p. 18. 
****87, p. 18. 
Table X. 
RESTRICTED STOCK OPTION PLANS ADOPTED 
BY LISTED COMPANIES 
170 
Number of Number of 
Shares Eligible 
Employees 
Option Price 
as Per Cent of 
Market Price 
United States Steel 
Sinclair Oil 
Sears, Roebuck and Co. 
American Airlines 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Gulf Oil 
Standard Oil (N. J.) (1) 
Republic Steel 
Union Oil of California 
Bond Stores 
Celane'se 
Jones and Laughlin 
E. M. Loew's 
Allegheny Corporation (2) 
St. Regis Paper 
United Paramount 
1,300,000 
598,700 
500,000 
500,000 
450,000 
. 400,000 
300,000 
300,000 
300,000 
300,000 
300,000 
300,000 
250,000 
250,000 
250,000 
250,000 
300 
200 
40,000 
30 
4,000 
95 
125 
75 
30 
659 
45 
100 
6 
10 
100 
50 
100 
100 
85 
85 
85 
85 
95-100 
95 
100 
95 
95 
100 
100 
100 
95 
95 
(1) 
(2) 
Number of shares may be doubled to adjust for two-for-
one stock split. 
Option exercisable only when assets are above liquidation 
value, or provided earnings for four quarters equals $1 
a share. 
Source: New York Times, June 10, 1951, Page 1. 
b. Who Should be Included 
The answer to the question of how far down the line 
to go with options is greatly affected by the amount of stock 
to be issued but, assuming that sufficient stock has been made 
available, it still apEears that stock options benefit the 
employer most when they are limited to top executives and key 
personnel. A study of 50 different-sized companies in dif-
ferent industries indicates that participation in option plans 
is being limited to a small top group.* 
A study of the first 100 stock option plans filed 
with the Stock Exchange showed that about one-third included 
less than 15 top executives and another one-third, less than 
50.** It appears that middle and lower echelon executives 
normally find more motivation in incentive compensation other 
than stock options, since their need for cash is usually more 
acute. A cash bonus generally offers greater incentive to 
those executives earning less than $25,000 .*** Also, there 
is adequate evidence that a company stands to gain relatively 
little from an option plan which included too many employees. 
When shares are spread too thinly, dilution of incentive to 
executives follows, as well as dilution of stockholders' 
equity when too much new stock is created by the option. 'rhe 
lower l evel executive , too, is often not fully aware of the 
risk inherent in an option plan and may suffer a serious 
decline in morale if the value of his holdings suddenly drops. 
There are a variety of ways in which companies 
choose those executives who are to participate in option 
*4, p. 16. 
**89, p. 417. 
***89, p. 422. 
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plans. Robert Gair and Company names the specific individuals 
who are to participate; North American limits the number of 
individuals who may be eligible; Nesco leaves to its president 
the choosing of the officers and key men who are to benefit; 
United Paramount Theatres leaves the choosing to a committee 
of directors; Jones and Laughlin leaves it up to a stock 
option committee made up of the pres i dent and three nonofficer 
directors; Philco has its board of directors choose from a 
group of 27 possible participants; and American Viscose grants 
options to 25 to 30 executives and key personnel but in no 
event, more than 50, as chosen by a stock option committee. 
One eligibility requirement which is frequently 
appearing in stock option plans today is the age of the execu-
tive. Many companies feel that an executive aged 60 or older 
will not ·be sufficiently motivated by the long run possibili-
ties for · income in an option plan, since he will soon be 
retiring. 
The following quotation taken from a proxy statement 
sums up fairly well the qualifications which are considered 
in deciding how far down a stock option plan should go.* 
"In determining the employees to whom options shall 
be granted ..•• the committee shall take into account 
the duties of the respective employees, their present 
*50, p. 385. 
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and potential contributions to the success of the 
corporation, the anticipated number of years of 
effective service remaining, and such other factors 
as they shall deem relevant ...•. " 
c. Terms of Payment 
There is no particular type of ·payment necessary in 
the exercise of restricted stock options. If an option plan 
meets the statutory requirements, the fact that installment 
payments are made will not affect the favorable tax treat-
ment to the executive. In fact, the option stock itself can 
be used as a pledge in making the purchase, or the employing 
company itself can finance the purchase by making loans to 
its officers·. Sylvania, as early as 1950, was making loans 
for this purpose, up to 90 per cent of the stock's cost.* 
A lot depends on how the individual company feels 
about financing such purchases. Gulf Oil, for instance, 
requires payment in cash; Consolidated Textile allows 4 years 
to pay; Celatex allows 10 years; and Arnold Constable, 15 
years but charges 2 per cent interest.** 
d. Unlisted Companies 
A warning which should probably be issued at this 
point, is that a l l the thousands of companies whose stock is 
*4, p. 11. 
**4, p. 18. 
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not listed on a securities exchange may find it dangerous to 
attempt to issue restricted stock options because of the 
uncertainty of their stock's market price.* The danger exists 
not to the company itself but to its executives, since the 
failure of the plan to qualify may subject the executives to 
income tax on the spread between the option price and the 
market price of the stock when the option is ~xercised. It 
is often quite difficult to determine what the market price 
is of a particular stock, since there may be several market 
prices. For instance, the average price for one day, an 
average for 20 days, the per share price for 100 shares, and 
the per share price of 10,000 shares may all vary consider-
ably; or to make it even worse, the stock may not be actively 
traded and so its selling price may be subject to consider-
able disagreement.** 
e. Purposes of Stock Option Plans 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that different 
companies may issue stock options to fulfill different pur-
poses. Some companies, like Corn Products Refining, use 
stock options as a form of deferred compensation to ease 
post-retirement economic problems. Others, like Moore-
McCormack Lines, issue options to their younger men who are 
*60, p. 119. 
**81, p. 689. 
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expected to boost earnings for many years to come. Options 
may also be issued as a short-term incentive for key execu-
tives. 
At Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, a stock 
option plan was inaugerated in 1950 which included the pro-
vision that executives who received stock options could not 
exercise them for three years. Thus, President Chapman 
aimed to hold together for at least three years the new 
executive team which he had set up.* 
3. Examples of Stock Option Plans 
The great majority of stock option plans up to the 
present time have produced handsome paper profits for partici-
pating executives. Some, however, have failed to keep pace 
with the general climb, and in a few companies, today's market 
price is below the option price set two or three years ago.** 
Aircraft companies up to 1955 offer a striking 
example of the possible lucrativeness of stock options. One 
company issued options to its executives in 1952 at a price 
of $5.90 per share. By 1955 the market price had risen to 
$35 -- a gain of 493 per cent.*** 
*60, p. 151. 
**96, p. 27. 
***96,pp. 26, 27. 
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In the Ford Motor Company, it is estimated that up 
to November 25, 1955, Ford's top executives had total profits 
of more than $24 million on shares purchased under options.* 
One vice-president alone was able to make $394,000 and own 
3,000 shares of new Ford stock (estimated at a value of 
$200,000) without spending one cent of his own money.** 
An executive of tbe Columbia Broadcasting System, 
in 1954, exercised his options to buy 17,000 C.B.S. shares 
at $24.75 a share, and 33,000 shares at $38.25. The stock 
was later split three-for-one, resulting in paper profits in 
early 1956 of more than $2 million. Likewise, an executive 
of the Aluminum Company of America used his options in 1954 
to purchase 18,900 shares of Alcoa at $58.75 per share. A 
two-for-one split in 1955 converted them into 37,800 shares 
now worth over $2 million more than the purchase price.*** 
The examp~es cited above are, of course, extreme 
cases. Most stock option plans, however, have proven to 
be very satisfactory in increasing the income of their 
participants. 
Below is outlined one instance, in 1953, in which 
an executive suffered a substantial loss of paper profits 
under a restricted stock option plan. 
*94, p. 142. 
**14, p. 54. 
***95, p. 54. 
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The restricted stock option plan of David Sarnoff of the 
Radio Corporation of America worked out as follows:* 
November, 1950 - Sarnoff got an option 
to buy 100,000 shares of R.C.A. common 
stock at $17.75 a share (the market 
price at that time). $1,775,000 
February, 1953 - He exercised the 
option, using bank loans, when the 
market price was about $26.00 a share 2,600,000 
Approximate pre-tax paper profit $ 825,000 
Paper profits after 26% capital gains tax 
September$ 1953 - He sold 75,000 shares 
at about 21.50 a share, or a total of 
$1,612,500 for an actual gain (minu~ 
bank loans, interest, and brokers fees) 
of $281,250,less 26% capital gains tax $208,115 
Plus - 25,000 shares from the ·option 
now worth about $587,500 for which he 
$610,500 
paid $443,750, or a paper gain after 
26% capital gains tax of 106,375 314,490 
Result: A bear market "loss" of 
potential profit of $296,010 
As mentioned previously, there are certain risks 
involved in stock option plans. One is that, whether they 
want to or not, executives who receive potentially valuable 
restricted stock options are always playing the market. The 
problem they face is to try to choose the right time to exer-
cise their options, for they must hold the stock they get for 
*46, p. 90. 
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a period of two years after they get the options and six months 
after they get the stock, in •rder to realize the tax advant-
ages of such plans. In the face of changing market conditions, 
such problems of timing can be quite risky. Also, the problem 
of financing such stock purchases in the face of falling mar-
ket prices or changing economic conditions may prove to be 
very difficult. 
4. Advantages of Option Plans 
Stock options as well as stock purchase plans pro-
vide executives with ways of deferring income and, unlike 
pension plans, the extent of deferment rests with each indi-
vidual executive. Also, the executive is given a position 
in the company's stock without any immediate cash investment. 
He directly benefits, at deferred and very favorable tax 
rates, in anything which he can contribute to the building of 
the value of his company 1 s stock. He usually knows enough 
about the company and the industry to have an informed judg-
ment on whether or not he. has growth stock, and he can con-
tribute to that growth in a direct way. In short, the execu-
tive, by taking a stock option, can defer tax, get an 
investment return on tax money~ and a chance at capital gain 
from a position substantially sheltered from loss. 
From the corporation's point of view, the stock 
option alsp has some real advantages, the main one of which 
is probably its power to attract and hold first-class execu-
tive talent. Ford, for example, lured Ernest Breech away from 
a top General Motors' position by offering him an option to 
buy Dearborn Motors Stock; James Nance quit Hotpoint's presi-
dency to takeover Packard with an option to buy 200,000 shares 
of Packard stock at $4 a share at any time until 1957.* 
In addition, because of the capital gains retirement 
of profits from restricted stock options, the cost to the 
company of granting such options may be considerably less 
than the granting of a salary increase large enough . to net 
the executive as much as the profit on his option.** 
5. Disadvantages of Option Plans 
One of the biggest problems which the executive 
participating in a stock option plan is likely to face is the 
financing of the purchase of the stock. Very few top execu-
tives can afford to purchase large blocks of stock even at 
below market prices without borrowing the money. Since 
banks are limited by law to loaning only a portion of such 
borrowing, executives often find it difficult to accumulate 
the necessary cash to exercise ~heir options. 
So long as options are confined to only top execu-
tives who can afford the attendent risks, however, they are 
*91, p. 74. 
**60, p. 119. 
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not subject to the criticisms that have usually accompanied 
general stock plans for employees. But a good deal of em-
phasis should be placed on the hazards of stock options for 
lower echelon executives. Many of these men simply cannot 
afford to borrow large sums of money in order to purchase 
stock which in a given six months period could decrease 
from 30 to 50 per cent in value. It will be recalled that, 
in the past, the biggest waves of stock option plans occurred 
at peaks in the stock market 1928, 1929, and 1936, 1937.* 
The financial risks involved in such plans should therefore 
be self-evident. 
Another disadvantage of stock optio"ns as a form of 
compensation is discussed by Andrew R. Towl of the Harvard 
Business School.** He points out that companies which pre-
viously have gone all out for options for their executives 
now find that no further authorized stock is available for 
new executives or for continuation of .the plans already 
begun. Along these same lines, stockholders' equity and 
earnings are diluted. These objections, then, would tend 
to discourage the use of stock options as a continuing form 
of executive compensation. 
Another major objection to the use of stock options 
is that the company loses money when it sells stock to 
*89, p. 423. 
**71, p. 63. 
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executives at below market price (i.e., 85 per cent of market 
prices) because this same stock could be sold to outsid.ers at 
the regular market price. Even if the discount is considered 
to be additional compensation to the executives, unlike 
salaries or bonuses, it cannot be deducted by the company for 
tax purposes .* 
Many companies, like American Radiator and Standard 
Sanitary Corporation, find stock options to be unsatisfactory 
for their companies because, -"Our stock is not rising fast 
enough to give an executive an opportunity to make enough on 
his stock option to provide any real incentive, and if the 
stock drops, his morale will probably go down, too."** 
I. L. Handy, New York management consult~nt, feels 
that stock options may be undesirable for othe~ reasons. He 
tells of five successful company officers (two presidents 
and three vice-presidents) who have approached him recently 
in search of new positions. These men all held stock options 
which were of considerable value; the lowest with a profit of 
$350 , 000 and the highest touching $825,000. All of these men 
wanted to cash in on their holdings but none of them felt 
that they could do so while still with their companies. The 
very compensation .. plans designed to hold these men were 
actually driving them away.*** 
*96, p. 27. 
**60, p. 119. 
***27, pp. 116, li8. 
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Many stockholders have argued that restricted stock 
options are poor and undesirable forms of executive compensa-
tion. Their arguments have run as follows:* according to 
the law, options are designed to do three things: give 
executives (1) a share in the business -- to make them owners 
as well as professional managers, (2) an added incentive to 
make the worth bf the business grow, and (3) compensation of 
a sort that high direct income taxes prevent. But, they 
explain, when a market break forces executives to sell stock 
acquired with options, what happens to the first two reasons 
for such plans? 
Several minority stockholder suits have been 
brought, asking for injunctions against their companies• 
stock option plans. The most famous of these are probably 
four suits against Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), United 
states Steel Corporation, May's Department Store, and CIT 
Financial Corporation.** 
Pnobably the biggest danger in the use of stock 
options, at least from the company's point of view, is that 
its executives may become so intrigued with the ~orm of the 
plan that they lose sight of the substance. Preoccupation 
with the plan's tax relief aspects may cause executives to 
forget about the incentive features of stock options. 
*46, p. 94. 
**26, p. 69. 
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Finally,companies whose stock is closely held may 
find stock options to be less attractive to their executives 
than in more widely owned companies, since thin trading of 
the shares will make it difficult to dispose of stock 
interests. However, such companies may overcome this dis-
advantage by obligating themselves to buy back an executive's 
stock at his request at the current market price. 
~. Stock Warrants 
Because of the financing difficulties faced by 
executives in exercising stock options, some companies have 
turned to the stock warrant as an executive compensation 
device. Stock warrants are negotiable certificates· giving 
the holder the right to buy a certain number of shares of a 
company's stock at a set price within a specified time. 
Thus, an organization may sell such a warrant to an execu-
tive. When the stock appreciates in value, he may sell the 
warrant and pay only capital gains tax on the profit 
realized.* 
The major advantage of the warrant idea over the 
stock option is that in the former the executive does not 
have the huge financing problem involved in ·picking up the 
stock. The disadvantage is that the executive is not 
*2, p. 410. 
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encouraged to keep the stock. This is no different from the 
stock option arrangement, however, after the enforced holding 
period has elapsed. 
An example may help to more clearly explain the 
difference between stock options and stock warrants.* 
Warrant Plan Restricted Stock Option Plan 
1. In 1952 executive Jones pays 
company $6,000 for 100 
warrants giving him until 
1958 the right to buy 10,000 
shares at $21 a share ($210,000). 
Current market price is $20 a 
share. 
2. In 1953 the market · price has 
hit $30. The stock is worth 
$300,000. Jones sells his 100 
warrants for $90,000. 
3. Under a recent tax court ruling, 
Jones has an $84,000 profit 
( $90,000 minus $6,000) taxable, 
not as income, but as long-term 
capital gain. 
1. In 1952 executive Smith 
gets an option to buy 
10,000 shares at $19 
95 per cent of the 
market price ($20). 
2. In 1953 when the stock 
is $30 a share, Smith 
can pick up his stock, 
netting him $11 a share 
paper profit ($30 minus 
$19). 
3. To make the $84,000 
Jones made, Smith would 
have to be able to buy 
7,636 shares costing 
him $145,084 ($19 times 
7, 636). 
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4. And, in order to declare 
it as capital gain, 
Smith would have to stay 
invested in the stock 
for another year. 
c. Temporary Stock Restrictions 
Besides stock warrants and restricted stock options, 
there is yet another way which may be even more advantageous 
*34, pp. 104, 108. 
-
for compensating top executives. It is a relatively little 
used method of executive compensation and yet it is suffi-
ciently important enough to deserve mention here. Essenti-
ally, it works like this: the corporation sells shares to 
its key executives at bargain prices by putting temporary 
restrictions on the stock to lower its ·market value, the 
executives can realize substantial capital gains by selling 
the stock after the temporary restrictions have been lifted 
and the value of the stock returned to normal. 
The United States Tax Court has held that buying 
stock subject to restrictions does not result in income to 
the executive, nor does income arise when the restrictions 
lapse. And, so long as the stock is held more than six 
months, any gain is a long-term capital gain.* 
The advantage of stock with temporary restrictions 
as compared to stock options is that the price of optioned 
stock must rise in order to produce gain for the executive, 
while in the case of temporarily restricted stock, gain 
results so long as the stock merely returns to its normal 
value. 
In comparison to stock warrants, which stockholders 
ordinarlly dislike because these do not tie restrictions into 
t heir ownership, temporarily restricted stock can carry 
*38, p. 10. 
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whatever restrictions are deemed desirable from the company's 
point of view. 
Of course, the problem of financing the purchases 
of temporarily restricted stock! remains one of its biggest 
disadvantages, just as in the case of stock options. 
D. Stock Purchase Plans 
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Executive stock ownership grew out of profit-sharing 
at an early stage when employers began to pay shares of profits 
in company stock. It was a short step from this to offering 
t o sell company stock to executives. 
1. Ordinary Stock Purchase Plans 
A stock purchase plan is perhaps the best method of 
compensating executives when the major objective is to en-
courage them to acquire and keep the company's stock. 
The way these plans usually work is that the execu-
tive obligates himself to purchase a definite amount of stock 
at a particular price, arid the company aids him by financing 
t a low rate of interest, holding the stock the purchase a 
until it iS fullY paid.. for.* Thus, a plan is often set up 
executive may pay for the stock in convenient so that the 
*2, pp. 410, 411. 
installments. In many plans, the company agrees to repur-
chase the executive's stock at the price he paid for it, 
thus protecting him against a market loss. 
One of the differences between the typical stock 
purchase plan and the stock option plan is that usually 
only the former carries an arrangement whereby the company 
aids in the financing. Another difference is . that stock 
purchase .plans are usually designed to foster executives' 
interest in the business, while options often have as their 
primary purpose, to permit executives to take advantage of 
lower tax rates. 
An important holding effect may be incorporated 
into stock purchase plans by providing that the executive 
must sell the stock back to the company at cost if he 
decides to leave before retirement or death. This means 
that he will have to give up all unrealized capital gain 
on his investment if he decides to leave the company early.* 
2. "Management Stock" Plans 
A more uncommon way for a company to compensate a 
particularly important top executive or executives, is to 
create a special class of stock to be issued only to these 
executives and a~ a very small price, which will increase 
*4, p. 29. 
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in value if the corporation's business increases. This is 
known as a "management stock" plan. An illustration of such 
a plan was when Vacuum Foods Corporation created a block of 
management shares to be sold to Bing Crosby who paid only 
$0.10 a share for it. His radio programs promoting the 
company's orange juice were so successful that the value of 
his stock rose to $7.00 a share.* 
3. "Bargain Purchase" Plans 
Very akin to stock options are 1•1bargain purchase 11 
plans in which stock of the company is sold to lts executives 
at below current market prices. Such plans differ from 
option plans in that the executive binds himself to make the 
purchase. They also differ from ordinary purchase plans in 
that they usually involve but a single payment in which the 
whole transaction is carried through and completed at one 
time.** 
Of course, the difference between the purchase price 
and the current market price of the stock at the date of sale 
is considered to be ordinary income to the executive and is 
taxable as such. However, any increase in the value of the 
stock after that date is treated as a capital gain.*** 
*64, p. 138. 
**10, p. 121. 
***10, p. 148. 
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E. Summary 
·one of the most widely used forms of executive com-
pensation now in use is the restricted stock option. Although 
this is not a particularly new method, it has attained great 
.) 
popularity since the changes in the tax laws in 1950 which 
have tended to foster its growth. 
We have considered rather generally the principles 
involved in ' the use of stock options and how far down in an 
executive hierarctuthey should be granted. It must be 
remembered, however, that each individual company must make 
its own decision in this matter, after considering its own 
men and their responsibilities. It appears that stock 
options are used largely as a form of incentive among only 
top executives who include at least the president and those 
executives reporting to him. Below this level, each indi-
vidual company's decision must draw the line as to who is to 
be included in such a plan. 
In such cases where stock options have proven to 
be not feasible (i.e., where the value of the stock is not 
likely to increase or where the stock is closely held), 
many companies have found that deferred compensation con-
tracts more nearly fill their needs~* 
*77, p. 584. 
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Legally, the 11 bargain purchase 11 and other stock 
purchase plans present many of the same problems as stock 
,options . Also, all such plans derive their effectiveness 
from a rising stock market. As long as the market is rising, 
everyone is happy, but if the market declines the executive 
finds that he has little incentive to exercise his option or 
complete his purchase, and that the stock interest which he 
now holds in the company is not nearly so much of an incen-
tive for him to put forth greater effort as he once believed 
it to be. 
Of course, stock plans of all sorts may be parti-
cularly useful when a company finds itself struggling against 
adverse business conditions and is in no position to increase 
current compensation to executives. If its long-run future 
looks bright, the executives may be willing to risk the value 
of their present services for a small cash salary plus sub-
stantial amounts of contingent compensation to be taken in 
the form of options to buy stock or as 1.'bargain purchases 11 • 
Such an arrangement was made by the Remington Rand Company 
with James H. Rand at a time when the company's losses 
exceeded $3 million a year and its stock was selling at 
$1.50 a share. Valspar Corporation made a similar arrange-
ment with its president and general manager when its common 
stock was selling at between $0.25 and $0.50 a share.* 
*10, p. 122. 
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Stock forms of executive compensation, then, like 
all other forms of executive compensation, appear to have 
certain advantages and disadvantages which make them partic-
ularly suitable in some situations and definitely impracti-
cable in others. No one form of compensation is a panacea 
for all companies or all situations. 
The intelligence of choosing a particular form of 
compensation, whether it be current, deferred, in the form 
of stock, or a combination of these, depends upon all the 
complex factors involved in each case. To choose the one 
plan which best fills the needs of an individual company is 
indeed one of the true measures of managerial competence. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The material which has been presented thus far in 
this report has drawn substantially on the work of experts 
in the field of executive compensation who have made valu-
able studies in different phases of the field and who have 
presented their findings in the form of textbooks, periodi-
cal articles, and in other forms for distribution to those 
concerned. Their work has been very valuable in helping to 
understand and solve the problems involved in executive 
compensation. It is hoped that the material which has been 
drawn from the work of these experts, has been presented 
here in a well integrated manner with the other material, 
and may further aid in the solution of these problems. 
The material which comprises the remainder of this 
report consists largely of the conclusions which have been 
drawn by the author in regards to the various phases of 
executive compensation which have been here studied. It is 
hoped that up to this point the material has been presented 
in as unbiased a manner as is possible. No such attempt is 
made beyond this point . 
The conclusions drawn here are by no means the 
only ones which can be supported from the foregoing data, 
but it is hoped that they do appear to be logical in the 
light of the facts and opinions previously discussed. 
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A. Evaluating Top Executives 
It is a difficult task indeed to describe precisely 
what a top executive is and more difficult yet to define what 
he does. 
In attempting to drav'l a composite picture of the 
life of the average executive, we find that his work may vary 
from 9-lmost routine duties in one company to an almost end-
less chain of crises in another. Several characteristics of 
our average top executive, however, seem to be rather 
commonly found in men of his calibre regardless of the company 
for which he works. 
Hard work seems to be the one thing that most top 
executives seem to have in common. Long hours, difficult 
problems, extreme mental pressures, and loneliness also seem 
to be part of their normal lives. 
Upon examination, we find that the qualifications 
for top executives are not those found commonly among people 
in general or among the aspirants for such positions. Such 
qualifications often require years to achieve, if they are 
ever achieved, and, because of their scarcity, make those 
who are truly qualified for such positions greatly sought 
after and therefore able to demand compensation for their 
rare abilities in amounts which many persons who are unfa-
miliar with all tne factors involved consider to be 
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excessive and quite unnecessary. Those persons who qualify 
for such positions represent the minute percentage of the 
total population who possess the rare ability to manage a 
large business enterprise and make all of its many facets 
of activity function in a coordinated and effective manner. 
Such individuals are indeed difficult to find. It is true 
that most of them enjoy the benefits of large incomes, but 
are they not worth them with such valuable abilities as 
they hold? 
The factors which play probably the largest role 
in determining the general ranges of compensation to be paid 
such top executives are the allocaters of all resources in 
a freely competitive economy -- supply and demand. It is 
true, of course, that many other factors enter into the final 
. determination of the actual amount which the individual top 
executive is to receive, but supply and demand play a more 
basic part than many people ordinarily believe. 
To be really successful, the top executive, we 
find, must have more than just the personal, educational, 
and social characteristics which are so necessary in his 
qualifications. He must also possess the ability to admin-
ister the large investments which have been placed in his 
hands, in such a manner as to make them produce their maxi-
mum return to the company, while pacifying the demands of 
labor, the public, and the stockholders. He must be able 
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not only to make correct decisions, but to put them into 
force at precisely the right time. 
His hobbies, his interests, his health, and even 
his family must come second to the demands of the corpora-
tion, which is his problem and his alone. He must be 
willing to gamble his reputation, his education, and his 
compensation on the sole fact that he can successfully 
manage his corporation in a manner satisfactory to all 
involved. 
Finally, the top executive must be able to take a 
problem which no one else can or wishes .to handle, try his 
best to see the ramif2cations involved if certain lines of 
action were to be taken, peer into the future and try to 
establish what is best for the company, and then make the 
decision which he will be willing to stand by and defend in 
the face of any and all attacks. And he must be able to do 
this in a fairly consistent manner.~nd come up with favor-
able results. 
The actual evaluation of a particular top execu-
tive -is, of course, a difficult thing to measure. It is not 
impossible, but it is difficult. Many systems of evaluation 
have been devised for· this purpose. Some of them seem to 
require so much upkeep and computation that one may doubt 
their value. However, several are of adequate simplicity 
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and yet retain enough of the important factors necessary to 
make them v.aluable as measuring devices. 
In the top executive field, as in all other areas 
of hL@an activity, we find that there are those who are not 
11 earnin~ their keep 11 • They ride along on the wake of pros-
perity or luck, shirking the undesirable duties of their 
jobs and hoping to maintain their status by back-slapping 
and handshaking those who are over them in command. In 
order to make the individual corporation and the executive 
field in general a more productive and efficient group, 
these imitators must be weeded out. This is the job of 
everyone, but particularly of top management itself. 
B. Being 11Fair 11 in Executive Compensation 
What is 11 fair 11 compensation for an executive? This 
is a problem which has bothered corporations and their execu-
tives ever since the corporation became an important form of 
business organization. The directors of the corporation must 
decide (with the stockholders' approval) how much their 
executives' services are worth • . The fairness of their deci-
sions is then scrutinized by the stockholders, the public, 
labor, the courts, and the executives themselves. If the 
compensation is set too low the company may lose its valuable 
top men, and, with them, the company's chances for success. 
If it is set too high, stockholders, labor, etc., will 
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condemn such action violently. Fairness, then, must be seen 
through many sets of eyes, each looking at it a little differ-
ently. 
The lack of organized executive salary control pro-
grams appears to be the major cause of internal and external 
inequities in executive compensation. Without an effective 
plan which takes into consideration the going market rate, 
individual executive effectiveness, and company profits in 
general, the executive compensation system of a company may 
soon become valueless as an indicator of true executive 
worth. 
Job evaluation systems of different types may be 
extremely helpful in determining the value of a particular 
executive in an organization. However, unless su~h systems 
. I 
are constantly maintained and consistently employed in judg-
ing the worth of the executives, they soon will lose their 
effectiveness and become merely another cost to the company. 
The great variations between companies and indus-
tries in their executive compensation practices is the 
result of many factors. Competitiveness and the importance 
of individual decisions rank high in any list of such 
factors. This is readily understandable, since when a 
person takes a larger risk, he ordinarily expects a higher 
return than those who follow less risky pathways. This is 
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true in practically all phases of human activity; so is it 
true in executive compensation. Of course, other immeasur-
able factors, such as historical customs, attitude of the 
top man and the degree of widespread ownership of the com-
pany's stock, also effect; in varying amounts, the execu-
tive compensation plans of comp~nies and account · for a 
large share of the differences between their systems. 
In the area of incentive compensation, we find 
varying opinions as to its worth in top executive compen-
sation. Some argue that it motivates such men to give more 
of themselves in their day-to-day work. There is, rio doubt, 
a degree of truth in this claim, but to use ·the argument that 
the paying of incentive compensation in itself attracts more 
capable executives to a company and, hence, increases the 
profits of the company, appears to be stretching the facts 
of the case, for it is also true that companies which pay 
incentive compensation also generally pay more in total com-
pensation to their executives. It would seem that this is 
what attracts the more capable executives and not t he mere 
fact that the additional compensation is in the form of an 
incentive payment. 
In setting _up an executive compensation plan, it 
appears logical that the management should first seek out 
the objectives of the plan and then determine how closely 
the plan meets thes~ total objectives. If there are 
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conflicts with fundamental objectives or with public or 
stockholder relations, management should consider redesigning 
the plan. 
Federal taxation and inflation in the Uni t ed States 
during the past seventeen years have drastically cut the pur-
chasing power of executive compensation after taxes. To a 
certain degree, this may have been justified. However, no 
one with any knowledge of executive compensation would claim 
that there are not dangers in such an extreme shift of total 
income distribution. How it will affect our supply of top 
executives in the future years iSi of course, the big 
question mark. But that it has already caused many capable 
men to slow down in their efforts to reach the top is cer-
tainly not deniable. 
The establishment of alternative forms of execu-
tive compensation, then, is readily understandable. They fill 
a real need. What methods will prove to be acceptable in the 
future is more a question of prophecy than opinion, but in 
order for a plan to be satisfactory today, it must be revealed 
and understood by the stockholders, the public, and the execu-
tives; it must be carefully maintained; and it must be flex-
ible. Probably the~~ requirements will also hold true in 
future plans yet to be developed. 
Although the different forms of executive compen-
sation are certainly not arranged in this study in the order 
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in which they should be adopted by any particular company, 
it does seem logical that the three main areas of adoption 
should follow the order in which they are here presented; 
that is; current benefits, deferred benefits, .and the stock 
benefits. 
The current forms of compensation must necessarily 
come first in order to cover current living expenses of the 
executive. Deferred compensation, it would seem, should be 
next in order to provide the neoessary tax relief which 
executives in the high tax brackets require, as well as 
providing ways in which these executives can build up funds 
for later retirement years. The more complicated, and often 
resented by the stockholders, stock benefit plans, it would 
seem, should be last in line in the order of adoption in 
establishing an executive compensation plan. This does not 
mean that such plans are less advantageous or less desirable 
or are to be considered last resorts by a company, but 
merely that because of the intricacies involved in such 
plans and the stockholder resentment which such plans often 
arouse, it would seem, in many cases, to be to the company~s 
best interests to use alternative plans first. However, 
where stock plans do seem to best fill the needs and objec-
tives of a particular company, there appears to be no reason 
why these plans shou1d not be installed ahead of deferred 
plans. 
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C. Current Benefit Compensation 
It is certainly true that no one type of executive 
compensation plan is best for all companies. However, it 
seems to be equally true that all such plans must include 
some form of current benefits in them. 
Salaries, although .the most unsatisfactory form of 
executive compensation from a tax standpoint, do provide 
executives with a stable source of funds with which to meet 
personal living expenses. Salaries, also, are the easiest 
form of compensation to administer from the company's point 
of view. 
However, income tax laws have made further salary 
increases to already highly paid executives practically 
meaningless and quite uns~tisfactory as a .form of compen-
sation. 
Tax reimbursement plans are also quite impracti-
cable but for somewhat different reasons. First of all, 
they are extremely costly to the company -- in fact, so much 
so that stockholder disapproval alone has almost made such 
plans extinct. Secondly, it would be quite foolish for a 
company to use such an expensive executive compensation 
method as this when there are a myriad of· other far more 
advantageous executive pay methods available Finally, the 
uncertainty of future tax rates and executives dependency 
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status make such plans highly qangerous for the company 
using them, since it has no way of predicting the future 
costs of such plans. 
Although incentive bonus plans for executives have 
been increasing in number in recent years, this is not true 
of those plans which pay current benefits to their partici-
pants. T0e major growth has been in plans paying long-term 
deferred benefits on a profit-sharing basis and, to a much 
smaller degree, :_in plans paying benefits on the instalment 
basis over a number of future years, Particularly where 
such plans are. designed for top executives, the benefits, out 
of necessity, have been paid on a deferred basis, since 
current benefits would be as unsatisfactory as current salary 
in such cases. Also, even for lower echelon executives, com-
panies ·have found that b;y deferring the benefit payments, 
they acquire a valuable holding power over their executives 
and at no additional cost. 
Probably few companies, outside of those who have 
I 
actually installed executive incentive plans, realize the 
great amount of work which goes into the designing and 
installing of such a plan and, still further, the tremendous 
job which is involved in properly administering and main-
taining such a plan in order that the company realize the 
maximum benefits therefrom. 
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In an incentive plan designed to compensate execu-
tives according to their contributions, every important factor 
with which the executives work must be analyzed and evaluated 
in terms of its worth to the company. Yardsticks of measure-
ment must be established, and changes must be made quite fre-
quently in order to keep these plans up-to-date. 
In profit-sharing plans where the executives : share, 
often according to their salary relationships, less work may 
be involved, but the appropriate base to use for computation 
of the amount of bonue may still present a problem. Since 
sales or net income by themselves may have certain disadvan-
tages for use as the base, it seems that net income as a per-
centage of sales may be much more sa~isfactory, as this would 
tend to eliminate the sales which were unprofitable but were 
made merely to build up the sales or the net income figure. 
It would seem logical, tooi for the management of 
a company to impose limits on total bonus payments which can 
be received in one year. The bonus plan should not be set up 
in order to provide executives with unreasonably high incomes 
but, basically, to provide incentive for greater effort. 
Since unusually large increases are not anticipated under 
such a plan, nq participant should resent the limitations, 
and stockholders will be more likely to approve of a plan 
with such lim~tations. However, these limitations should be 
sufficiently high enough to encourage maximum effort by the 
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executives and should only tend to restrict bonus payments on 
huge windfall profits. Also, as the business grows, the 
directors of the company should have the power to raise such 
limits (unless they are on a percentage basis, in which case 
this would not be necessary). 
Stock bonuses, like current cash bonuses, seem to 
be subject to the same disadvantages, taxwise. For the top 
executives, stock bonuses are usually impracticable unless 
on a deferred basis. They may, however, be useful in the 
compensation of lower echelon executives if some way can be 
found to circumvent the problem of paying the taxes on such 
bonuses without having to dispose of the stock. Thus far, 
no generally satisfactory method has been devised. 
The area of fringe benefits as a form of executive 
compensation appears to be given entirely too little atten-
tion. It seems that there are a great many possibilities 
available here which too many companies overlook but which 
present relatively inexpensive, effective ways of increasing 
the total compensation of the top executive while, at the 
same time, easing his tax burden. The cost of fringe bene-
fits to the company, in terms of after-tax income to the 
executive, is comparat~yely low. 
Such fringe .:t:>enefits as group life and group health 
insurance for top executives Should come directly after 
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salaries, in the opinion of the author. They fil l a definite 
need of the executive and so so much more cheaply than the 
executive could himself. ·They serve as a powerful incentive 
through the indirect personal satisfaction which the execu-
tive receives, out of all proporti on to the cost to the 
company. 
Other fringe benefits are also. extremely satis-
factory both from the executive's point of view since it 
reduces his taxes, and from the company's point of view --
since it takes fewer dollars to provide the executive with 
benefits ·which would ordinarily cost much more if he paid 
for them himself. However, it appears that probably the one 
reason which causes most companie s to hesitate in expanding 
fringe benefits for their executives is the fear that rank-
and-file employees will demand similar privileges. 
D. Deferred Benefit Compensation Plans 
Although many persons condemn deferred benefit 
plans as being unethical, "gimmicks 11 , and paternalistic, it 
certainly seems that their legitimacy has been well estab-
lished by the courts. They have been satisfactorily 
installed in some of America's largest corporations where 
they have filled definite business needs, and they include, 
to some degree, practically every important type of execu-
tive compensation P-lan commoply in use except salaries. 
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What else then are we to consider in determining whether or 
not they are acceptable forms of executive compensation? 
Since top executives are gener~lly precluded by 
today's tax laws from sav1ng substantial retirement funds 
from current salaries, formal or i nformaLc'retirement plans 
for them appear to be quite necessary. 
Profit-sharing, of course, would seem to be the 
most satisfactory type of plan from the company's point of 
view, since it provides a highly flexible incentive method 
with no fixed charges; it is usually acceptable by stock-
holders if designed fairly; and it receives favorab l e tax 
treatment under today's income tax laws. The big drawback, 
however, is the tax provision which requires such a large 
percentage of the employees of the company to be included 
that the plan becomes an extremely costly one for the com-
pany, and even then, it does not provide substantial 
retirement funds for the top executives. 
Joint-capital trusts are somewhat more lenient in 
their requirements for favorable t ax treatment, bu t even 
so, they tend to fall short of being a highly satisfactory 
method of compensation for top executive personnel for 
reasons similar to t hose of the qualified pension __ trust. 
Annuities, too, have not proven to be a particu-
larly practical method of setting aside current ea rnings in 
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order to provide funds for the post-retirement years of top 
executives. The annuity is actually one of the least used 
methods for this purpose in the business world. 
Individual deferred pay agreements have emerged as 
one of the most practical methods of providing retirement 
funds for top executives. Even though current income cannot 
be converted into capital gai~s under this sy&tem, still, 
the deferring of current income until a period when total 
income will be considerably reduced and taxes thereby also 
reduced, has proven to be enough of a stimulus to make such 
an arrangement preferred over ·annui_ties or other deferred 
_pay plans. 
It has been stated that one of the disadvantages 
of the deferred pay contract is that, since certain forfeit-
able features must be included in such a plan, the actual 
receipt of future benefits by the executive is dependent upon 1 
the company's whims and the quality of his future services. 
It seems, however, that there is more to it than jus·t this, 
for if the company failed to fulfill its part of the bargain 
in a particular deferred pay agreement with an executive, it 
would probably find that the remaining executives in the 
company would begin to doubt the value of this or any other 
type of deferred pay plan which the company had made with 
them and might even begin to look around for positions with 
other companies who would be more liable to fulfill their 
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agreements with their executives. It is very doubtful that 
a company would ever be so foolish as to place itself in 
such an undesirable position. 
Deferred pay agreements, then, have become quite 
popular as a means of leveling out the income of a top execu-
tive over his lifetime. It has been found that most of the 
disadvantages of such plans can be avoided if the agreements 
are carefully worded when drawn up. 
Deferred pay agreements also provide the company 
with one of the best holding devices that exists in executive 
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compensation plans, for, in such a case as this, if the execu-
tive leaves the company early he loses all of his deferred 
benefits under the agreement. Likewise, the company· may rest 
assured that under such agreements the top executives will do 
only those things which are for the best long-term interests 
' 
of the company, since they have absolutely nothing to gain 
from short-term profits. 
The major disadvantage of all deferred pay arrange-
ments is that, since no immediate benefit can be seen from 
individual efforts, lack of incentive may result, and the 
deferred plans may begin to be taken for granted. This is 
particularly true of deferred profit-sharing and pension 
plans, although it is also a factor in annuities, deferred 
pay contracts, and other deferred pay plans. 
E. Stock Benefit Compensation Plans 
Many ·stock benefit plans seem to have been designed 
primarily to tak advantage of lower tax rates for executives. 
By turning income into capital gains the executives end up 
with a substantially larger portion of their total income. 
It appears that there is nothing ethically wrong with such 
plans as these and that they certainly have advantages for 
both the company an~ the executive. 
Some stock benefit plans may have been installed 
for other than tax reasons: to provide additional retire-
ment income, to hold key executives for a limited period, 
to conserve cash, or to provide a short-term incentive. All 
of these · appear to be valid reasons for such plans so long 
as they meet the company's objectives. 
It should be remembered that stock benefit plans, 
such as stock options and warrants, are only practicable in 
some companies, and even then it appears to be to the com-
pany ' s advantage to restrict distribution of such options or 
warrants only to the really top executives or those execu-
tives who occupy key positions in the firm. 
Unrestricted stock options are rarely used today 
since there are available much more satisfactory methods for 
deferring income which do not involve stock market risks . 
Also, the necessity of paying income tax on an amount equal 
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to the fair market value of the option at the time it is 
exercised presents a serious disadvantage to such options. 
The use of the restricted stock option is much 
more widespread, but even this presents tax problems, financ-
ing problems, and market risks which, it appears, should be 
limited to only the really top group of executives in a com-
pany. Here, the chance at large capital gains appears worth 
the risks and problems involved, since high tax brackets 
practically preclude any substantial increase in the present 
incomes of these men by any other method. 
One great danger with restricted stock options which 
has probably not been emphasized enough is that, although :.n 
the last six years they have provided very lucrative forms 
of gain for top executives, there is no reason to believe 
that this situation will hold true during the next six years. 
Although most people will agree, and it seems correctly so, 
that our economy is due for great growth in future years, this 
does not mean that the stock market will continue to rise at 
a steady, uninterrupted rate. A bad year or two, or a sudden 
decline in the market could easily wipe out all the paper 
profits that executives have accumulated in the past several 
years. And, of course, even if the market stays high execu-
tives may have a problem in t~ying to dispose of their stock 
interests in their companies and still not be forced to give 
up their positions~ since the main objectives of a stock 
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option plan, from the company's point of view, can only be 
realized if the executives buy and hold the stock. 
Restricted stock options provide companies with a 
way by which they can compensate their top executives at 
much less cost than with direct salary increases • . However, 
such plans are essentially a one-time ( but spread over a 
limited number of years) form of executive compensation 
rather than a continuing incentive to present and future 
, 
executives to encourage better and better performance. 
This is one of their most serious drawbacks. 
Stock warrants, if seems, much more closely fill 
the desires of the executives but less, those of the company. 
Warrants give the executive capital gains income with no 
investment, no need to buy company stock, and are virtually 
free from requirements to be fulfilled. However, the com-
pany gets little value from warrants except a relatively 
inexpensive form of compensation for its executives. 
Temporarily restricted stock appears to have some 
peculiar advantages which many companies might do well to 
investigate, since, in many instances, they would seem to be 
more suitable to the company ' s needs than either restricted 
stock options or warrants and yet they would be no more 
costly to the cqmpany. They do, however, still possess the 
financing problem which is inherent in all stock benefit 
plans except warrants. 
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Stock purchase plans, in general, seem to be the 
type of stock benefit plan which is more advantageous to the 
company than to the executive. They, above probably all 
other stock plans, encourage the executive to hold the stock 
after purchasing it. Such plans can also be used to include 
a larger share of the company's. executives than either 
restricted stock options or warrants. Stock purchase plans, 
on the other hand, seem to be less advantageous to the execu-
tives, since they result in higher taxes than stock options 
and provide less opportunity for large amounts of capital 
gain than with warrants. 
Both "management stock 11 plans and "bargain pur-
chases" of the one-time deal type are rather rarely used in 
executive compensation and appear to be practicable only in 
special situations. They may be used to fill the needs of 
these particular cases, but otherwise, they have little use 
as an executive compensation method. 
F. Combination Compensation Plans 
Many companies have found that no single plan, of 
the types previously discussed, will meet their objectives 
fully. The qualified pension plan permits the most effi-
cient method of capital accumulation and gives the company a 
current deduc~ion, but the nondiscrimination rule may restrict 
the size of the benefits which can be paid without entailing 
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ex cessive costs. The deferred compensation contract reduces 
the executive's taxes but is not inflation proof. The stock 
option affords inflation protection but entails risk of a 
market drop. Therefore, many companies have combined vari-
ous plans, or certain characteristics of diflferent plans, 
into a form which best suits thei r needs. This is a very 
commendable practice and shows the ingenuity which many 
managements possess in planning their companies' p;r-ograms. 
One combination plan can be developed, for in-
stance, which will accomplish the following:* 
• A qualified pension trust -- to get the most efficient 
accumulation of as much retirement income for execu-
tives as can be provided by a pension formula which 
the company can afford for a satisfactory segment of 
its rank-and-file employees • 
• A deferred compe'nsation contract to supplement the 
dollar benefits available under the qualified pension 
plan. 
• A stock option -- to give the executive equity 
participation and incentive as well as inflation 
protection. 
Likewise, a combination of the annual incentive 
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bonus and the stock option offers an intriguing possibility.** 
*4, p. 59. 
**70, pp. 44, 45. 
If, instead of paying a bonus in cash, a company were to make 
available stock options to its eligible executives, a great 
deal of incentive .would be provided. The principle of allo-
cating options according to individual efforts would be the 
first form of incentive. Then, if such options were made 
available each year, a continual form of stimulation for 
greater effort could be provided. Finally, the accumulation 
of the company's stock by its executives would mean addi-
tional effort to increase dividend payments by increasing net 
profits, and, at the same time, would tend to bring about a 
more stable market price for the stock, eliminating a good 
deal of the usual fear of a slump in the stock market price. 
An example of such an arrangement was when a large 
oil company recently offered its executives their choice of 
a cash bonus or an 85 per cent-of-market stock option in the 
amount of one-fifteenth of the cash bonus. Thus, it an 
executive's bonus was $150,000, he could choose instead 
10,000 shares of stock optioned at the market price.* 
The top executives of the Ford Motor Company also 
share in a combination compensation plan. Those executives 
earning between $100,000 and $200,000 receive in addition to 
salaries, bonuses, deferred bonuses and stock options, com-
pany contributions to a retirement plan which starts paying 
*70, p. 45. 
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after age 65 and runs as high as $74,900 annually.* ' For 
Ford executives, this adds up to an important pay package 
in a complicated way. Behind the complication is two 
reasons: high taxes, and a fervent company desire to keep 
its management team together. 
North American Aviation is another company which 
uses a combination plan.**· It utilizes a pension plan in 
part. It has signed deferred compensation contracts with 
two of its top executives -- the board chairman and the 
president. The first is to receive $125,000 a year cur-
rently and $2,500 a month for life after retirement, with 
$1,000 a month going to his widow in case of his death. 
1he other man -- the president, draws $85,000 a year cur-
rently, gets $1,500 a month after retirement, and his wife 
will get $750 a month for life in case of his death. Both 
officers also come under the pension plan covering salaried 
employees of the company. Their contracts provide, however, 
that deferred compensation due them under the contracts must 
be reduced by the amounts which they receive under the pen-
sion plan. 
Thus, we see that considerable variations may 
result in the de.signing of the entire program of top execu-
tive compensation within any particular company. The only 
*39, p. 41. 
**4, p. 60. 
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r ule which need govern such plans is that they fulfill the 
objectives of the company for which they were designed; for 
then, and only then, can it be said that such plans are good 
ones. There is no better meaS1lre of executive compensation 
plans. 
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